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Abstract 
 
Many cognitive resources contribute towards the appraisal of stressors. 
Of these, self-efficacy (SE) is widely acknowledged to play a significant 
role in protecting adolescents from the effects of stress (Bandura, 
1997). This study investigated that relationship through the use of a 
quasi-experimental methodology (Cook & Campbell, 1979) utilising an 
untreated Control group of 44 adolescent, female participants and an 
Experimental group of 70 additional participants, all of whom were 
volunteers drawn from the Sixth Form of a single participating school. 
The members of both participant groups took part in two rounds of 
testing, between which the members of the Experimental group were 
exposed to a significant academic stressor (one or more public A-level 
examinations). During both test phases, all participants completed the 10-
item Perceived Stress Scale self-report (Cohen & Williamson, 1988), the 
Examination Self-Efficacy Scale instrument (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 
1995) and a bespoke Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998) 
designed to measure implicit stressor appraisal. Significant trends were 
identified by means of ANCOVA, correlation and regression analyses, and 
the resulting data were interpreted in terms of a dual process model of 
stress (Compas, 2004). Results not only concurred with those of previous 
studies (e.g. Betoret, 2006; Vaezi & Fallah, 2011) by demonstrating a 
strongly negative correlation between acute academic stress and 
academic SE, but provided new evidence to suggest that the ‘protective’ 
effect of SE occurs via a buffering mechanism at the level of 
preconscious stressor appraisals (Bargh, 1990), which limits the effect of 
acute stress exposure on preconscious stressor appraisals (e.g. Luecken & 
Appelhans, 2005). 
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Buffering Preconscious Stressor Appraisal: the Protective 
Role of Self-Efficacy 
 
Chapter 1: Background 
 
The vast majority of contemporary theories of stress stem from the 
pioneering work of Walter Cannon, whose ground-breaking research in the 
early years of the last century established that emotionally salient 
stimuli were capable of eliciting change in physiological systems. From 
these initial publications a substantial and diverse field of research has 
blossomed, which contributes many thousands of papers every year – 
enough to more than fill the twenty or so journals which cater specifically 
for the subject. Given the exponential interest that Cannon’s initial 
investigations engendered, it would be tempting to assume that stress 
was a modern phenomenon, perhaps borne from an increasing culture of 
individualism and ever-increasing expectation (Eckersley & Dear, 2002), 
or from the mounting zeitgeist of materialism (Twenge et al., 2010). 
However, although references to stress do disappear from the academic 
record before the mid-1920s, this is simply a consequence of etymology1: 
in fact, history documents ancient incidences of stress: “in the Talmud 
and the Bible, we read that families have been affected by the events of 
change, trouble, disaster and ambiguity since the beginning of recorded 
time” (Boss, 1987, cited in Weber, 2011, pg696). Stress, therefore, is 
anything but new, despite its relatively recent emergence onto the 
academic stage. 
 
                                                
1 Stemming originally from the Latin word stringere – to draw tight - Walter Cannon 
first applied the word ‘stress’ to a physiological context in 1926. 
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Whilst it is tempting to dismiss such claims as alarmist, or a product of a 
deepening understanding of an expanding field of research; nevertheless, 
a growing number of authors now assert that stress is, rather like 
obesity, very much a growing problem internationally, particularly for 
young people (Zimmer-Gembeck & Skinner, 2008).  
 
“In recent years there have been major increases in stress-related disorders in 
young people, including suicides, substances abuse, depression, anxiety and eating 
disorders… Such patterns have emerged world-wide and represent a challenge to 
policy-makers, service providers and families alike” (McNamara, 2000, pgxv - 
introduction). 
 
The evidence substantiating such statements is significant: for example, 
comparisons of self-reports taken in 1950 and 1990 reveal a rise in 
anxiety levels of approximately one standard deviation. In fact, “anxiety 
is so high now that normal samples of children from the 1980s outscore 
psychiatric populations from the 1950s” (Twenge, 2000, pg1018). 
Similarly, young people score about a standard deviation higher on clinical 
scales of psychopathology than their grandparents did at the same age, 
which includes a five-fold increase in the number of adolescents scoring 
above the thresholds for psychopathological diagnosis (Twenge et al., 
2010). In a similar way, the PSS10 instrument I introduce later in this 
study displays a clear two-point increase in normative stress scores 
between 1983 and 2006, with further rises recorded in the last three 
years (Cohen & Janicki-Deverts, 2012). Although, like Wainwright and 
Calnan (2000), I resist the metaphor of a ‘stress epidemic’ (Claxon, 
2008), it is indubitable that stress has become a national concern, 
particularly for young people, for whom approximately one quarter will 
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experience a significant life stressor during their formative adolescent 
years (Zimmer-Gembeck & Skinner, 2008) and as many as one student in 
two will experience symptoms of stress whilst they are at school 
(Chamberlain et al, 2011). It is against this disquieting backdrop that the 
rationale for this study is contextualised: if my ultimate aspiration for 
stress research is to facilitate the ‘inoculation’ (Howard et al., 1975) of 
adolescents against this ‘epidemic’, it is critical first to establish a 
comprehensive understanding of the pathogenesis of stress, so that 
programmes of intervention can be both informed and strategically 
structured to avert stress in young people before it becomes chronic. 
 
At this point personal experience develops some relevance: having taught 
in British independent schools for the last decade, I have not only 
witnessed first-hand the harmful effects of stress, but also observed 
(happily and intriguingly) a number of students who, despite considerable 
academic pressure and/or unfortunate personal circumstances, did not 
develop stress. This baffling observation served not only as an emotive 
catalyst in prompting me to try to understand the sequence of events, or 
phenomena, that appeared to have protected those students from stress, 
but it also encapsulated the inceptive experience that inspired this study. 
 
Undoubtedly many factors lie behind the genesis of stress – far too many 
to review here. However, amongst the numerous schema, models, 
hypotheses and suggestions, I have come to believe that efficacy 
theories offer the most potential to develop the next steps in stress 
research; both in terms of explaining the ‘anti-stress’ effect I described 
earlier, but also for the advancement of pedagogy, policy and practice 
that could successfully reduce the intensifying occurrence, and the 
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pathological consequences, of stress in young people. Simply put, our 
efficacy beliefs, or sense of self-efficacy, are the “measure of 
confidence or conviction that one can successfully execute the behaviour 
required to produce an outcome” (Bandura, 1977, pg79). I withold 
advancing here the evidence emphasising the important role self-efficacy 
(SE) plays in protecting adolescents from stressors – that comes later – 
however, I will point out that the popular media is replete with examples 
of the positive effects of SE in high stress scenarios. Athletes, for 
example, often ascribe their success to their belief in themselves - “some 
people say that I have an attitude; maybe I do. But I think that you have 
to: you have to believe in yourself when no one else does, that makes you 
a winner right there” (Venus Williams, cited in ITF, 2013, pg3). Similarly, 
after successfully scaling Everest in 1953, Edmund Hillary famously 
quipped that “it is not the mountain we conquer, but ourselves” (Hillary, 
cited in DeVyre, 2002, pg1), alluding both to the mental challenge of 
climbing the world’s tallest mountain, but also to the most significant 
resource that enabled him to achieve this feat – his belief in his ability to 
do it. In other words, Hillary clearly understood that, whilst SE “does not 
necessarily ensure success…, self-disbelief assuredly spawns failure” 
(Bandura, 1997, pg77). Indeed, the seminal work of Albert Bandura, in 
collating over fifty years of research at the end of the last century, 
(virtually single-handedly) succeeded in replicating experimentally exactly 
this scenario – whilst people with high SE appear to be protected from 
the effects of stressors, people with low SE are anything but. His 
research led assuredly to the conclusion that; 
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“Students’ beliefs about their efficacy to manage academic task demands… 
influence them emotionally by decreasing their stress, anxiety, and depression” 
(Zimmerman, 2000 – original emphasis, pg82).  
 
Bandura’s assertion about the protective nature of SE in overcoming 
stress is, like stress itself, not really anything new. For example, in Book 
V of the Aeneid, Virgil chronicles the triumph of Cloanthus – one of 
Aeneas’s captains – in a boat race to mark the first anniversary of 
Anchises’s death. Virgil describes Cloanthus’s victory with the phrase 
‘possunt, quia posse videntur’, which translated literally means “they can, 
because they think they can” (Eden, 1993, pg168). Whilst this is, 
effectively, the same point that Bandura was making 2000 years later; 
what separates Bandura’s eminent work from Virgil’s social observation is; 
a) the weight of evidence Bandura collated, which more than fills the six 
books he published on the subject, b) his use of post-positivist 
epistemology to demonstrate a causal link between SE and stress and, c) 
his commitment towards the development of a model of social cognition, 
which could both explain, and then predict, the effect. In essence these 
degrees of separation form the grounding principles that shape the 
foundation of this research. Following Bandura, I too have chosen to 
explore the stress-reducing effect of SE within the post-positivist 
ontology: not only does this make available methodologies that seek to 
demonstrate causality between experimental variables (Shadish et al., 
2002), but also, through the ontological axiom of objective, critical 
realism (Guba & Lincoln, 1994), such methodologies seek to accumulate 
knowledge of the world through the principle of generality. As I stated 
earlier, one of the guiding motivations behind this work is a desire to 
contribute, albeit in a very small way, towards the development of a 
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national curriculum that incorporates a focus on stress resistance, or 
anti-stress training. Without external validity, the conclusions of this 
study cannot be applied to such aims; which, simply in itself, warrants the 
choice of a post-positivist approach. A further consideration of following 
a Bandurian perspective is that a great deal of his formative research 
was conducted within an educational context. Given this, and the implicit 
objectives of the study, I made two key decisions early in the inception 
of this project;  
 
1) To pursue an EdD (as opposed to a PhD), and thus to develop a 
significantly greater focus on the context of my research.  
 
2) To prioritise the ecological validity of my research.  
 
A necessary consequence of these decisions was that the methodological 
rigor of the study was, to a degree, impinged in some areas (most 
particularly when forced to choose between an experimental or a quasi-
experimental methodology). However, in keeping with Bandura’s earlier 
work, the outweighing benefit of preserving ecological validity was that 
the study maintained a realistic, natural research milieu which, I argue 
later, lends considerably to the generality of my conclusions and, 
therefore, to my over-arching ambition of completing a rigorous research 
project that adds significantly to the pursuit of reducing stress in 
adolescents. 
 
Where the study differs from Bandura’s prior work is part c) – the 
development of a model. Commitment notwithstanding, a fundamental 
vergence between this study and that of previous research is that I have 
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focused entirely on the events that occur in the first few seconds of 
exposure to an academic stressor. Effectively, this precludes a coping-
based approach as, although I have no doubt that coping has a very 
significant role to play in the genesis of stress (e.g. Folkman, 1984; 
Dweck, 1999), I believe that recent breakthroughs in the study of 
psychopathologies such as addiction, anxiety and depression, have 
considerable scope to inform our understanding of stress. Therefore, I 
adopt a dual process perspective in this study (e.g. Compas, 2004) and 
examine the extent to which SE appears to protect adolescents from 
stress by exerting an effect on stressor appraisals, particularly those 
appraisals that occur preconsciously (Bargh, 1990; Bargh et al. 1993), To 
disclose any further details here would detract from the bearing of the 
study; however, as a final comment I wish to add that, if anything, the 
work that went into completing this project has served thoroughly to 
reinforce my conviction that, “among the types of thoughts that affect 
action, none is more central or pervasive than people's efficacy 
judgments” (Bandura, 1997, pg21), particularly in our response to 
stressors.  
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Chapter 2: Stress 
 
For adults, a large body of research documents the serious negative 
impact of chronic stress on health, including the development of cancers 
(Adler, 1994; Antonova et al., 2011), predisposition to cardiovascular 
diseases (Kivimaki et al., 2006) including myocardial infarction (Rosengren 
et al., 1991), coronary atherosclerosis (Hollis et al., 1990) and stroke 
(Harmsen et al., 1990), depression (Kessler, 1997; Kopp et al., 2007), 
anxiety disorders (Stanford et al., 1993), infectious disease (Glaser et al., 
1987; Stone et al., 1987), pregnancy complications (Pagel et al., 1990) and 
a number of other serious illnesses (Herbert & Cohen, 1993). In 
adolescents, the “exorbitant toll exacted from students by stressors” 
(Matheny et al., 1993, pg109) is also well documented and chronic stress 
has been strongly linked with poor academic performance (Barker, 1987), 
depression (McLaughlin & Hatzenbuehler, 2009) and may well contribute 
to violence and truancy (Fremont, 1993).  
 
More worryingly, however, are the results from nation-wide studies, 
which document not only a rising incidence of stress-related self-harming 
in young people (Truth Hurts, 2005 – which showed that at least one child 
in fifteen self-harms, giving the UK the highest incidence of adolescent 
self-harming in Europe), but also that a growing number of school-aged 
children (approximately a million in the UK last year - National Centre for 
Health and Statistics, 2012) seriously consider taking their lives because 
of stress. This figure directly correlates with the rising incidence of 
teenage suicide (National Centre for Health and Statistics, 2012), which 
is now the third largest cause of death in young people (National Centre 
for Health and Statistics, 2012). Again, these studies have implicated a 
 9
causal role for stress, as high stress scores in self-assessment 
questionnaires are predictive of teenage suicide (Schneider, 2004; Green, 
1984), particularly for adolescents exposed to academic sources of stress 
(Ang & Huan, 2006a; Nelson & Crawford, 1990;). Indeed, the recent 
observation that, globally, teenage suicide rates show a good degree of 
correlation with the timing of public examinations (Toero et al, 2001) - 
especially in cultures where examinations are perceived to be particularly 
stressful (Sue & Okazaki, 1990) – has led campaigners for young people’s 
health to denounce stress as the “children’s epidemic of the twenty-first 
century” (Claxon, 2008, pg192). Nationally, this voice is growing stronger 
as more evidence accumulates to substantiate the link between ill health, 
psychopathology and the ‘mounting anxiety’ and ‘intolerable academic 
pressure’ (Hough, 2011) increasingly suffered by adolescents at school 
(Twenge, 2000). 
 
Unfortunately, however, the association between stress and mortality is 
not simply limited to suicide, as many studies have revealed other 
potential indirect links between stress and morbidity. For example, stress 
generated from natural disasters has been linked not only in an increase 
in the incidence of suicide (Krug et al, 1998), but also an elevated 
frequency of mental illnesses (Rubonis & Bickman, 19912), including 
depression (Ollendick & Hoffmann, 1982; Siegel & Brown, 1988), anxiety 
(Gjerde, 1995), insomnia (Maida et al, 1989) and symptomatology for a 
range of other ‘internalising’ pathologies (Compas et al, 1989) and 
affective disorders (Leadbeater et al, 1995). Additionally, exposure to 
stressors has also been found to correlate with various ‘externalising’ 
problems such as delinquency and aggression (Baer et al, 1987; Rutter, 
                                                
2 Although see Bravo et al, 1990, who argues that these effects are pre-existing. 
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19903) as well as an elevated rate of substance abuse and domestic 
violence (Shore et al, 1986). However, compounding these effects is the 
wealth of data supporting a direct and causal relationship between stress 
and early death. For example, Leor and colleagues observed an increase in 
the number of cases of sudden cardiac death in response to an 
earthquake (Leor et al, 2003), whilst Li’s research group observed an 
increase in mortality rate in family members who had suffered the death 
of a child (Li et al, 20034). Similarly, Eitinger (1973) found a strongly 
increased mortality rate in Norwegian concentration camp survivors, 
which he attributed to the effects of chronic stress exposure. Whilst it 
is easy to criticise such studies on the grounds that they rely on 
retrospective analyses, or employ small sample sizes5, recent large-scale 
national and international prospective studies have conclusively 
established that stress does indeed decrease life span, particularly for 
males (Nielsen et al, 2008). This effect is likely to occur either through 
decreased immune functioning (Segerstrom & Miller, 2004; Kiecolt-Glaser 
et al, 1991) resulting in increased healing time (Kiecolt-Glaser et al, 1995) 
and greater susceptibility to disease (Kiecolt-Glaser et al, 1996), or 
through specific stress-induced pathologies, amongst which 
cardiovascular disease (Ohlin et al, 2004; Iso et al, 2002; Eaker et al, 
2004), stroke (Rosengren et al, 2004), cancer (Ferraro & Nuriddin, 2006) 
and accelerated senescence (Epel et al, 2004) are specifically implicated. 
All of these conditions are aggravated by, but not limited to, stress-
                                                
3 These ‘externalising’ effects are significantly more pronounced in boys. By contrast, 
girls exhibit greater ‘internalising’ conditions (Compas et al, 2001). 
4 It should be noted that this study has been criticised on the grounds of statistical 
validity as eight of the twelve analyses of mortality described in this study were not 
statistically significant (Rogers & Reich, 1988). Other studies have also failed to 
observe the same effect (e.g. Levav et al, 1988). 
5 It is also worth noting that some studies with similarly small sample sizes have not 
found a link between stress and morbidity (e.g. Singer et al, 1976; Rasul et al, 2004). 
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induced changes in lifestyle, including the reduction in uptake of 
preventative behaviours (Schulz et al, 1997), increased smoking (Cohen et 
al, 1993), missing sleep and elevated consumption of alcohol (Cohen & 
Williamson, 1988). 
 
Collectively, the implications of these studies are significant: although 
psychopathologies frequently reveal an augmented prevalence in 
adolescence naturally (Cohen et al, 1993; Dekovic et al, 2004 - and 
particularly for affective disorders Steinhausen et al, 1998), stress is 
known to amplify the effect markedly and, consequentially, many of these 
conditions also show strong co-morbidity with stressor exposure 
(Seiffge-Krenke, 2000). The supposition, therefore, is clear: “stress… 
constitutes a significant and pervasive risk factor for psychopathology in 
childhood and in adolescence” (Compas et al, 2001, pg87).  
 
This disquieting conclusion is exacerbated by the observation that young 
people frequently experience stress at school (Compas, 1987; Currie et al, 
2004) which, in the UK, may affect as many as one student in two 
(Chamberlain et al, 2011). Other surveys report even higher incidences of 
adolescent stress: Lohaus (1990), for example, interviewed 342 pupils in a 
range of secondary schools and found that 72% of the children 
interviewed had experienced significant academic stress within the 
previous month (either as situations related to school work, or stress 
related to other performance-oriented contexts) – a statistic that was 
further increased through additional stress experienced as a 
consequence of social problems, rather than from exposure to academic 
stressors. Reports indicate that, although many adolescents experience 
specific stressful events at school (Ng et al, 2003), repeated exposure to 
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minor stressors is a more significant predictor of psychopathological 
state (Siegel & Brown, 1988), rather than the occurrence of significant 
negative life events (Siegel & Brown, 1988; Seiffge-Krenke, 2000). These 
‘minor stressors’ cover a considerable range of events and include both 
academic (Kohn & Frazer, 1986) and social (Sgan-Cohen & Lowental, 1988) 
stimuli. However, most studies conclude that, whilst social stressors have 
a significant effect on the health of adolescents, the pressure to achieve 
academically (Hirsch & Ellis, 1996) and, particularly, the significance of 
strong performance in examinations (Lakshmi, 2009) constitute the most 
salient stressors experienced by adolescents (Burnett & Fanshawe, 1997; 
Shah et al, 2009). Clearly, then, understanding (and then preventing) the 
mechanisms by which academic stressors engender stress in adolescents 
is of great importance, not only for the health and well-being of young 
people, but also to avert what the Chairman of the American Psychological 
Society has recently described as “our next public health crisis” 
(Anderson, 2010, pg17). 
 
What is stress? 
 
Stress is, in fact, pretty difficult to define and, consequentially, a large 
and varied range of descriptions and characterisations of stress exist in 
the literature. Butler (1993) deals with this problem by advocating 
thinking about stress in three different ways. She argues that stress can 
be encapsulated in terms of stimulus overload and draws the example of 
the collapse of a load-bearing beam. Stress, therefore, is a condition 
elicited by the combined ‘pressure’ of stressors – stimuli or events, which 
elicit the stress. Whilst it is important to make clear the distinction 
between stress and stressors, the notion of stress as a unidimensional 
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state - i.e. being ‘stressed’ or ‘not stressed / normal’ (Duffy, 1962) - is 
very unsatisfactory, chiefly because it omits any consideration of the 
uniquely subjective nature of stress (Lazarus, 1999; McEwen, 2007). 
Therefore, I move onto Butler’s second model of stress, which views 
stress as a variable, adaptive response to stressors.  
 
Based on the seminal work of Hans Selye, response-based theories tend 
to view stress in terms of “the nonspecific response of the body to any 
demand made upon it” (Selye, 1974, pg32). Current theories focus on 
endocrine responses to stressors6, particularly activation of the HPA and 
SAM axes, resulting in increased glucocorticoid and catecholamine 
secretion (see Schlotz [2008] for a review of these endocrine responses). 
Within this definition of stress, such hormones (and most particularly 
cortisol) mediate adaptive metabolic responses such as gluconeogenesis 
and glycogenolysis, which are collectively categorised as the acute 
response to stressors (McEwen, 2004). These acute allostatic responses 
are purported to protect against the impact of the stressor (although, 
under some circumstances, they are also acknowledged to have damaging 
effects on the body too - McEwen, 2005). By contrast, acute stress can 
be differentiated temporally and physiologically from chronic stress, 
which is defined in terms of maladaptive allostatic loading (McEwen, 2004 
– see later), and tends to occur if exposure to the stressor is prolonged. 
 
In support of response-based theories, perceived stress is reliably 
correlated with elevated cortisol levels (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; 
                                                
6 Traditionally, one of the most significant limitations of response-based theories of 
stress as they tend not to recognise, or under-represent, psychological or cognitive 
influences on stress. 
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although see Kirschbaum et al., 1999 who argue that it is not) and many 
stress-related diseases (e.g. Burke et al., 2005) are associated with 
elevated or abnormal glucocorticoid secretion. Thus, in response-based 
terms, stress may be defined as a physiological reaction to a stressor, 
and is now commonly viewed in terms of allostatic load (McEwen, 1998). 
Allostasis refers to the physiological mechanisms that maintain 
homeostasis7 (Romero et al., 2009) and allostatic load (AL) is the 
physiological cost of allostasis - i.e. the “cumulative result of an allostatic 
state” (McEwen & Wingfield, 2003, pg4) or;  
 
“The wear and tear on the body and brain resulting from chronic over-activity or 
inactivity of [allostatic] physiological systems that are normally involved in 
adaptation to environmental challenge” (McEwen, 1998, pg37).  
 
McEwen and Wingfield (2003) recognise two different groups of AL; 
Type I, which occurs when the energy required for allostasis exceeds 
that available from the environment, and Type II, which occurs when 
sustained activity of allostatic mechanisms produces maladaptive or 
pathological side-effects. McEwen (2000; 2007; see also Goldstein & 
Kopin, 2007) presents Type II AL as a model for stress, arguing that 
prolonged, inadequate, unbalanced8 or repetitive activation of allostatic 
systems causes chronic stress and stress-related illness. 
 
                                                
7 Homeostasis refers to the physiological parameters (such as blood glucose 
concentration, or the degree of haemoglobin O2-saturation) that must be held constant 
in order to sustain life (McEwen, 2000). 
8 McEwen (2000) proposes that an inadequate response in one system leads to 
compensatory hyperactivity in other allostatic systems, which is what causes the 
damage. 
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McEwen’s proposal for AL as a mechanism for stress is well supported by 
experimental evidence, the most significant of which is the McArthur 
Study on Successful Ageing – a longitudinal study of 1189 high-
functioning, healthy women aged 70 – 79. Starting in 1997, participants 
were interviewed each year and, using data from psychometric 
assessments, anthropometric protocols, blood and urine samples, AL was 
calculated quantitatively using data from a combination of primary 
endocrine mediators and secondary outcomes (e.g. blood pressure, hip-to-
waist ratio etc). The study found that AL strongly predicted mortality 
(Seeman et al., 2001), was closely negatively correlated with cognitive and 
physical functioning (Steward, 2006) and exhibited independent 
explanatory power over and above a measure of doctor-diagnosed disease 
(Seeman et al., 2004), thus collectively implying a causal link between AL, 
mortality and disease. Similar conclusions were drawn by Goldman and 
colleagues (Goldman et al., 2006), who reported close correlations 
between AL and poor mental and physical functioning in a prospective 
study of morbidity in middle-aged Taiwanese people. Crimmins has also 
observed the same effect in the USA across a wider age bracket (20 – 
50), which remained statistically significant even after age and gender 
had been controlled for (Crimmins et al., 2006). Others reliably replicate 
the McArthur study, leading to the suggestion that the correlation 
between biomarkers of AL and mortality may be causal (Gruenewald et al., 
2006; Karlamangla et al., 2002). Taken together, these studies provide 
persuasive evidence in support of response-based, physiological models of 
stress, most particularly as they have been found to be excellent 
predictors for the onset of stress-related disease. 
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That said, there are a number of limitations with response-based models. 
Firstly, they tend to focus heavily on glucocorticoid activity, ignoring the 
conclusions of researchers like Taylor (2006), whose work strongly 
implicates other hormones as mediators of stress9. Secondly, they place a 
good deal of emphasis on energy budgets in the development of stress-
induced pathology (Romero et al., 2009) and evidence linking cortisol with 
increased energy expenditure is conflicting (Remage-Healey & Romero, 
2001; Cyr et al., 2008). Thirdly, they fail to differentiate between 
specific stressors, and thus view all threats to homeostasis as stressor 
stimuli of equal valence (Day, 2005), which is clearly not the case, for 
example, for a glucose load after a heavy meal and a close encounter with 
a runaway bus! Finally, as with condition-based models of stress, 
response-based models also leave restricted scope to account for the 
oft-reported subjectivity of stress, as it is well-known that people 
respond to stressors in very different ways (Lazarus, 1991; 1999), even 
when the stressors they experience are identical (e.g. see Williams et al., 
2011). Therefore, although response-based models such as AL have 
contributed significantly to our understanding of the genesis of stress-
related disease, I posit that they do not offer sufficient explanatory 
potential to account for the individualistic nature of stress. Therefore, I 
move onto Butler’s (1993) third and final group of definitions, which view 
stress as a dynamic relational process (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  
 
According to this view, “stress is more than a physiological response to 
environmental demands: it is based on personal perception and 
individuality” (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, pg19), which may explain both the 
individualistic experience of stress (Cooper & Bright, 2001) and the wide 
                                                
9 Taylor’s (2006) Tend and Befriend hypothesis centres on oxytocin in stress. 
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variation in responses that occur when different people are exposed to 
the same stressor (Williams et al., 2011). Research in this field began 
through studies with war veterans, whose widely varying experiences of 
stress in combat (Lazarus & Erikson, 1952) led Richard Lazarus to the 
joint conclusions that, 1) stress is experienced very subjectively and, 
therefore, 2) that stress originates in the cognitive interpretation of 
stressors – a process he referred to as appraisal (Lazarus, 2001; 1999; 
1993 see also Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). 
Developed in the late 1960s, Lazarus’s Cognitive Mediational theory 
(Lazarus, 1966; 1968) evolved to view stress as a subordinate component 
of emotion (Lazarus 1993; 1999; 2001 see also Smith & Kirby, 2011) – 
“psychological stress should be considered part of a larger topic, the 
emotions” (Lazarus, 1993a, pg10). In this view, stress exists within a 
“part-whole relationship” with affect (Lazarus, 1999, pg37), leading to its 
definition in functional terms as an affective process, or an emotion. 
Thus, so the argument goes, as an emotion stress serves the adaptive 
function of “mobilis[ing] the organism to deal quickly with important 
interpersonal encounters” (Ekman, 1992, pg171) and, therefore, acts as; 
 
“The interface between an organism and its environment mediating between 
constantly changing situations and events and the individual’s behavioural 
responses” (Scherer, 1982, pg556).  
 
In support of considering stress in affective terms, I suggest three 
unique advantages of this position over the other approaches outlined 
earlier; 1) it may begin to explain the subjective nature of stress which, 
as I asserted above, both condition- and response-based definitions do 
not adequately account for; 2) it reinforces (and may even predict) the 
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success cognitive intervention programs have achieved in limiting the 
stress experienced by adolescents at school (Hampel, Meier & Kummel, 
2008; Mori & Uchida, 2009; Frydenberg, 2004; Kraag et al., 2006; 
Lohaus, 2011)10; and 3) it promotes the conception of stress from a 
functional standpoint, rather than a physiological end-point, which is 
arguably more useful from a pragmatic, pedagogical or clinical 
perspective. Apropos, in functional terms, emotions are; 
 
“Unique experientially-valenced ‘state spaces’ that help organisms make cognitive 
choices - e.g., to find food when hungry, water when thirsty, warmth when cold, 
and companionship when lonely or lusty...: they [emotions] provide intrinsic values - 
organic ‘pressures’ and ‘drives’ for the guidance of behaviour” (Panksepp, 2003, 
pg6).  
 
Therefore, to view stress as an emotion (as I advocate) one should expect 
to see evidence of adaptive stress-induced changes in cognition and 
behaviour. Fortunately, such evidence is plentiful! However, before 
substantiating my assertion that stress is an emotion, I first wish to 
outline briefly what I mean by ‘emotion’. 
 
What are emotions? 
 
Defining stress as an emotion leads immediately to the problem of 
establishing a definition for emotion. This is no easy task as a plethora of 
different descriptions and characterisations exist in the literature: for 
                                                
10 Adopting an emotional definition of stress also allows considerably more scope for the 
development of further intervention programs such as those cited here, thus shifting 
the emphasis in stress-prevention away from drug treatment (which tends to be the 
outcome of physiological response-based models like AL) and towards vastly more 
practical (and, arguably, more successful) pedagogic interventions. 
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example, Kleinginna and Kleinginna (1981) identify nearly one hundred 
different definitions of emotion and that number has certainly risen over 
the three decades that have passed since they published their study. 
This issue is further complicated by the use of ambiguous terms such as 
‘mood’, ‘disposition’ or ‘feeling’ (Scherer, 2000) which are employed very 
differently by different authors, often to mean a temporary 
predisposition to emotion, or to a low intensity emotion (Oatley & 
Johnson-Laird, 1987), but even this is inconsistent across the literature! 
However, despite these difficulties, I have managed to draw together 
commonalities from the field that have helped me to bring together a 
working definition (Frijda, 1986) of ‘emotion’11. Therefore, I posit that 
emotions; 
 
1. Are manifested within the brain (Davidson et al., 2009; LeDoux & 
Phelps, 2008; LeDoux, 1998; Rolls, 1999; Lane et al., 1998; 
Panksepp, 1991; 1998),12,13 either via emergent constructivist 
processes (Barret, 2009; Lindquist et al., 2012) or through the 
activity of bespoke anatomical structures (Panksepp & Watt, 2011; 
Ekman & Cordaro, 2011) or networks (Izard, 2011). 
 
2. Are neurocognitive states (Ekman, 1992; Frijda et al, 1991) or 
processes (Scherer, 1982) which alter behaviour and cognition 
                                                
11 See Reisenzein’s (2007) commentary on the notion of nominal vs real definitions in 
research. 
12 Bottom-up somatovisceral feedback undoubtedly has a pronounced effect on emotion 
(Cacioppo et al., 2000; Larsen et al., 2008). However, I do not accept the James-Lange 
view of independent visceral emotions; instead I posit that somatovisceral information 
biases or sets the tone of higher level substrates (Berntson, Sarter & Cacioppo, 2003) 
and thus does not generate emotion per se. 
13 By defining emotions as having neurobiological origins, I dismiss social constructionist 
theories of emotion (e.g. Mesquita’s [2010] theories of social context or Harré’s [1986] 
and Averill’s [1980] constructionist model). 
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adaptively (Pinker, 1997; Panksepp, 2003) to optimise intrapersonal 
functioning (Levenson, 1999; Keltner & Gross, 1999) 
 
3. Are not single modalities, but rather consist of multiple ‘coherent 
clusters of components’ (Silva, 2006), which include physiological 
regulation, motor expression and subjective feeling14 (Scherer, 
1993) and may also include motivation and cognition (Moors, 2009; 
Scherer, 2000). 
 
4. Are episodic (Scherer, 2000) and can be characterised by an 
abrupt onset, which fades away over time (Frijda et al., 1991; 
Ekman, 1992). 
 
5. Are triggered by internal or external stimuli or events that are of 
major significance to the organism (Frijda, 2008). These stimuli 
are identified as such through appraisal processes, which include 
cognitive appraisal mechanisms (Lazarus, 1991; 1999; Frijda, 1986; 
1987; Roseman, 1991; Smith and Ellsworth, 1987) and preconscious 
processes (Zajonc, 2000; 2001; LeDoux, 1998, LeDoux & Phelps, 
2008) in a multi-level appraisal system (Dahaene et al., 2006). 
 
Beyond these five points of agreement a very diverse range of definitions 
and models of emotion exists - certainly far too many to review here.  My 
view is that emotions are best considered from a multi-level perspective 
(Robinson, 1998), in which; 
  
                                                
14 The reaction triad of emotion (Scherer, 2000). 
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“Emotion is the product of an interaction between simple, non-conscious, automatic 
processes and deliberate, conscious and controlled processes” (Ochsner & Barrett, 
2001, pg39).  
 
This view depicts emotions as either a two- (Levenson, 1999) or three-
tier (Panksepp & Watt, 2011) hierarchical neurobiological system, with an 
underlying and largely automatic15 core processor of basic emotions 
(Panksepp 1998; Ekman & Cordaro, 2011) which initiate (or part-comprise) 
adaptive states of ‘action readiness’ (Frijda & Parrott, 2011), or ‘modes of 
adaptation’ allowing people to adapt efficiently to changing environmental 
demands (Levenson, 1994). Panksepp (1998; 2001) identifies seven such 
universal (Ekman, 1992) and evolutionarily-primitive (Panksepp, 2005) 
basic emotions in the core system (seeking, rage, fear, lust, care, panic 
and play), which he views as subcortical and, therefore, largely automatic. 
Evidence from neuroimaging meta-analyses largely supports the existence 
of these basic emotional systems (Denton, 2006; Vytal & Hamann, 2010; 
see also Murphy et al., 2003; Phan et al. 2002), which is further 
corroborated by Mobbs and his colleagues (Mobbs et al., 2007), who 
observed a clear graded shift in emotional brain activity from ‘higher 
emotion’ in cortical centres to ‘basic emotion’ in subcortical areas in 
response to increasing threat (a ‘virtual predator’ in a VR maze). This is 
comparable with evidence from animal brain imaging studies (Logothetis 
et al., 1999) and positive and negative reinforcement animal learning 
paradigms (Dawkins, 2006) which, in conjunction with other research on 
animal emotions (Griffin & Speck, 2004; Beshkar, 2008), provides 
                                                
15 I define automatic processes as those that are conducted unconsciously and without 
direct cognitive attention or intention (Bargh, 1994; see also Koole & Rothermun, 2011). 
It should be noted that this definition does not mean that automatic processes are 
hard-wired or inflexible, quite the opposite, in fact (see later section on preconscious 
appraisals)! 
 22
persuasive evidence to support the existence of the evolutionarily-
conserved basic emotion system Panksepp (1998) advocates16. Although 
these basic programmes are largely conceived to be automatic (Levenson, 
2011), it has been suggested (e.g. Ekman, 1984) that input from higher 
cortical systems adaptively modulates these core programmes and, when 
combined with evidence of subconscious associative and operant learning 
within the core emotions (e.g. LeDoux’s [1998] work on fear conditioning 
in the amygdala or Öhman’s [1993] studies on anxiety in humans17), the 
conclusion I propose is that significant malleability occurs within these 
‘core’ neurobiological affective systems.  
 
In tandem with these core emotions, I support the existence of;  
 
“A more recently evolved, highly flexible, and much less predictable set of control 
mechanisms that are designed to influence the actions of the core system” 
(Levenson, 1999, pg483).  
 
Numerous evidence from animal electrophysiology experiments (Rolls, 
1999) and neuroimaging studies (Damasio, 1994) implicates specific 
neocortical areas18 in the regulation of higher emotion – a finding reliably 
corroborated by patients with cortical lesions, who have been found to 
display emotional deficits but, crucially, do not appear to suffer complete 
loss of affective reaction (Damasio, 1994; see also Berridge, 2009). Thus, 
I advance that a very wide range of cognitive processes may contribute 
towards emotion by channelling their collective effect into the regulation 
                                                
16 It is also worth highlighting that evidence also exists supporting the evolutionary 
phylogeny of these systems (see, for example, Cabanac, 1999). 
17 See also Panksepp (2001) for associative learning in other core command systems. 
18 Particularly the left and right PFC and ACC. 
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of a finite number of core subcortical emotional systems, which are 
thought to generate the underlying affective state (Panksepp, 1998). 
According to this view, higher cortical systems, therefore, regulate the 
underlying core emotions (Davidson et al., 2000; Berkman & Lieberman, 
2009) as well as generating affective states directly. This regulation is 
believed to be important, not only because it may elicit significantly 
greater flexibility in the control of affect, but also because - as I explain 
later in this Chapter - it is one of the significant points of congruence 
with stress research. Before looking at the (sizeable) cross-over that 
exists between stress research and theories of emotion, I wish briefly to 
outline what I mean by emotion regulation before looking at the evidence 
that supports my assertion that stress is best considered in functional 
terms as an affective process. 
 
Emotion Regulation 
 
Emotion regulation “involves the initiation of new, or the alteration of 
ongoing, emotional responses through the action of regulatory processes” 
(Ochsner & Gross, 2005, pg242). These processes can be roughly divided 
into two separate groups: conscious emotion regulation and automatic 
emotion regulation (AER).  
 
Conscious emotion regulation processes are often separated into 
antecedent-focused strategies, which, “occur before appraisals give rise 
to full-blown emotional response tendencies” (Gross & Thompson, 2006, 
pg12) and response-focused strategies, which are defined as occurring 
after the responses are generated (Gross, 1999; 2001). Antecedent-
focused strategies are known to be capable of decreasing the experience 
 24
of negative emotion with little physiological arousal or impact on memory 
(Ochsner & Gross, 2005) and have been further characterised into four 
sub-groups; situation selection, situation modification, attentional 
deployment and cognitive change. Of these, the first two strategies are 
usually couched in terms of the regulation of emotion via deliberately 
absenting (or exposing) oneself to places and situations with known 
associations with specific emotive stimuli, thereby deliberately activating 
(or seeking to avoid) specific affective states. In a similar way 
attentional deployment is defined as purposely distracting oneself from 
(Stifter & Moyer, 1991) or explicitly concentrating on (Wegner & Bargh, 
1997) a specific stimulus - in effect “an internal version of situation 
selection” (Gross & Thompson, 2006, pg16). Cognitive change is subtly 
different, it has been described as;  
 
“Changing how one appraises the situation one is in so as to alter its emotional 
significance, either by changing how one thinks about the situation, or [changing 
how one thinks] about one’s capacity to manage the demands it poses” (Ochsner & 
Gross, 2008, pg154).  
 
To date, three categories of cognitive change have been identified;  
 
1) Stimulus reappraisal (Ochsner, 2007), in which a stimulus is cognitively 
transformed so as to alter its emotional impact (Gross, 1998a). Evidence 
suggests that this occurs via a top-down route to ‘tone up’ or ‘tone down’ 
the emotional significance of a stimulus in order to re-represent the 
meaning of that stimulus in a goal-congruent way (Ochsner, 2007). 
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2) Cognitive repression of affect (Gross, 2002), which is purported to 
play an adaptive role by deliberately reducing a negative emotion 
(Ochsner, 2007). However, this potentially important aspect of response-
focused emotional regulation may also come at some psychological cost 
(Goldin et al., 2008) and has been implicated with maladaptive 
psychological and physical functioning in the long term (Abelson et al., 
2005). 
 
3) The controlled generation of emotion, including the anticipatory 
elicitation of emotion in expectation of pain (Hsieh et al., 1999; Ploghaus 
et al., 1999) and in scenarios when memory leads to the negative appraisal 
of a normally neutral stimulus (Ochsner & Gross, 2005). Both examples 
reinforce the view that, not only does the cognitive interpretation of the 
stimulus appear to be critical in determining affect, but also (particularly 
in the case of Ochsner and Gross’s [2005] study) that the effect is most 
likely mediated through top-down inhibition, or activation of subcortical 
systems. Both of these scenarios support a model of emotion in which 
affect arises from the interaction of top-down regulatory processes 
(including appraisals and reappraisals) on underlying subcortical systems 
(Ochsner & Barrett, 2001; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; 2008; Ochsner, 2007; 
Barrett et al., 2007; Gross & Thompson, 2006; Gross & Barrett, 2011).  
 
Automatic emotion regulation systems appear to exhibit significant 
plasticity (e.g. Öhman & Soares, 1998) and much evidence supports their 
modulation by top-down conscious processes (e.g. Kunde et al., 2003; 
Kentridge et al., 2004; Dahaene et al., 2006) - i.e. as described in the 
previous section, conscious processing and/or prior experience seem 
capable of altering the way emotive stimuli are appraised preconsciously. 
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However, it has recently been suggested that modulation may also run in 
the opposite direction too. In other words, preconscious systems could 
well influence the functioning of neocortical emotional centres (Ferguson 
et al., 2005). Over the last decade research in this area has expanded 
dramatically and the field of implicit, or automatic emotion regulation 
(AER - see Mauss et al., 2007; Gyurek et al., 2011) is the result.  
 
AER can be defined as processes; 
 
“That operate without the need for conscious supervision or explicit intentions, 
and which are aimed at modifying the quality, intensity, or duration of an emotional 
response. Implicit emotion regulation can thus be instigated even when people do 
not realise that they are engaging in any form of emotion regulation and when 
people have no conscious intention of regulating their emotions” (Koole & 
Rothermund, 2011, pg390).  
 
A wide body of research has implicated processes which automatically 
regulate attention (such as attentional tunnelling [for a review see Staal, 
2004] or the positivity effect [Isaacowitz et al., 2006]) as playing a 
significant role in AER. As such processes “resolve emotions before they 
are fully triggered” (Mauss et al., 2007 – original emphasis, pg149), they 
are often referred to as antecedent-focused AER, with a similar 
semantic (Gross, 2001) and functional (Mauss et al., 2007) emphasis to 
conscious regulatory strategies. Although response-focused AER systems 
have also been identified (i.e. the regulation of behaviour and affective 
state “after the emotional response has been triggered” [Mauss et al., 
2007, pg154], which include cognitive engagement, cognitive 
disengagement and behavioural regulation), the majority of research into 
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AER has tended to focus primarily on antecedent-strategies because of 
their potential to promote adaptive behaviour and cognition. 
 
For example, many researchers (e.g. Custers & Aarts, 2005; Bargh & 
Gollwitzer, 1994; see also Bargh & Williams, 2007) have found that 
explicit performance goals can be activated and executed without 
conscious volition or awareness. Bargh, for example (Bargh et al., 2001), 
used an implicit priming methodology to prime participants subliminally 
with cooperative goals on a problem-solving task. When performance on 
the task was measured Bargh found that, not only did primed participants 
out-perform control groups, but that they did so by cooperating with 
each other. Crucially, the adoption of cooperative goals occurred without 
the participants’ explicit knowledge that they had acted in that way – i.e. 
they were unable to explain accurately why they had performed well. 
Bargh concluded that unconscious goal pursuit had occurred and, 
therefore, that, under some circumstances, preconscious systems may 
have access to mental representations of ‘desired outcomes’ – i.e. goals. 
Koole and Rothermond (2011) go further and suggest not only that 
preconscious processes have access to goal-related memory, but that 
they are capable of eliciting goal-targeted behaviour without conscious 
awareness. They propose a preconscious stimulus reappraisal process 
similar to cognitive reappraisal to explain the phenomenon of unconscious 
goal pursuit. In this view; 
 
“People are not aware of any strategic attempts to create the reappraisal, [and 
thus]… people may easily perceive it as a true picture of the given situation. 
Reappraisals resulting from automatic processes and biases may thus have a much 
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higher chance to change personal beliefs and resulting emotions” (Koole & 
Rothermond, 2011, pg392). 
 
A similar view is held by Silvia Bunge, who cites repressive coping as an 
example of automatic stimulus reappraisal (Mauss et al., 2007). Bunge 
asserts that automatically re-evaluating a negative emotive stimulus as 
being less stressful than it would normally be appraised, plays a 
significant adaptive role in helping people recover from exposure to 
serious life stressors, such as the death of a spouse (Bonanno, 2005). The 
implication being that the preconscious reappraisal processes that are 
believed to mediate repressive coping serve to protect the individual by 
diminishing (or, possibly extinguishing completely) the valence of the 
emotive stimulus, thereby reducing the degree of activation of the 
ensuing affective state. As I shall explain, this suggestion not only 
sketches out a very powerful role for cognitive resources (such as coping 
strategies) in preventing the development of chronic affective state (and 
thus, potentially, psychopathology), but it also draws tantalising links 
between the study of emotion regulation and stress research by placing 
AER and coping within the same functional bracket. As I asserted earlier, 
I believe that the connection between emotion and stress Bunge alludes 
to in repressive coping stems from their equivalence as affective 
processes and, in the following section, I set out the evidence that 
reinforces my position. 
 
Evidence that stress is an emotion 
 
1. Evidence from neuroimaging studies reliably identifies activity in 
identical brain areas during emotion regulation tasks and during episodes 
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of psychosocial stress (e.g. see Wang & Saudinio, 2011). For example, in a 
public speaking task Tillfors and colleagues (Tillfors et al., 2002) 
observed significant increases to cerebral blood flow in the prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) - neocortical areas 
specifically implicated in the regulation of emotion (Ochsner et al., 2002; 
Davidson, 2003). Similar patterns of activity were detected in other 
stress-related tasks, such as Stroop tests (Gianros et al., 2005) and 
combined stress tasks (Kern et al., 2008). By itself, this evidence is 
inconclusive as stress is commonly associated with negative emotional 
states (Shina, 2001) and, more recently, has been found to accompany 
positive emotions as well (Folkman, 2008). Therefore, whilst neuroimaging 
studies do support my assertion that stress is an emotion, the activity of 
brain emotion regulation systems during stress could be explained 
separately in terms of regulating stress-induced positive or negative 
emotions. 
 
2. Evidence from studies on animals with cortical lesions clearly 
identifies a role for the neocortical areas that regulate emotion19 in 
activating the physiological stress response (Feldman & Conforti, 1975), 
possibly via a neurological ‘stress circuit’ (Cerquiera et al., 2008)20. 
Activation of this circuit appears to be highly stimulus-specific (Amat et 
al., 2005; Spencer et al., 2004), implying that the cognitive appraisal of 
stressors most likely makes use of similar neocortical circuitry that 
appraises other emotion-generating stimuli. Such a conclusion is further 
                                                
19 In this case, specifically the medial PFC. 
20 Interestingly, the stress circuit appears to be able to differentiate between intrinsic 
‘systemic’ stressors (which activate the HPA axis automatically) and ‘processive’ 
stressors, which require appraisal by neocortical areas before HPA activation (Herman & 
Cullinan, 1997). 
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supported by neuroimaging studies, which implicate the PFC and ACC in 
cognitive appraisal of stressors (Johnson et al., 2002), even when 
selective attention to stimuli was controlled for (Kalish et al., 2006).  
 
3. Studies employing people with neocortical damage further support an 
overlap between stress and emotion, as studies investigating the impact 
of neocortical damage report not only attenuated stress in patients with 
such lesions (Diorio et al., 1993; Buchanan et al., 2010) but also disturbed 
emotion regulation (Bechara et al., 1994; Anderson et al., 2006) as well. 
 
4. Studies highlighting the effects of stress on cognition imply that, as 
an emotion, the stress process may be able to modulate cognition 
adaptively to optimise intrapersonal functioning21. For example, it is 
reliably observed that experience of stress results in increased attention 
to stressors (Bradley et al., 1998; Compton et al., 200322) in a manner 
that selects attention towards specific stimuli known experientially to 
have high stress valence (MacLeod et al., 2002). This seems also to 
produce dramatic improvements in the memory of stressors (e.g. 
Bohannon’s [1998] work on flashbulb memories after the Challenger 
shuttle disaster, or Cahill’s [Cahill et al., 1994] demonstration that 
enhanced memory of emotional events is attenuated by drug-induced 
blockade of stress hormones), which mirrors effects on memory reported 
with other emotions (e.g. see Roozendaal et al., 2009). This memory-
enhancing effect is posited to occur biphasically (i.e. an initial positive 
                                                
21 The notion of stress as a positive functional process is not new as eustress was a 
central feature of Selye’s (1974) original GAS theory. However, the concept of eustress 
seems to have fallen out of favour somewhat and has only recently become a focus of 
investigation. 
22 A processes Compton and colleagues (Compton et al., 2003) refer to as hypervigilance. 
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effect, followed by attenuation and negative outcome if the stressor 
exposure is chronic) via the differing long-term effects of 
glucocorticoids on both glucocorticoid receptors and mineralocorticoid23 
receptors in the brain (Ron de Kloet et al., 1999) – a theory which also 
accounts for why most research so far has tended to find only negative 
effects of stress on cognition (e.g. Kim & Yoon, 1998; Kirschbaum et al., 
1996), particularly as animal (and particularly human) research 
methodologies tend not to examine the differing temporal effects of 
glucocorticoids in separate brain areas across two very different 
receptor systems. 
 
Intriguingly, it may be that chronic or traumatic stress may also hold 
adaptive value. A recent body of research has begun to emerge 
documenting the phenomenon of post-traumatic growth (PTG - see 
Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004), in which “an individual experiences positive 
psychological change (above pre-stress levels) as a result of the struggle 
with trauma or any extremely stressful event” (Jackson, 2007, pg2). This 
effect appears to manifest as an increased appreciation of life, enhanced 
sense of new possibilities in life, increased personal strength, 
improvement in close personal relationships and positive spiritual change 
(Tedeschi, Park & Calhoun, 1998). At the moment there is no clear 
consensus on the underlying cause of PTG (or, indeed, whether it is 
artefactual or a de facto phenomenon in its own right) but, if authentic, 
PTG provides compelling evidence for the adaptive role of stress and, 
therefore, very much supports my definition of stress as an emotion with 
adaptive function (Keltner & Gross, 1999).  
                                                
23 Which are much less frequently distributed, but have approximately ten times more 
affinity for cortisol (Ron de Kloet, 1991). 
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5. The early development of the cortisol response in infancy also 
supports my view that stress is best viewed as an emotion. Although it is 
arguably inappropriate to use the term ‘stress’ (as perceived by an adult) 
as applied to infants, there is clear evidence that HPA regulation and 
cortisol response to stressors becomes established within the first year 
of a baby’s life (Gunnar & Donzella, 2002) and that successful attachment 
with a primary caregiver plays an important part in this process (Gunnar 
et al., 1996). The establishment of HPA responsiveness and diurnal 
cortisol rhythm constitutes a crucial developmental stage through which 
normal regulation of the HPA axis is established (Graham et al., 1999) and 
the adaptive stress process becomes activated. This is essential, not only 
for enabling infants to experience stress (which, as I have argued earlier, 
exerts adaptive functionality), but it also proves critical in establishing 
normal affective regulation in later life (Hammen et al., 1992) and 
evidence is mounting to support a role for early HPA activity in avoiding 
pathological states such as depression in later life (Browne & Finkelhor, 
1986). Therefore, for a normally-attached infant, early experience of 
controlled stress (e.g. brief separation from the primary caregiver) 
seems to serve a particularly important role in normal emotional and 
psychological development. The central tenet of the Differential 
Emotions Theory (DET – Izard, 1978; 1991; Izard et al., 1995) is that;  
 
“Emotions retain their adaptive and motivational functions across the lifespan, 
[but] different sets of emotions become relatively more prominent in the 
different stages of life as they serve stage-related developmental processes” 
(Abe & Izard, 1999, pg523).  
 
 33
Thus, in regulating the development of the HPA axis (and, potentially, 
later mental health), the infant stress process plays out precisely the 
kind of stage-related developmental function posited by DET. Thus I 
assert that, in regard to its significance developmentally, stress is 
functionally homogenous to the other emotions in DET and, therefore, 
ought to be viewed with equivalence as an affective process.  
 
6. Demonstrating the universal nature of stress would also serve to 
defend my definition of stress as an emotion, because basic emotions are 
common across all humans (Ekman, 1992; Panksepp, 2005). Thus it follows 
that, as functional state with equivalence to affect, stress should also be 
present in people from different cultures and countries around the globe. 
However, in practice this is very difficult to demonstrate as cross-
cultural studies in stress research are confounded conceptually in three 
key areas (Laungani, 1996); 1) many cultures lack an appropriate 
vocabulary equivalent for stress that captures the same meaning as the 
Western notion of stress24, 2) the conceptual schema in which stress is 
defined tend to be very pro-Western, 3) instruments for measuring 
stress tend to be of Western design and, as “psychometric tests reflect 
the underlying values of the culture in which they were constructed… 
they are cultural products” (Laungani, 2002, pg141), their employment in 
cross-cultural studies tends to invalidate any conclusions such a study 
would put forward. However, despite these (significant) limitations, work 
in the study of culturally-specific trauma in India does support the notion 
that stress is a universal process (Laungani, 2002), even in collectivist 
cultures. Less rigorous studies (using Western instruments) also support 
this notion as equivalent stress concepts have been documented in 
                                                
24 This is particularly true for cultures where collectivism is valued over individualism.  
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Mexican (Mirowski & Ross, 1984), Chinese (Dyal & Chan, 1985), Korean 
(Klassen, 2010), Greek (Georgas & Giakoumaki, 1988), Russian (Poltavski & 
Ferraro, 2003) and Jordanian cultures (Hattar-Pollara & Dawani, 2006). 
Additionally, stress has also been identified across many different 
cultures through meta-analyses of well-being (e.g. Fischer & Boer [2011] 
who identify stress in studies across 63 different countries). Thus I 
posit that stress is universal and, therefore, that it demonstrance 
concordance with my definition of emotion. 
 
7. Stress follows the same temporal profile as other emotions. As 
stated above, emotions are frequently characterised as having an abrupt 
onset, which fades away over time (Frijda et al., 1991; Ekman, 1992). This 
is also true for acute stress, as brief stressor exposure elicits immediate 
activation of adrenal chromaffin cells via the SAM axis, resulting in 
dramatic elevation of catecholamine release above tonic levels and also 
the release of a host of other circulatory neuropeptides as well (Fulop et 
al., 2005). Whilst catecholamine secretion produces an immediate 
adaptive effect (e.g. increasing heart rate), activation of the HPA axis 
and other adrenomedullary neuroendocrine systems allow for physiological 
responses to be graded, subtle and ‘primitively specific’ (Goldstein, 2010) 
- i.e. by varying patterns of neuroendocrine activity (Goldstein, 2003) 
even the immediate, automatic response to stressors can be stimulus-
specific and capable of adapting physiology to support the cognitive 
responses to the stressor – precisely the same role as that conceived for 
the emotions. 
 
8. Studies on animal welfare often show that animals experience 
phenomena similar to human stress. This can seen in experiments using 
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stressor-induced physiological biomarkers of stress (e.g. see Borell et al., 
2007), or through endocrine responses to stressor-exposure (Mormède 
et al., 2007). As animals also suffer from similar stress-related diseases 
to humans (Blokhuis et al., 1998), some authors have suggested that the 
term ‘welfare’ ought to be reconceived in terms of AL and stress (Korte 
et al., 2007). Therefore, at least in response-based terms, it seems likely 
that animals experience stress on par with humans. 
 
However, research from other studies suggests that animals also 
experience basic emotions like fear (Forkman et al., 2007; see also 
Panksepp, 2005), which are conceived to hold similar adaptive value to 
that of human emotions (Fraser & Duncan, 1998) and, most researchers 
agree, are initiated as a consequence of basic cognitive appraisal25 (e.g. 
Ursin & Erikson, 2004). This has led some authors to advocate an affect-
based definition of welfare (Dawkins. 1980; Duncan. 1993). According to 
this view, animal stress overlaps considerably with animal emotion and, I 
therefore argue, can be considered as one and the same. 
 
9. A final source of evidence for considering stress as an emotion is that 
“both literatures prominently share the common theoretical framework 
of appraisal theory” (Smith & Kirby, 2011, pg195). Appraisals form one of 
the major reoccurring themes across models of affect. Most theories 
tend to divide appraisals into those that are cognitive and those that are 
preconscious, or automatic. Although some theories do not view appraisal 
as the eliciting mechanism of emotion (e.g. Russell’s [2003] Core Affect 
Theory); nevertheless, the significant majority of theories of emotion do 
                                                
25Which, according to Erikson, is a phylogenic faculty germane to all vertebrates 
(Erikson et al., 2005). 
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include a role for the emotion-antecedent processing of stimuli at some 
level (Smith & Kirby, 2000; Scherer, 2009; Roseman, 1996; Lazarus, 
1999), be it cognitive, automatic or multi-level (Moors, 2009)26. 
 
Cognitive Appraisals are difficult to define and their exact nature is very 
much open to discussion (e.g. Ellsworth & Smith, 1988). For example, 
Lazarus views cognitive appraisals as “the process of categorising an 
encounter, and its various facets, with respect to its significance for 
well-being” (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, pg31), which is very similar to 
Scherer’s definition, where appraisals are seen as “the evaluation of the 
relevance of environmental stimuli or events for the organism’s needs” 
(Scherer, 1982, pg556). Thus both definitions see the key factor in 
cognitive appraisal as the perceived relationship between the individual 
and his or her environment. Although this view has been criticised (e.g. 
Manstead and Fischer [2001], who argue that cognitive appraisal must 
consider social context; or Parkinson [2001], who believes environmental 
context is important in the appraisal process) the majority of structural 
models of cognitive appraisal (e.g. Lazarus, 1991; Roseman 1984; Scherer 
2009; Smith & Ellsworth 1985; Smith & Lazarus 1990; see also Scherer, 
1988; Schorr, 2001) are in common agreement that cognitive appraisals 
constitute; 
 
“Some sort of evaluation of how important or relevant the stimulus situation is to 
the person, whether it is desirable or undesirable, [and] whether, and to what 
                                                
26 Because of this consensus, I spend no time discussing process-based psychological 
models of emotion that do not consider appraisal from a multi-level perspective (e.g. 
Duffy’s [1962] Theory of General Activation, or Schachter’s [Schachter & Singer, 1962] 
Two-Factor Theory). 
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degree, the person is able to cope with the situation” (Smith & Kirby, 2001, 
pg197).  
 
Most authors (see Barrett et al., 2007) also agree that cognitive 
appraisals should be considered as an on-going27 or continuous ‘hot’ 
process28 that focuses on personal well-being (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) 
and occurs largely outside of our awareness (Kappas, 2001). In this view, 
cognitive appraisals can either generate emotion directly, or serve (via 
top-down input) to regulate pre-existing activity in underlying basic 
emotional circuits “like a set of switches which, when configured in 
certain patterns, trigger [subcortical] biologically basic emotional 
responses” (Gross & Barrett, 2011, pg10; see also Gross & Thompson, 
2007).  
 
A wide body of evidence supports the assertion that emotions are related 
to patterns of cognitive appraisal. For example, Smith and Ellsworth 
(1985) asked participants to recall past emotional events and, using 
structured interviews, they identified six common cognitive categories of 
appraisal across participants (pleasantness, anticipated effort, certainty, 
attentional activity, self-other responsibility/control, and situational 
control). This finding has also been replicated by others (Shaver et al., 
1987; Roseman, 1991; Smith et al., 1993; Smith & Lazarus, 1993a; 
Scherer, 1997; Kuppens et al., 2003; Tong et al., 2007; see also Lazarus, 
                                                
27 The exact sequence of cognitive appraisal varies with different theories. Some 
advocate a flexible order of appraisals (Lazarus, 1999), or a cyclical cycles process 
(Smith & Lazarus, 1993a). Others maintain that some appraisals (Ellsworth, 1991) or all 
(Scherer, 2001) occur in a fixed order. 
28 The ‘heat’ refers to emotion-generation, which functionally separates appraisals from 
‘cold’ factual or situational construals (Weiner, 1985), which provide the underlying 
knowledge required to support cognitive appraisals, but do not contribute in the 
generation of the emotion itself (Smith et al., 1993). 
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1991; Omdahl, 1995). Recent evidence from neuroimaging studies also 
implicates the role of cortical areas in appraisal. For example, Drevets 
and Raichle (1998) observed increases in blood flow to neocortical areas 
(specifically the PFC and ACC29) during cognitive emotional tasks. 
Similarly, Lane and colleagues (Lane et al., 1997a; 1997b) found increases 
in neocortical activity in PET scans when participants were shown 
positively- and negatively-valenced photographs. Other studies also 
advance cogent evidence for a cognitive cortical appraisal system capable 
of generating and regulating emotion in response to stimuli (Reiman et al., 
1997; Mobbs et al., 2007; see also Ochsner & Gross, 1998a). 
 
However, despite this supporting evidence (and general agreement) that 
cognitive appraisal processes are capable of eliciting emotion, progress 
establishing the precise nature of these appraisals has proven slow30 and 
the chief criticism of cognitive appraisal theories remains their lack of 
specificity31,32, either in terms of the precise cognitive neurological 
circuitry involved in appraisal (although see Ochsner & Barrett, 2001), or 
in terms of the individual dimensions of appraisal, which vary considerably 
from researcher to researcher (e.g., Roseman et al., 1990; 1996; Scherer, 
                                                
29 Although their study also showed decreases in flow to these areas when attentionally-
demanding tasks were employed. 
30 This is commonly ascribed to methodological limitations in assessing cognitive 
appraisal (Siemer et al., 2007). 
31 This causes two further difficulties for appraisal theory; 1) it makes appraisal theory 
very difficult to falsify and, 2) apparently similar appraisal patterns are capable of 
eliciting very different emotions in different individuals (Frijda & Zeelenberg, 2001). 
32 Further criticisms of appraisal theories are; 1) that most studies supporting cognitive 
appraisals use correlation analyses (Parkinson & Manstead, 1992; 1993) which, in addition 
to their failure to demonstrate causality, often fail to consider alternative explanations 
through their limited methodology (Reisenzein, 1995; Parkinson, 1997); 2) a large number 
of studies use recall of events, rather than studying the events themselves; 3) often, 
appraisals seem to be caused by emotions, rather than the other way around (Frijda, 
1993; Zillman, 1983; although see Roseman & Edvokas, 2004; Siemer et al., 2007; Smith 
& Kirby, 2009). 
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1997; Lazarus, 2001). Briefly, models of cognitive appraisal can be roughly 
divided into two groups; those who recognise a limited number of 
appraisal dimensions (e.g. Lazarus, 1994; Ellsworth, 1994; Scherer, 1997; 
see also Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003) and those who believe the number is, 
effectively, unlimited (Ortony et al., 1988). As described earlier, my view 
is that the neocortical areas that administrate the cognitive appraisal 
processes do so by regulating underlying basic emotion systems (Davidson 
et al., 2000; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; 2008). Therefore, whilst I recognise 
that a very wide range of cognitive processes may contribute towards 
appraisal, I conjecture that their collective effect is channelled into the 
regulation of a finite number of core subcortical emotional systems, 
which generate the affective state. 
 
Preconscious appraisals are frequently identified as playing a significant 
role in underpinning emotion (Ekman, 1999; LeDoux, 1998; Teasdale, 1999; 
Bargh & Williams, 2007) - “evidence to date strongly supports the notion 
that emotional significance is rapidly and preconsciously detected” 
(Compton, 2003, pg82). Contrasting conscious and involuntary appraisal 
systems, Mauss states that, whereas cognitive appraisal processes; 
 
“Require attentional resources, are volitional, and are driven by explicit goals..., 
automatic processing is initiated by the simple registration of sensory inputs, 
which in turn activate knowledge structures (schemas, scripts, or concepts) that 
then shape other psychological functions” (Mauss et al., 2007, pg148).  
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Beginning with Zajonc’s (1980; Murphy & Zajonc, 1983) early discovery 
that stimuli could elicit emotions automatically33, research has 
consistently reported that stimuli can not only be attended automatically, 
but that a significant degree of processing and evaluation may also take 
place preconsciously (Bargh, 1990; Bargh et al. 1993; 199634). If accurate, 
such processing is likely to be of significant adaptive advantage as, in 
theory, it facilitates rapid, parallel processing (Robinson, 1998) of a great 
deal of information (Kitayama, 1990) with little to no attentional 
resources (Schneider et al., 1984) and, because of its assumed adaptive 
value, preconscious appraisal may well prove to be be significantly larger 
in capacity than conscious processing (Öhman, 1994; Öhman et al., 1993). 
Accordingly, a number of theories of emotion include a role for 
preconscious appraisal (e.g. Clore & Ortony, 2000; Power & Dalgleish, 
1999; Smith & Kirby, 2001; Teasdale, 1999). 
 
Initially, the role of preconscious appraisal was viewed either as a 
stimulus valence-detection process (Robinson, 1998), or in terms of 
directing the focus of cognitive attention. This is because early research 
in this field found that patients with emotional disturbances tended to 
                                                
33 A process he ascribed to classical conditioning through repeated stimulus exposure 
(Zajonc, 2000; 2001), 
34 In general, experiments demonstrating preconscious evaluation of stimuli tend to make 
use of either the phenomena of affective priming (e.g. Fazio et al., 1986; De Houwer & 
Eelen, 1998; Winkielman et al., 1997) or of implicit association (Greenwald et al., 1998; 
Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). This latter technique has been used frequently to 
demonstrate preconscious racial prejudice (e.g. McConnell & Leibold, 2001) and other 
preconscious emotional appraisal processes (Mauss et al., 2006). These studies have 
been validated through the use of neuroimaging techniques, which have shown 
conclusively that these implicit association methodologies activate subcortical affective 
systems to conduct preconscious appraisals. For example, Phelps and colleagues (Phelps 
et al., 2000) used the implicit association paradigm to show that implicit tasks involving 
racial stereotyping are associated with amygdala activity. Similar observations have been 
made by others (e.g. Cunningham et al., 2003), who demonstrate that, whilst explicit 
(cognitive) appraisals are associated with PFC activity, implicit appraisals are not. 
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demonstrate an unconscious preference for information relevant to their 
conditions (Williams et al., 1996), and people with high trait anxiety often 
show an automatic bias towards information associated with their 
anxieties (Wells & Matthews, 1994). This led Kitayama (1990) to suggest 
that the primary function of preconscious appraisals is to act like an 
unconscious ‘spotlight’ to direct conscious attention towards high-valence 
stimuli. Work on the neural basis of fear has now conclusively 
demonstrated that one of the functions of preconscious appraisals is 
exactly that - to shift cognitive attention onto dangerous stimuli 
(LeDoux, 1998; LeDoux & Phelps, 2008) and evidence is growing to 
support the existence of similar preconscious mechanisms for the other 
basic emotions as well (e.g. Both’s work on automatic appraisal of sexual 
stimuli [Both et al., 2011]; see also research into the evaluation of social 
stimuli [Adolphs, 1998], contextual stimuli [LeDoux & Phelps, 2008], facial 
expression [Adolphs et al., 1999] and the modulation of long-term memory 
storage [McGaugh, 2004]). Thus, I advance that one on the primary 
functions of preconscious appraisals is to evaluate and encode stimulus 
valence (Bargh & Williams, 2007) and to direct cognitive attention 
selectively towards high-valence stimuli. 
 
In close alignment with theories of emotion, stress research also 
recognises the crucial role of stimulus appraisal; indeed, considerable 
experimental evidence supports this conclusion: Lazarus (1999), for 
example, details over forty separate studies (many of which have been 
replicated recently e.g. Compass et al., 2006; Yi et al., 2005) 
demonstrating the importance of appraisals in eliciting stress. This 
evincing research is further supported by evidence from physiological 
studies, which have repeatedly concluded that stressor appraisal 
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processes are associated with increases in glucocorticoid secretion (Ursin 
& Eriksen, 2004; Ursin, 1998; see also Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004) and 
cardiovascular arousal (Brownley et al., 2000) which, as a consequence of 
threat-type stressor appraisals, have been strongly implicated in the 
development of stress-related illnesses, including cardiovascular disease 
(Ohlin et al., 2004), depression (Kessler, 1997), anxiety disorders 
(Stanford et al., 1993) and accelerated ageing (O’Donovan et al., 2012). 
Thus, in tandem with emotion theory, I assert that appraisal processes 
also play a critical role in the generation of stress. 
 
Traditionally, theories pertaining to the evaluation of stressors have 
coalesced onto two different types of appraisal process; Primary and 
Secondary (Lazarus & Launier, 1978). Primary appraisals are defined as 
assessing whether “what is happening is relevant to one’s values, goal 
commitments, beliefs about self and world, and situational intents” 
(Lazarus, 1999, pg92) - i.e. an evaluation of “what is at stake in the 
encounter” (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, pg33) or, simply put, whether a 
stimulus is irrelevant, benign/positive or a potential stressor. By contrast, 
secondary appraisals determined whether a stressor was evaluated as 
harmful, threatening or a challenge (Lazarus & Launier, 1978) depending 
on whether the individual believed they had the resources to cope with 
the stimulus (in which case it was evaluated as ‘challenging’) or not (when 
it was appraised as a ‘threat’). However, these definitions have 
increasingly fallen out of use in recent years, chiefly because they 
appeared to define appraisals as exclusively ‘cognitive’ events (Zajonc 
2001; 1984). Without wishing to re-open the infamous Zajonc-Lazarus 
debate about the fundamental nature of the stressor appraisal process; 
most stress theorists, including Lazarus himself, now recognise that 
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appraisals can be automatic (Frijda, 1986; Smith & Kirby, 2001; see also 
Bargh et al., 2010) and, mirroring the appraisal of emotive stimuli, 
frequently occur preconsciously – i.e. entirely outside of conscious 
awareness (Kappas, 2006). This acknowledgement of the role preconscious 
appraisal processes can play in the development of the stress process 
ultimately engendered a reconceptualisation of stress from a multi-level, 
or dual process perspective, which I will briefly outline now. 
 
Dual process models of stress 
 
Emotions, as I have defined them, already share many significant 
elements with models of stress, leading some researchers to redefine 
psychophysiological stress responses in affective terms as ‘emotion 
regulation under stress’ (Compas, 2009; see also Eisenberg et al., 1997; 
Oschner, 2007; Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2007). For example, as with 
affective research, theories of stress have converged on the notion of 
separate levels of stressor appraisal. Such proposals are collectively 
known as dual process models of stress (Compas, 2004; Compas et al., 
2001; see also Eisenberg et al., 1997; Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2007). 
Dual process models identify two distinct types of appraisal process: 1) 
those that are automatic – i.e. they;  
 
“Occur without intention [often outside of awareness], require relatively little in 
terms of cognitive resources, and are often difficult to interrupt or terminate 
once they have been initiated” (Sherman et al., 2008, pg315) 
 
And, 2) a set of controlled, volitional responses to stress, which;  
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“Require cognitive resources, can be volitionally interrupted or stopped, and 
typically [occur] within awareness” (Sherman et al., 2008, pg315). 
 
Evidence for dual process models of stress is sizeable (for a 
comprehensive summary of this evidence, see Compas et al., 2009) and 
can be collated into 8 distinct categories; a) research on associative 
conditioning and learning (Compas et al., 2001), b) studies on strategic-
controlled and automatic cognitive processes in emotional disorders 
(Compas et al., 2001; Compas et al., 2009), c) research into stress-
induced changes in attention (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), d) research 
differentiating temperamental characteristics from intentional, cognitive 
processes (Compas et al., 2001), e) research on automaticity in social 
cognition (Matthews & Macleod, 1994), f) neuroimaging studies (Gianaros 
& O’Connor, 2011), g) studies analysing stress-induced manipulation of 
memory (Carver & Cluver, 2009), and h) evidence from research into 
stress-induced alteration in executive functioning (Compas, 2006). In 
addition, dual process theories have also been independently 
corroborated using self-report questionnaires from adolescents and their 
parents (Connor-Smith et al., 2000) and through separate, confirmatory 
factor analyses studying a large range of stressors in a diverse variety of 
people (e.g. Connor-Smith & Calvete, 2004; Wadsworth et al., 2004). 
 
By dividing stressor appraisals into two levels, dual process models of 
stress separate psychophysiological responses to stressors functionally. 
Preconscious responses tend to describe automatic appraisal processes in 
terms of stress reactivity (automatic, rapid responses to stressors), 
which includes stressor valence detection processes (Bargh & Williams, 
2007), allocation of attentional resources (Williams et al., 1998; see also 
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Bar-Haim et al., 2007) and, possibly, implicit activation of long-term 
memory and goal-dependent behaviour (Bargh et al., 2012). By defining 
these “immediate and automatic reactions to stressful situations” 
(Compas et al., 1999, pg231) as ‘action tendencies’ (Skinner, 1999) – i.e. 
processes which amalgamate motor programmes and core affect (e.g. fear 
or shock) with goal orientation (Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2007) – 
Skinner is, effectively, equating the role of these involuntary stress 
responses with the core processor components of basic emotions 
(Panksepp 1998; Ekman & Cordaro, 2011), to which I have already ascribed 
responsibility for initiating very similar ‘states of ‘’action readiness’ 
(Frijda & Parrott, 2011). Indeed, the similarity is further emphasised by 
examining the adaptive roles of these processes, which are both clearly 
defined in terms of efficient, rapid adaptation to environmental stimuli. 
Additionally, as neuroimaging studies (e.g. McEwen & Gianaros, 
2010; Pruessner et al., 2010) tend to place preconscious stressor 
appraisal processes in exactly the same subcortical areas (particularly 
the hippocampus and the amygdala - Davis & Whalen, 2001) as multi-level 
models of affect, this serves clearly to emphasise my assertion that 
stress and emotion are functionally synonymous; particularly in terms of 
the neurobiological operation of their respective preconscious responses. 
 
In addition to the automatic responses to stressors, dual process models 
of stress also identify an over-laying set of volitional, conscious 
processes, which “are captured by the concept of coping,” (Compas, 2009, 
pg93; see also Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2009). These systems are 
purported to mediate the longer-term response to stressors and are also 
reported to be capable of significantly more diverse regulation of the 
stress process than the automatic ‘action tendencies’ (Skinner, 1999). As 
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with the preconscious processes, neuroimaging studies frequently locate 
coping-based systems within neocortical brain regions (particularly the 
ACC, PFC and Cingulate Cortex - Gianaros & O’Connor, 2011) heavily 
implicated in the regulation of emotion (Damasio, 1994), leading Bruce 
Compas to suggest that coping and emotion regulation could be unified 
within one construct (Compas et al., 2009)35. Additionally, and in direct 
parallel with emotion regulation, because coping responses are “shaped by 
the resources and contexts in which they unfold, [they] are virtually 
infinite in their variety” (Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2007, pg124) and 
thus it has been proposed that a very wide range of cognitive processes 
may contribute towards the ‘regulation of stress’, or coping (Compas, 
2009) – a system that draws many parallels with the top-down 
contribution to emotion I reviewed earlier in this Chapter.   
 
Although there is some disagreement (e.g. Cole et al., 2004), most 
researchers accede that the conscious and preconscious components of 
dual process theories are likely to function either simultaneously (Campos 
et al., 2004), or in parallel (Compas et al., 1999) with a significant degree 
of mutual influence (Skinner, 1999; Compas et al., 2001; 2007). Whilst I 
suggest that this consensus appears very similar to the quorum of opinion 
within emotion regulation research, nevertheless, some interesting 
differences have been documented between the two constructs. Firstly, 
coping is specific to the regulation of stressors, whereas emotion 
regulation incorporates responses to a much wider range of stimuli 
(Aldwin et al., 2011). Secondly, and in tandem with the first point, “coping 
is an organisational construct, encompassing the regulation of multiple 
                                                
35 Compas’ suggestion was that executive function could unify coping and emotion 
regulation. 
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processes” (Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2009, pg7); whereas emotion 
regulation, by contrast, appears limited to the control of behaviours, 
responses and systems associated with affect. Should dual process 
models of stress and emotion regulation become unified as Compas 
(Compas et al., 2009) and I both advocate, I suggest that the differences 
outlined here between the concepts would support a role for emotion 
regulation to become subsumed within the more expansive concept of 
coping. Although further work is required to explore this relationship, it 
is promising to note that recent new research (e.g. Wang & Saudino, 2011) 
has already begun to provide evidence which not only supports such a 
relationship, but also underscores the commonalities I have previously 
described that appear to exist within these literatures. 
 
The final difference that appears to exist between emotion regulation 
and dual process theories of stress is that, within stress research, the 
majority of investigations have focused on the role of descending 
neocortical input in regulating preconscious systems (e.g. see Compas, 
2006) – the ‘top-down’ approach – chiefly because it has been reported to 
exert a significant effect on the allocation of conscious attention to 
stressors (Mogg et al., 2004; Pine et al., 2005) as well as other forms of 
secondary control coping, such as disengagement from stressors 
(Copeland & Compas, 2006) and stressor reappraisal (Compas, 2009). By 
contrast, as I explained earlier in the Chapter, within emotion regulation 
research, some considerable evidence upholds a role for regulation in 
both directions (i.e. top-down and bottom-up). This difference is 
surprising on two grounds; 1) because it is very much out-of-keeping with 
my assertion that emotion regulation and the stress process should be 
considered as functionally equivalent, and 2) because, as I explain more 
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comprehensively in Chapter 6, it is incongruous with findings from studies 
of illnesses like anxiety, addiction and depression, where the influence of 
preconscious processes is believed to have particular significance in the 
development of psychopathology. Taken in tandem, these two 
observations highlight a potential ‘gap’ in stress research – i.e. the 
regulation of acute and chronic stress via changes to preconscious 
mechanisms. It is this area of research that I wish to explore further in 
this study, by examining the extent to which preconscious appraisals 
change during the acute stress process and, as I explain in the next 
Chapter, whether specific cognitive resources well-established in 
volitional stress regulation, could also play a role in preconscious stressor 
appraisal. 
 
Stress as an emotion – a synopsis 
 
Thus far I have presented an overview of emotion from a neurobiological, 
multi-level perspective. I have also outlined nine sources of evidence 
supporting my view that dual process models of stress share functional 
equivalence with multi-level models of emotion. Before advancing any 
further arguments I wish briefly to summarise the ramifications of my 
view.  
 
To conclude, by viewing stress as an emotion I assert that; 
 
1. Stress is an evolutionarily adaptive process that prepares 
individuals physiologically and neurologically to deal with exposure 
to stressors. 
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2. Stress may also become maladaptive if stressor exposure is 
chronic and/or if stress leads to physiological and/or neurological 
pathologies. 
3. Stress is generated by the activity of subcortical emotional 
systems, either directly or via top-down neocortical activity. The 
action of stress hormones upon these systems also affects stress 
further. 
4. Stressors are identified as such through two separate, but 
interrelated processes – namely cognitive appraisals and 
preconscious appraisals. 
5. Both appraisal processes are capable of eliciting stress. 
6. The evaluation and subsequent identification of a stressor as such 
by cognitive appraisal is affected by a wide range of goals, beliefs, 
knowledge, desires, emotions, memories and cognitions. 
7. Preconscious processes may also draw on many (or possibly all) of 
these mental representations to appraise stressor stimuli. 
8. Both appraisal processes are capable of self-regulation via a range 
of antecedent- and response-focused strategies. 
9. Both appraisal processes are capable of regulating or changing 
each other, either directly or indirectly. 
 
Having presented by argument that stress possesses functional 
equivalence with affect, in the next Chapter I move on to examine the 
impact of this position on social cognitive theories of human agency. I 
then explore the extent to which efficacy beliefs may interact with the 
stress process and propose three Research Questions to develop the ‘gap’ 
I identified earlier and thereby investigate the role preconscious 
stressor appraisals play in the stress process. 
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Chapter 3: Humans as Efficacious Agents 
 
Introduction 
 
Social cognitive theories of personality and motivation hold at their 
centre the view that people are emergent and interactive agents 
(Bandura, 1977; 1989; 1997): we are neither autonomous, nor simple 
mechanical conveyors of animating environmental influences. “Rather, we 
make a causal contribution to our own motivation and action” (Bandura, 
1989, pg1175) via our “beliefs, values and goals, which set up a meaning 
system within which we define ourselves (Dweck, 2000, pg138-139). Thus, 
to be an agent is to influence intentionally one’s functioning and life 
circumstances;  
 
“People are self-organizing, proactive, self-regulating, and self-reflecting. They 
are not simply onlookers of their behaviour. They are contributors to their life 
circumstances, not just products of them” (Bandura, 2006a, pg164).  
 
Bandura, therefore, presents agency in functional terms - “to be an agent 
is to influence the course of events by one’s action” (Bandura, 2011, 
pg52). A variety of other conceptions of agency exist (e.g. Blakemore & 
Frith, 2003), of which, I feel, Pajares’ definition comes closest to 
summarising a specific definition of agency as Bandura views it. Pajares 
states that agency is; 
 
“The sense that, among other personal factors, individuals possess self-beliefs 
that enable them to exercise a measure of control over their thoughts, feelings, 
and actions” (Pajares, 2002). 
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Central to this definition of agency, (and implicit in Bandura’s [1997; 
2006a; 2008] ‘core properties of agency’ – see later) is the concept of 
‘self’. ‘Self’ is a diffuse term and, accordingly, its definition presents 
something of a challenge! However, despite cross-cultural variations in 
the perception of ‘self’, Bukobza presents the consensus view that ‘self’ is 
‘a distinct and independent unit’ germane to all humans (Bukobza, 2007) 
and that, in contrast to transcendental views, ‘self’ is generated in the 
brain (Churchland, 2002). This view is corroborated by evidence from 
split-brain studies (Sperry, 1982) and a large body of research into self-
related clinical disorders (Feinberg & Keenan, 2005). However, despite 
numerous neuroimaging studies (e.g. Gusnard, 2005; Gilliham & Farah, 
2005; Northoff et al., 2006), convergence on a single neurological 
location for ‘self’ has proven difficult. There are a number of reasons for 
this impasse which, I suggest, could owe to limitations in neuroimaging 
methodologies (Christoff et al., 2011), the transient nature of ‘self’ 
(Strawson, 1999), multiple neurological locations for ‘self’ (Feinberg, 
2001; Feinberg & Keenan, 2005) or that ‘self’ may be an emergent 
phenomenon and, therefore, “different from and not reducible to neural 
events” (Sperry, 1977, cited in Trevarthen, 1990, pg384). As Sperry’s 
position appears similar to Bandura’s (1997; 2006a; 2006b; 2008), I 
address the issue of reducibility later in this Chapter. However, before 
doing that, I wish first to set down my own position on the nature of 
‘self’, as I believe a clear characterisation of ‘self’ is critical in 
establishing an unambiguous concept of human agency. 
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The neurological ‘self’ 
 
LeDoux’s (2003) suggestion of a multifaceted ‘self’ located across a 
number of brain systems seems to me to fit more pieces of the puzzle 
together than other suggestions about the nature of ‘self’. Firstly, this 
position adopts the ontologically reductive position of ‘grounding the self’ 
(Damasio, 2000) in the brain, which has become a widely accepted view36, 
even within the traditionally functionalist disciplines of psychology and 
cognitive science – “questions about self-representation are steadily 
shifting into the province of the brain and cognitive sciences” 
(Churchland, 2002, pg309). Secondly, LeDoux’s model of ‘self’ requires no 
single neurological ‘locus’ for ‘self’37, which explains the problems 
neuroimaging studies have encountered finding one. Thirdly, it begins to 
account for the multitude of different tasks and responsibilities people 
ascribe to their concept of ‘self’, which would certainly require, at the 
very least, distributed access to (and, according to LeDoux, integration 
with) many different brain areas. Fourthly, it encompasses multi-level 
interaction between ‘self’ and affect, possibly via a ‘shared 
neurobiological stem’ (Damasio, 2003a; see also LeDoux, 1998), which 
accounts for the repeatedly observed link between self-processing and 
emotion (Fossati et al., 2003). Fifthly, it accepts the notion that, at many 
levels, ‘self’ is subconscious (Gallagher, 2000), which is a difficult 
conclusion to avoid when considering self-recognition studies in neonates 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; 1983) and higher mammals (Beshkar, 2008). 
Finally, it also implicates ‘self’ in the generation of consciousness 
                                                
36 This is also Bandura’s stated opinion (see next section). 
37 Or any equivalent Cartesian homunculus. 
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(Damasio, 2000; 2003a; Panksepp, 2012)38, which may begin to account 
for the obviously subjective nature of ‘self’ (Strawson, 2009). 
 
Within this multifaceted ‘self’, I find Damasio’s (2000; 2003b) proposal 
of a protoself most compelling. Similar in concept to Panksepp’s Simple 
Ego-type Life Form (SELF - Panksepp, 1998; 200539), both ‘self’-models 
constitute an internal body map, which functions both as a core 
representation of ‘self’40 and also as a reference point for the generation 
of other self-related systems (Damasio, 2003b). Damasio (2000; 2003a) 
advocates the existence of the protoself on the grounds that, a) the 
body is relatively static and, b) evidence exists to suggest that the brain 
continually represents the structure of the body internally (see Craig, 
2002). This ‘internal representation’ was first documented in the 1950s, 
when Holst, Mittelstaedt and Sperry all observed independently that 
central motor commands are also accompanied by an identical, redundant, 
parallel copy command. Whilst Damasio (2000) and Panksepp (1988) use 
this as the starting point for their nuclear ‘self’ models, Frith (1992) 
suggested that this ‘efference feedback system’ could also be used as 
the neural basis of human agency. 
 
According to Frith, the ‘efference feedback system’ generates self-
awareness of our own actions. He cited a number of studies into 
somatoparaphrenia - ‘alien hand syndrome’ - as examples of the system 
                                                
38 Although note here that LeDoux (1998) and Damasio (2003b) have very different 
conceptions for the generation of consciousness. LeDoux believes it was layered on top 
of the brain by recent evolutionary processes, whereas Damasio’s proposal establishes 
rudimentary consciousness from the beginning of evolution. 
39 Although note that Damasio and Panksepp suggested different brain areas for the 
basis of their models. 
40 Cf. Gallagher’s (2000) suggestion of minimal self. 
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functioning improperly - i.e. when our own movements are not associated 
as ‘self’. The opposite observation can be seen in anosognosic patients, 
who believe they have initiated movement when, in fact, they have not. In 
this case the motor command is believed to fail, whilst the efference 
feedback copy records the movement as having taken place (Heilman et 
al., 1988). Frith (1992) suggested that a centrally-driven comparison of 
the efference command copy and the motor command could account for 
the sense of agency as it would produce a self-responsibility ‘label’ for 
our actions. Frith also used this as a model for schizophrenia: 
schizophrenics, he argued, were self-aware of their movements but, 
through a failure of the comparator process, did not experience a normal 
sense of agency. Whilst Frith’s argument is, at many levels, compelling, 
Vignemont and Fourneret (2004) point out a number of scenarios where 
this explanation cannot fully account for agency (e.g. in paranormal 
phenomena such as automatic writing, where a conscious system must also 
contribute to the sense [or absence] of agency). Thus, whilst the ‘self’ 
map advocated by Damasio and Panksepp is a very helpful starting point, I 
conjecture that it cannot account for the full sense of agency, or of ‘self’. 
In order to do that, I need to recruit other aspects of LeDoux’s 
multifaceted self. 
 
Markus and Kitayama (1991, pg229) assert that the ‘self’ must contain 
“self-relevant schemata, [which are] used to evaluate, organize, and 
regulate one's experience and action”. As I explain later, the key idea 
here is experience, or memory. At first sight, LeDoux’s multifaceted self 
may appear analogous to Dennet’s (1989; 1992) Joycean Machine, in which 
a decentralised model of cognition drives a human machine, much like a 
‘self-steering ship’ (Dennet, 1992). In this system, ‘self’ is illusory – a non-
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causal by-product of the steering mechanism41. However, what separates 
Dennet’s ‘Joycean Machine’ from the multifaceted ‘self’ is Markus and 
Kitayama’s (1991) observation that experience is crucial in generating the 
subjective, or autobiographical (Damasio, 2000) nature of ‘self’. As 
Ismael’s (2006) rightly points out, the Joycean Machine model would 
predict history encoded as an objective record of events, rather than the 
autobiographical, subjective (and, frankly, patchy) narrative that is 
actually remembered. Thus, the multifaceted ‘self’ does not function as a 
Joycean Machine because it comprises an autobiographical ‘self’ in 
addition to the ‘steering mechanisms’ of the protoself. Gallagher (2000) 
also advocates the existence of ‘self’ in a narrative form - a “self 
extended in time to include memories of the past and intentions toward 
the future” (Gallagher, 2000, pg15). Both Damasio and Gallagher base 
their experiential forms of ‘self’ within episodic memory systems, which 
theoretically enable one to construct a ‘narrative’ of ‘self’ over time and 
also to project that ‘self’ forward in time42. However, as “episodic memory 
is constantly remodelled by innate and acquired dispositions as well as 
social and cultural environments” (Gallagher, 2000, pg20), it follows that 
the ability to self-recognise in episodic memory requires a minimal and 
constantly reiterated sense of self, which Damasio (2000) argues comes 
from reference to the protoself generated via the efference feedback 
system. Whilst evidence from amnesiacs seems to refute the idea of a 
narrative self (Churchland, 2002), studies with patients suffering from 
other clinical memory disorders reliably supports the suggestion of a 
memory-based ‘self’ as disordered memory commonly affects self-
                                                
41 Dennet draws the parallel of the mind as a termite mount, where centralised control 
appears to be present, but is actually an illusion generated as a by-product of a self-
organising system of autonomous parts. 
42 A pivotal role in the development of self-belief systems such as SE. 
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concept (Schacter et al., 200343). Therefore, within the neurobiological 
mechanistic model of ‘self’ I have sketched out here, I conceive that 
there are two key conceptual components;  
 
1. A narrative, subjective ‘self’, which functions as a context-
dependent, subjective process (Damasio, 2003a; 2003b) that is bi-
directionally integrated with conscious and unconscious affect 
regulation processes, cognitive cortical areas and memory systems. 
 
2. An underlying protoself (Damasio, 2000) or SELF concept 
(Panksepp, 1998), which acts as a source of reference for the 
higher system/s.  
 
Thus, similar to LeDoux’s (2003) multifaceted view of ‘self’, I posit that 
‘self’ is best understood from a mechanistic neurobiological position 
(Craver, 2006 – see next section) such that ‘self’ is produced by a ‘non-
nested hierarchy’ of brain systems (Feinberg, 2001; Feinberg & Keenan, 
2005) which generate ‘self’ as a collation of mechanisms. This ‘self’ is not 
a Cartesian ‘I’ (as it is influenced by unconscious and affective ‘bottom-up’ 
processing), but neither is it sensory-driven ‘mindless automaton’ 
(Bandura, 2006a). It is a unified orchestra of systems, whose processes 
assemble to generate a unique and biologically-contextualised ‘self’, whose 
experience and subjective monologue establishes a critical foundation 
underlying human agency. 
 
 
                                                
43 Their work on implicit memory also supports the role of ‘self’ generation via 
subconscious processing. 
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On reductivism 
 
For Bandura, human agency is founded on the principle of ‘non-reductive 
physicalism’ (Bandura, 2008; 2006b; 1989) and, as such, he defines agency 
as an ontologically emergent, materialist phenomenon (Bandura, 1991b; 
2006b) which, despite its dependence on underlying brain processes, is 
not epistemologically or methodologically reducible to them - i.e. agency is 
derived from neurological processes in the brain, but cannot be explained 
by studying them at their component levels. I contest this position and, 
whilst I firmly subscribe to Bandura’s view that agency plays a central 
causative role in governing human behaviour, I do not adopt his definition 
of agency. I view human agency from an ontologically reductive 
neurobiological perspective which, because it is at odds to Bandura’s view, 
necessitates a brief critique of Bandura’s anti-reductive stance as applied 
to human agency. 
 
In many of his recent papers, Bandura (2008; 2006a; 2006b) is critical of 
biological models of agency, which he suggests have a tendency to be 
dehumanising due to their reductionist underpinning; 
 
“Self-regulatory processes are being dismissed in some quarters on the grounds 
that human behaviour is regulated unconsciously by neural networks with illusory 
belief that one is exercising personal control. This type of conception strips 
humans of agentic capabilities, a functional consciousness, and a self-identity” 
(Bandura, 2006b, pg3).  
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This argument has been repeated in subtly different guises by many 
other authors. For example, Melden (1961) presents the challenge of the 
‘disappearing agent’ such that biological-behaviouristic processes reduce 
the agent to “a helpless victim of the conditions in my body and its 
immediate physical environment”44 (Melden, 1961, pg 129). Whilst 
Schlosser (2008) presents an excellent counter-argument to the 
reductionist dilemma of the ‘disappearing agent’ (which I outline in a 
footnote45), Bandura’s position appears to maintain that reductionist 
philosophy falls short of encapsulating a meaningful concept of agency as 
he views it. 
 
Theoretical reductionism, such as that put forward by Nagel and 
Schnaffer (Nagel, 1986), traditionally focuses specifically on ontological, 
or theoretical reduction i.e. processes that derive reduced laws from 
reducing theory. This approach has been heavily criticised (e.g. Sakar, 
1992; see also Dijadzi-Bahmani et al., 2010), particularly in biological 
fields, where philosophers have argued that underlying biological laws 
simply do not exist46 (although see Sober [1993], who argues that 
predictive patterns can be considered as laws), particularly in genetic- 
and evolutionary processes (Waters, 2004). This is compounded by the 
                                                
44 See also Nagel (1986), who argues that neurological ‘events’ must be attributable to 
other events in a causal chain. According to Nagel, this “leaves no room for action” (and 
hence agency) as every event is pre-determined by another. 
45 Schlosser (2008) argues that hierarchical standard-causal theories of agency allow 
for the type of rigid behaviourism, or biological reflexivity Melden describes, but also 
for deliberate-, reflective- and autonomous action, provided the agent is ceded the 
ability to deliberate between different behavioural outcomes (an effective control 
system) and a schema of attributes and beliefs with which to evaluate those outcomes. 
This is not without some irony when one considers that it is precisely this system of 
beliefs that forms the lynchpin of Bandura’s notion of human agency. 
46 On par with those of other Natural Sciences, e.g. the laws of thermodynamics. This is 
particularly the case for genetics and proteomics, where the example of protein folding 
or genetic coding is often cited (e.g. see Huttenman & Love, 2011 for a full explanation). 
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dependence of evolutionary mechanisms upon explicit environmental 
contexts (Hull, 1972; 1979), which also introduces the further problem of 
multiple realisable outcomes (e.g. convergent evolution) when theories 
overlap each other (see Sklar, 1993, who cites the example of pain as a 
non-reducible concept on the grounds of multiple realisability). However, 
whilst theoretical reductionism may well have significant challenges to 
face within the critical realist paradigm (and particularly in biological 
research) it is by no means the only reductive position available (e.g. 
Dowell, 2006). This is my main criticism of Bandura’s position – he 
collectively dismisses reductionism en masse without appearing to make 
any visible account for different reductive epistemologies. For example, 
explanatory reductive theory47, such as that proposed by Kauffman 
(1971) in his ‘articulation of the parts’ process, does not adhere to the 
truth-derivation system central to theoretical reductionist epistemology. 
Instead, it attempts to establish a causal explanation for the behaviour 
of a system in terms of the properties of the component parts and the 
relations between them. Effectively, Kauffman is advocating a form of 
pragmatic reductionism that allows researchers to make knowledge claims 
about the respective parts of a system towards the goal of understanding 
how the system works collectively, but without the requirement that 
theory dissolve entirely into reduced system components. I posit that 
such explanatory epistemology may overcome a large number of the 
problems associated with theoretical reductive approaches, chiefly 
because it does not hold towards the same stringent ontological 
requirements about the nature of reducible knowledge.  
 
                                                
47 See also Part-Whole approaches (e.g. Winther, 2011) 
 60
Mechanistic theory (Craver, 2006) is a subset of explanatory reductive 
philosophy that has been extensively applied to the study of cognition and 
neurology (Craver, 2007). Briefly, this approach postulates that the 
overall behaviour of a system (e.g. the brain) can be decomposed into the 
activity of mechanisms that underpin the activity. Mechanisms are 
”entities and activities organised such that they are productive of regular 
changes from start or setup to finish or termination conditions” 
(Machamer et al., 2000, pg3) and are themselves defined as constructs of 
smaller entities (physical structures e.g. cortical lobes or thalamic 
regions) and activities (“things that entities do” [Craver, 2006, pg371] i.e. 
causal actions e.g. synaptic action). Whilst some philosophers view 
mechanistic approaches as purely reductive (e.g. Bickle [2003], who 
argues that psychological approaches should “lose their initial status as 
causally-mechanistic explanations” (pg110) when ”real neurobiological 
explanations” are on offer [pg111]), by contrast Craver (2007) argues 
that mechanisms should be considered non-reductive insomuch as they 
have no discernible, intractable hierarchy of explanation: “there are no 
monolithic levels in biology” (Craver & Bechtel, 2007, pg190) – a point they 
assert is particularly relevant to the study of neurobiology. Craver (2007) 
cites Hebbian LTP as a good example of non-reductive mechanistic theory 
in evidence, as the discovery of synaptic potentiation in 1973 has 
contributed not only towards a ‘top-down’ reductive search for a 
molecular model of synaptic memory, but also to extensive ‘bottom-up’ 
research into systems of memory formation – another example of 
multilevel mechanisms in action. As stated previously, Bandura seems to 
make little consideration of mechanistic models of agency, and I suggest 
that, for him, a sparse dichotomy exists, which appears to catalogue 
agential theories into either reductive or non-reductive brackets. I 
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reject this position on the grounds that multiple, non-reductive 
perspectives are available (such as Craver’s mechanistic perspective) and 
propose that the concepts of agency and ‘self’ fit well into the 
ontologically reductive, neurobiological mechanistic framework I outlined 
previously. In addition to the criticism previously presented, there are 
three lesser (but important) considerations which also introduce clear 
water between my position and Bandura’s non-reductive perspective. I 
outline these arguments as follows. 
 
For Bandura, agency is very much more than the sum of its neurological 
parts. To make this point, he cites the example of education, where a 
“thorough knowledge of the brain circuits involved in learning does not 
tell one much about how best to devise conditions of learning” (Bandura, 
1991b, pg157). He advocates the notion of ‘second-order control’ 
(Bandura, 2008) to explain his position, arguing that; 
 
“In acting as agents, individuals obviously are neither aware of, nor directly 
control, their neuronal mechanisms… They intentionally engage in activities at the 
macrobehavioral level” (Bandura, 1991b, pg160).  
 
Thus, to paraphrase the emergent physicalist argument (Bandura, 2006b) 
– the brain generates agency, but neurobiological methodologies are 
insufficient to provide an understanding of agency. Apart from the 
reservation previously identified, my main criticism of this view is 
eloquently voiced by Rottschaefer (1991), contends that, by adopting a 
position of physicalism, despite his assertion that agency is emergent, 
Bandura is, nevertheless, arguing from an ontological reductionist 
perspective. Thus his philosophical standpoint is, paradigmatically, 
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subject to the same epistemic principles as the neurobiological 
mechanistic view I propose48. This is because both standpoints derive 
from “regularities that are predictive and explanatory of observations 
[which has] led to the formation of [both] theories explanatory of these 
regularities” Rottschaefer (1991, pg154). In other words, all physicalist 
positions (whether Bandura’s or my own) attempt to predict behaviour 
empirically. Given this, Rottschaefer argues that an application of 
Occam’s razor would lead to a rejection of Bandura’s notion of agency in 
favour of a neurobiological approach on the grounds of complexity - it 
necessitates an additional irreducible construct that neurobiological 
models do not require. Therefore, in addition to my first argument for 
rejecting Bandura’s notion of irreducible agency, I also reject it on the 
grounds of parsimony when a mechanistic position is available. 
 
A second rationale for adopting a mechanistic position over that 
described by Bandura (2008; 2006b; 1997) is epistemological, rather than 
ontological. In a general criticism of cognitive theory Eysenck (1989) 
argues that ‘cognitions’ themselves are simply metaphors for underlying 
complex physiological brain processes and, therefore, must be considered 
only to be “loose descriptions of processes which we do not understand” 
(Lee, 1992, pg259). Kimble (1989) also highlights the potential danger of 
confusing such ‘descriptive metaphors’ with actual explanations of 
behaviour, warning against the tendency of psychologists to pass off 
post-hoc concepts as explanations. Lee (1989) draws these reservations 
together into one specific criticism - Bandura appears not to make an 
attempt to provide an underlying neurobiological explanation for agency 
                                                
48 Note that the principles themselves do not have to be identical merely that they 
subscribe to the same ontology. 
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(quite the opposite in fact!) which, I conjecture, effectively makes the 
concept ‘unobservable, unverifiable and unfalsifiable’ using post-positivist 
methodology. A similar argument is advanced by Craver (2006) when 
comparing representational and phenomenological models. He argues that, 
although phenomenally accurate models may predict behaviour 
exceptionally well, they are at heart non-explanatory and, therefore, 
limited in power. He couches this in terms of ‘how-possibly’ and ‘how-
actually’ models and argues that “constitutive explanations require 
descriptions of real mechanisms, not mere how-possibly posits” (Craver, 
2006, pg374). Thus, I also reject Bandura’s ‘how-possibly’ concept of 
irreducible agency in preference to a ‘how-actually’ neurobiological 
mechanistic model (even if that model has less predictive power) on the 
grounds of increased explanatory potential.  
 
In close relation to the previous point, a third criticism of Bandura’s 
position is highlighted by Lee (1992). She points out that, without a 
testable model of agency, methodologies for data collection are severely 
limited;  
 
“A great deal of research with a cognitive orientation seems to be no more than 
the correlation of self-reports of hypothetical constructs with self-reports of 
other hypothetical constructs” (Lee, 1992, pg259).  
 
As a ‘how-actually’ model, the neurobiological encapsulation of agency I 
propose below is, at least theoretically, more testable methodologically 
than Bandura’s irreducible concept. Thus, I assert that my position is, 
therefore, preferential on the grounds of methodological scope. For 
example, whilst Bandura’s concept of agency is frequently limited 
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methodologically to self-reports (as Lee [1992] attests), hypothetically a 
neurobiological model is congruent both with this method of data 
collection and also with a wide range of other post-positivist empirical 
methodologies (e.g. neuroimaging, genetic analysis or animal modelling) 
many of which, by nature of their post-positivist epistemology, make 
available the principle of proof by experimental falsification (Popper. 
1959). I do not wish to critique this philosophical position here (and I 
readily acknowledge the ontological equivalence of the ‘plurality of post-
Khun research perspectives’ [Popkewitz, 1984] now available); rather, my 
point is that the neurobiological mechanistic model I propose seems to 
make available a considerably greater range of methodologies than 
Bandura’s non-reducible concept, at least from a theoretical perspective. 
Furthermore, as many of these additional methodologies offer 
alternatives to simple correlational analysis (a major limitation of all self-
reports – see Chapter 6), I reassert that the neurobiological mechanistic 
approach I adopt here may possibly constitute a more pragmatically 
versatile model for understanding human agency than Bandura’s original 
concept. I outline my understanding of agency in the next section. 
 
Humans as efficacious agents 
 
In the previous sections I asserted that agency could be ontologically 
reducible to neurobiological brain mechanisms and attempted to explain 
how these systems, when collated, might generate the ‘self’ that supports 
human agency. In this section I explain how neurobiology may account for 
human agency and I focus on efficacy beliefs as a key component of 
agentic functioning.  
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Human agents “exercise a measure of control over their thoughts, 
feelings and emotions” (Pajares, 2002, pg1). My emphasis in this definition 
is crucial, because ‘control’ forms a vital lynchpin of Bandura’s conception 
of agency and also a focus for his critique of neurological models of 
agency; 
 
“The exercise of human agency is dismissed by physical eliminationists on the 
grounds that human behaviour is regulated by neuronal mechanisms operating at a 
subpersonal level outside of one’s awareness and control. Deliberative, reflective, 
self-referential, and other high-level cognitive events are dismissed as 
epiphenomenal events that create an illusion of control but actually have no effect 
on how one behaves. In this view, humans are essentially conscious hosts of 
automata that dictate their behaviour subpersonally” (Bandura, 2011, pg52). 
 
Although I agree with the principle of human agency, I also hold three 
reservations the view above; 1) to me, it seems to assume that 
neurobiologists adopt a de facto view of agency as epiphenomenal, 2) to 
me, it appears to describe stimulus processing as a function only of 
‘bottom-up’ processes and, 3) to me, it seems to view preconscious 
neurological processing as hard-wired and not under conscious control. In 
response to the first two points, I argued earlier that ‘self’ can be viewed 
as teleological process conducted by neurobiological mechanisms. I assert 
that the same is true of other ‘higher level cognitive events’, including the 
sense of agency. If these ‘events’ are ontologically reducible to 
mechanistic neurobiological models (Carver, 2006) I suggest that, by 
nature of their multi-level activity, it therefore follows that they should 
not be construed in simplistic ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ terms.  
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However, the third point about control is more challenging. Wegner 
(2002) advances a similar view in his theory of Apparent Mental 
Causation. Wegner posits that conscious will can be defined an illusion 
generated by causal inference between conscious thought prior to an 
action and self-awareness of enacting the action49. Wegner argues that 
interaction between cognitive and self-authorship neurological 
mechanisms generates ‘illusory agency’ – i.e. 
 
“Experiences of conscious will thus arise from processes whereby the mind 
interprets itself – not from processes whereby mind creates action. Conscious will, 
in this view, is an indication that we think we have caused an action, not a 
revelation of the causal sequence by which the action was produced” (Wegner, 
2004, pg649 – original emphasis).  
 
Wegner’s suggestion of illusory will is critiqued by Nahmias (2005) who 
argues that, amongst other criticisms, this view of agency does not easily 
account for agentic capabilities like ‘distal intention’ (i.e. planning ahead) 
and is, therefore, too simplistic. However, the most significant evidence 
in support of causative agentic control comes from research 
demonstrating deliberate conscious modulation of subconscious 
processing. These studies provide evidence to suggest that neuronal 
mechanisms operating at subpersonal level very much operate within one’s 
awareness and control, which is not in keeping with a Bandurian view. 
 
Neuroplasticity and neurogenesis are well-documented (e.g. Pascual-Leone 
et al., 2005) and, to me, it come as little surprise that learning a new skill 
                                                
49 Possibly using Frith’s (1992) proprioceptive system outlined previously, although 
Wegner also suggests other somatic-feedback systems too (see Wegner, Sparrow & Lea, 
2004). 
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(e.g. violin playing [Elbert et al., 1995] or juggling [Draganski et al., 2004]) 
involves neurological growth and cortical remodelling (Ilg et al., 2008). 
Critically, however, it has been reported recently that the same 
processes may also be controlled consciously – i.e;  
 
“With appropriate training and effort, people can systematically alter neural 
circuitry associated with a variety of mental and physical states” (Schwartz, 
Stapp & Beauregard, 2005, pg2).  
 
This self-directed neuroplasticity has been documented in a number of 
clinical conditions such as OCD (Schwartz et al., 1996; Schwartz 1998), 
depression (Brody et al., 2001; Martin et al, 2001), Wernicke’s aphasia 
(Musso et al., 1999) and spider-phobia research (Paquette et al., 2003). In 
these studies the positive impact of mental training and coping exercises 
was associated with significant changes cortical fMRI activity pre- and 
post-training, implying that “people deliberately and consciously alter[ed] 
neural circuitry” (Schwartz & Begley, 2002, pg11). More evidence 
supporting ‘thinking induced plasticity’ (Schwartz & Begley, 2002) can be 
found in non-pathological studies. For example, Hölzel and her associates 
(Hölzel et al., 2008; 2011) observed that regular periods of meditation 
led to increases in grey matter density and cortical thickening; whilst 
others (De La Fuente-Fernandez et al., 2001) have published evidence to 
suggest that the placebo effect may be attributable to self-induced 
dopamine release. Numerous studies (e.g. Ochsner et al., 2002; 
Beauregard, 2001; see also Beauregard, 2007) have reported that 
conscious influence on emotional state is linked with neurological-based 
changes in affective regulation (see, for example, the sections in the 
previous Chapter on reappraisal processes). Therefore, in contrast to 
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Bandura’s (2011) assertion, I posit that such subconscious processes are 
not only exceptionally malleable, but that they may also be subject to 
significant direct and indirect influences from the activities of other 
entities within the agentic neurobiological mechanism.  
 
Thus, I conjecture that the neurobiological agent is anything but an 
automaton: rather, through a system analogous to ‘second-order control’ 
(Bandura, 2006a; 2006b; 2008), I have argued that the agentic 
neurobiological process may consciously self-guide by indirectly 
modulating subconscious entities to achieve a full measure of control over 
thoughts, feelings and emotions. Therefore, although my views on the 
generation of agency are very different to Bandura’s, we arrive at 
precisely the same conclusion: as humans we “make a causal contribution 
to our own motivation and action” (Bandura, 1989, pg1175) via our “beliefs, 
values and goals, which set up a meaning system within which we define 
ourselves (Dweck, 2000, pg138-139). Thus, in the words of Beauregard; 
 
“With the emergence of self-consciousness, self-agency, and self-regulatory… 
capacities, evolution has enabled humans to consciously and voluntarily shape the 
functioning of their brains. These advanced capacities allow humans to be driven 
not only by survival and reproduction but also by complex sets of insights, goals, 
and beliefs” (Beauregard, 2007, pg222). 
 
Efficacy beliefs 
 
Human agency is believed to centre around four such beliefs, or 
‘features’, which “define what it means to be a human” (Bandura, 2001b, 
pg6). These features are intentionality, forethought, self-reactiveness 
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and self-reflectiveness (Bandura, 1997; 2008). Each of these core 
aspects of agency are known to be affected by sociostructural and 
environmental influences (Bandura, 1986b), which interact with internal 
personality factors and behaviour to form the deterministic reciprocal 
triad that Bandura (1997) defines as underpinning human agency. 
Although a lot of evidence points to significant contributions from 
behaviour and the environment in the generation of agency (Bandura, 
1986b), Bandura has consistently asserted that personality factors and, 
specifically, “beliefs of personal efficacy constitute the key factor of 
human agency” (Bandura, 1997, pg3). 
 
Bandura defines Self-Efficacy (SE) as;  
 
“People's beliefs about their capabilities to produce designated levels of 
performance that exercise influence over events that affect their lives” (Bandura, 
1994, pg71).  
 
In other words it is the measure of confidence or conviction “that one 
can successfully execute the behaviour required to produce [a desired] 
outcome” (Bandura, 1977, pg193). Such beliefs should not be confused 
with the component repertoire skills they encompass, rather;  
 
“Self-efficacy is concerned not with the number of skills you have, but with what 
you believe you can do with what you have under a variety of circumstances” 
(Bandura, 1997, pg37).  
 
For example, Bandura (1984) draws the example of driving a car. He 
argues that a person’s belief in their ability to drive, whilst based in part 
on their ability to steer, change gears, interpret road signs etc, 
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comprises considerably more than the sum of the subskill components. 
Thus, in this example, driving SE constitutes a meta-belief in its own 
right – “investigators would do well to follow the dictum that the whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts” (Bandura, 1997, pg37). In keeping with 
the same driving analogy it is important to acknowledge that SE beliefs 
are believed to be very task- and context-specific (i.e. they do not 
generalise well from one domain to another), thus whilst a person may 
have high SE driving a car through the country at the weekend, they may 
be very reluctant to take on the motorway in the rain at midnight.  
 
Although SE beliefs do not appear to vary greatly in generality, they have 
been found to differ considerably in level, which is a measure of 
perceived task demand (Bandura, 1997) or, in simple terms, how easy the 
task is perceived to be. Thus, as Chase (2001) observed, only individuals 
with high SE choose to undertake tasks that they perceive challenging 
(Chase specifically cites physical activities like rope-climbing). In similar 
vein, evidence suggests that SE beliefs also vary in strength, which 
describes the tenacity of SE to overcome disconfirming experiences. 
Although separate constructs, SE strength overlaps considerably with 
persistence (Bandura, 1997), behavioural choice (Bandura, 1977) and 
intention (Wulfert & Wan, 1995), which are all hypothesised to act 
synergistically with SE to affect performance. 
 
SE beliefs have been reliably reported both to predict attainment 
(Bandura, 1997) via the causative triadic interactions outlined above 
(Bandura, 1986b). In this way SE is viewed as deterministic, rather than 
prognostic: “self-efficacy beliefs determine how people feel, think, 
motivate themselves and behave (Bandura, 1994, pg2 - original emphasis). 
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This effect is well evidenced (Bandura, 1992). For example, Baron (1988) 
conducted a prospective study into the effect of different types of 
feedback on undergraduates’ performance. He found that destructive, 
untargeted feedback led not only to decreased SE on further tasks, but 
also to a significant reduction in the quality of work the students 
produced in later assignments. Meta-analyses (e.g. Guzzo et al., 1985; 
Kluver & De Nisi, 1996) also support Baron’s observation that feedback 
intervention moderates performance indirectly via increased SE (although 
see Kluver & De Nisi, 1996 for other suggestions). 
 
Bandura (1977, 1986b) posits that the effect of SE on performance 
occurs via mediation between knowledge and action. Apropos, it has been 
hypothesised that SE affects performance in a large number of ways, 
which include; cognitive appraisal of personal, environmental, and 
behavioural variables (Bandura, 1977); changes in performance goal-
setting and intra-performance coping strategy (Bandura, 1977; 1986b; 
1992), discarding faulty self-regulatory strategies more quickly 
(Zimmerman, 2002), increasing persistence (Bandura, 1991a), motivation 
(Bandura, 1992) and emotional and physiological arousal (Bandura, 1986b; 
1991; 1992), or working more accurately than those with lower efficacy 
(Bandura, 1986b, 1992). A full summary of the effect of SE on 
performance is presented in Appendix A. 
 
More significant than the effect of SE on performance is the weight of 
literature supporting a link between low SE and ill health. For example, in 
a prospective study McFarlane and colleagues found that people who 
scored lower on measures of self-efficacy showed substantially more 
symptoms of depression in later life (McFarlane et al., 1995; see also 
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Petersen et al., 1993). Similar results were found by Cowen (Cowen et al., 
1991), who also showed that low SE scores are strongly correlated with 
negative social–emotional and behavioural functioning. Their results have 
been replicated both in retrospective correlation analyses (Ehrenberg, 
Cox, & Koopman, 1991) and prospective studies (Bandura et al., 1999), 
including experiments in which negative affect traits are controlled for 
(Muris, 2002). Other studies have found correlations between low SE and 
mental illnesses such as anxiety disorders (Matsuo & Arai, 1998; Yue, 
1996) and addiction, including alcoholism (Taylor, 2000) gambling (Casey 
et al., 2008) and drug dependence (Stephens et al., 1993). However, the 
link between low SE and the development of clinical conditions is not 
limited solely to mental illness, as SE has been implicated in the 
regulation of the specific immune response (O’Leary & Brown, 1995; 
Caserta et al., 2011; see also Bandura, 1997), the development of 
cardiovascular disorders (Cutrona & Troutman, 1986) and has recently 
been reported to predict heart failure in people suffering from CHD 
(Sarkar et al., 2009). 
 
Similarly, considerable evidence implicates SE in the development of both 
acute and chronic stress. For example, self-reported SE is repeatedly 
found to correlate negatively with self-reported stress levels. This has 
been reported in studies involving university students (Hackett et al., 
1992; Solberg et al., 1993; Gigliotti & Huff, 1995; Solberg & Villarreal, 
1997; Torres & Solberg, 2001), teachers (Cadiz, 1989; Betoret, 2006; 
Vaezi & Fallah, 2011), nurses (Schaubroeck & Merritt 1997; Lo 2002), 
mothers of young children (Teti & Gelfand, 1991), carers (Pinquart & 
Sörensen, 2003) and across a wide variety of occupational and 
professional environments as well (Jex & Gudanowski, 1992; Matsui & 
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Onglatco, 1997; Jex & Bliese, 1999; Prati et al., 2010). However, such 
correlations, by themselves, do not demonstrate a causal link between SE 
and stress. Indeed, on these grounds, Lee (1989) has criticised the SE 
construct in three regards; 1) SE is vague, which effectively makes it an 
unfalsifiable concept50, 2) SE is commonly used as a behavioural 
descriptive model (rather than an explanatory theory), and 3) SE is an a 
priori hypothetical construct invoked to help understand a pattern of 
observed behaviour and, therefore, cannot be an independent variable in 
itself. Whilst Lee’s first point is well made (although see Bandura’s [2012] 
comment about variation in instruments designed to measure SE), Bandura 
(1982; 1997) has repeatedly asserted, contrary to Lee’s criticism, that 
SE does influence stress causally. In his most recent book, Bandura 
(1997) cites numerous studies in which efficacy beliefs are purported to 
have a causal effect on behaviour via artificially raising or lowering SE 
through false positive- or negative feedback (e.g. Bouffard-Bouchard, 
1990; see also Appendix A). In stress research concomitant procedures 
have been observed to have a similar effect on stress: for example, 
Holroyd and colleagues (Holroyd et al., 1984) found that manipulating SE 
feedback during an EMG biofeedback training programme successfully 
reduced tension-induced headaches, even when the positive feedback was 
spurious. Similar findings in other false-feedback experiments (Neufeld & 
Thomas, 1977; Litt, 1988; Kores et al., 1985; Manning & Wright, 1983) 
also support a causal role for SE in limiting the development of stress. 
This conclusion is further reinforced through the success of stress-
reduction programmes, where students undertaking a curriculum designed 
to boost SE have reported significant reductions in stress. This is 
particularly well established in outdoor training schemes (Thurber et al., 
                                                
50 This also explains the ease of associating SE with behaviours in correlation studies. 
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2007; McKenzie, 2000; Masten & Coatsworth, 1998; although see Sheard 
& Golby [2006], who present an alternate explanation of the success of 
outdoor educational programmes), and also in recent classroom-based 
studies, which have reported similar findings (e.g. Lohaus, 2011; Hampel 
et al., 2008; Frydenberg, 2004; see also Kraag et al., 2006), prompting 
the conclusion that SE training not only improves academic performance, 
but may also have a causal effect on stress reduction (Mori & Uchida, 
2009). Therefore, as Bandura posits;  
 
“People who regard themselves as highly efficacious act, think, and feel 
differently from those who perceive themselves as inefficacious” (Bandura, 1997, 
pg395).  
 
In this way, SE is believed to exert a causal, protective role in limiting 
the development of stress when people are exposed to stressors. The 
key, question, therefore, is how might this happen? 
 
Most research to date attempts to explain this ‘protective’ nature of SE 
in limiting stress development in terms of adaptive changes in coping style 
(e.g. Taylor, 1989; Rothbaum et al., 1982; Brandtstädter, 1992; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1999; see also Suls & Fletcher, 1985; Parker & 
Endler, 1996; Skinner et al., 2003; Snyder, 1999; Lazarus, 1993b). 
Although robust evidence exists to link the adoption of adaptive coping 
style with reduced stress (e.g. Mikolajczak et al., 2007) and in 
attenuating stress-related illness51 (e.g. Temoshok et al., 2008; see also 
Penley et al., 2002), a wealth of studies have repeatedly demonstrated 
                                                
51 It should also be noted that coping-based intervention programs have had some 
success in limiting stress (e.g. Antoni et al., 2006; Fife et al., 2008; see also de Riddler & 
Schreurs, 2001). 
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that coping strategy is heavily and independently influenced by 
antecedent appraisal processes (Bjorck et al., 2001; Portello & Long, 2001; 
Pakenham, 2001; Chung et al., 2001; Mikulincer & Victor, 1995; Anshel & 
Wells, 2000) and that, by itself, coping style is not predictive of the 
development of stress (Chung et al., 2001), or of stress-related disease 
(Blalock & Joiner, 200052). Thus it appears that, whilst SE-induced 
adaptive coping is likely to play a role in reducing stress, its effect in 
stress genesis may be more limited. Considering this supposition in 
conjunction with other, more general criticisms of coping theory in stress 
research (e.g. Perlin, 1991; Snyder, 199953), I posit that SE may not 
exhibit its protective nature exclusively via changes in adaptive coping; 
instead I propose that the protection may also occur through changes in 
the appraisal of stressors. 
 
In the previous Chapter I explained that dual process models of stress 
identify two discrete and functionally independent stressor appraisal 
processes: those that are automatic and those that are conscious. Thus 
far research appears to have focused predominantly on conscious 
stressor appraisals. Indeed, many studies have reported that the 
negative correlation between SE and stress is clearly associated with a 
change in conscious stressor appraisal (Chemers et al., 2001; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984; Pintrich & De Groot, 1990), which supports my conjecture 
that SE might exhibit at least part of its protective nature via changes in 
                                                
52 Their work focused heavily on depression. Little evidence exists for other stress-
related diseases. 
53 See also Coyne and Gottlieb (1996), Coyne (1997) and Somerfield (1997), who criticise 
the methodologies employed in coping research. Others draw attention to the inability 
of coping paradigms to explain preconscious reactions to stressors (Somerfield & 
McCrae, 2000) and the repeated failure of coping research to inform, or to engender 
positive change in clinical practice (Coyne & Racioppo, 2000). 
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the way in which stressor stimuli are evaluated. However, I have been 
unable to identify any research investigating a link between SE and 
preconscious appraisals processes. Thus, as explained in Chapter 2, not 
only does a ‘gap’ in stress research exist in establishing whether stress 
regulation includes change to preconscious appraisal mechanisms, but an 
additional ‘gap’ exists in determining the involvement of SE on such 
preconscious appraisals. Therefore, the role of this study is to take the 
first few steps to explore these ‘gaps’ in an attempt both to expand our 
understanding of the protective nature of SE in limiting stress, but also 
to draw the attention (and resources) to an area of research that could 
potentially help to achieve my over-arching goal of witnessing the 
establishment of a national curriculum that incorporates a focus on stress 
resistance, or anti-stress training. 
 
Summary and research questions 
 
By citing work in the field of self-directed neuroplasticity, I argued 
earlier that, as efficacious agents, humans are capable of consciously and 
deliberately altering the neurological processes that underpin cognition. 
By drawing together evidence in the field of emotion regulation I further 
asserted that affect may be altered in similar ways – i.e. the conscious 
and preconscious appraisal processes that generate emotion may be 
regulated significantly to manage resultant emotions. However, in 
contrast to the self-directed neuroplasticity paradigm, the functional 
manipulations that regulate emotion occur not only consciously, but also 
preconsciously, without our awareness. As I have suggested that stress 
shares functional equivalence with affect regulation (and provided 
significant evidence to support this position), I further advance that the 
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emotional regulation processes outlined here also apply to the 
management of stress. If one accepts the hypothesis presented - that 
stress is an emotion and that agentic beliefs can alter cognitive processes 
– I present the logical sequitur that SE may manipulate stress via an 
effect on stressor appraisals. I further assert that, whilst SE may 
interact with processes that regulate conscious appraisals, a second 
significant stress-limiting effect could also occur through unconscious 
regulation of preconscious stressor appraisal processes. Therefore, I 
propose that SE may also provide some of its protective effect by 
unconsciously ‘toning down’ the preconscious appraisal of stressor stimuli. 
In other words, people with high SE may simply not perceive stimuli to be 
stressors, which is in keeping with the conclusions of Bandura (1997), 
Lazarus (1999) and others (e.g. Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), albeit for very 
different reasons! 
 
To explore my assertions further, I propose the following research 
questions, which will form the focus of this study; 
 
1. To what extent does academic SE limit the development of 
acute academic stress? 
 
2. To what extent does acute academic stress exposure affect 
the preconscious appraisal of academic stressor stimuli? 
 
3. To what extent does academic SE affect the preconscious 
appraisal of acute academic stressor stimuli? 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
Choosing the research methodology 
 
Post-positivist methodologies seek to reveal causal descriptions (Shadish 
et al., 2002) between manipulated-, controlled- or empirically observed 
variables, most frequently through the use of objective, randomised 
experimental procedures (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Such protocols are;  
 
“Widely considered the gold standard because they are expected to produce an 
estimate of the mean treatment effect on a given dependent variable that 
deviates from the true value only by random error, which is kept small when 
statistical power is adequate” (Wilson & Lipsey, 2001, pg413).  
 
However, consistent with the post-positive notion of multiple 
operationalism (Campbell & Fiske, 1959);  
 
“Although randomised experiments are often seen as the golden standard… there 
are many situations where the use of experimental design is not suitable or [is] 
simply impossible” (Aussems et al., 2011, pg21).  
 
Thus the researcher is compelled to draw from other post-positivist 
methodologies, such as modified experimental protocols (Cook & Campbell, 
1979), or other quantitative comparative procedures (e.g. Cochran, 1965).  
 
As an example, consider the clinical trials process for testing new 
pharmacological agents. This procedure entirely typifies Shadish’s ‘true’ 
experimental methodology (Shadish et al., 2002) as it employs a system 
of pre- and post- intervention testing, the use of control groups and, 
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crucially, the randomisation of participants and of treatment via placebo 
and double-blind protocols. However, this well-established process 
becomes entirely inappropriate if, for example, the efficacy of the drug 
being tested has already been partially established. Under such 
circumstances ethical considerations would prevent the researcher from 
withholding the treatment from members of a control group, which 
immediately removes the possibility of the trial following the standard 
post-positivist clinical trial protocol (Harris et al., 2006). In similar 
fashion, access to a limited number of participants, or the inability to 
randomise those participants into control and experimental groups 
undermines the feasibility of following an experimental methodology, and 
thus necessitates the use of methodologies other than randomised 
experiments (Cook & Campbell, 1979). In such circumstances, quasi-
experimental methodologies are frequently used (Cook & Campbell, 1979) 
as they allow causal hypotheses to be tested; 
 
 “In circumstances where full control over the scheduling of experimental stimuli 
(the when and to whom of exposure and the ability to randomise exposures) which 
make a true experiment [are not] possible” (Campbell & Stanley, cited in Shadish 
et al., 2002, pg14). 
 
In this research all three of the scenarios illustrated above apply. Firstly, 
by definition, studies conducted within one school are subject to the 
limitations of a small sample size (at least on the kind of scale used in 
large randomised experimental studies). Secondly, as ethical guidelines 
insist that “participants must be protected from stress by all appropriate 
measures” (British Psychological Society, 2012, pg1), this removes any 
possibility of establishing an independent stressor stimulus of the kind 
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necessary for a ‘true’ experimental protocol. Lastly, as a consequence of 
the previous limitation, the procedure for allocating participants to 
experimental and control groups cannot be operationalised arbitrarily: in 
other words, it was not possible to follow the randomised grouping 
protocol that lies at the heart of the ‘true’ experiment (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994). In the words of William Shadish; 
 
“Those of us who toil in the trenches of fields like psychology, education and 
economics know that random assignment is what we would like to do, but that 
quasi-experiments are what we are sometimes forced to do for practical or ethical 
reasons” (Shadish & Cook, 1999, pg294). 
 
Therefore, in summary, although my ontological preference would be to 
uphold the ‘golden standard’ of post-positivist research (Shadish & 
Ragsdale, 1996) – the randomised experiment - for the reasons outlined 
above I chose to adopt the next best epistemic approach by following a 
quasi-experimental methodology in this research. 
 
Although the validity of quasi-experiments has been questioned 
(Glazerman et al., 2003) on the grounds that they offer limited scope to 
draw causal inference between intervention and outcome, a large body of 
research exists to support their role as a valid methodology for use in 
social scientific research. For example, in a pioneering large-scale study 
Dehejia and Wahba (1999) modelled the effects of a labour training 
programme on post-intervention earnings using both a randomised 
procedure and non-randomised trials. Their work (and its subsequent 
ratification by others e.g. Hill et al., 2004) provided strong supportive 
evidence that quasi-experimental and randomised studies can develop 
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similar effect sizes and equivalent predictive power. Although the 
conclusions of these studies have been debated (e.g. Shadish et al., 
2008), a number of authors have replicated their findings using 
propensity scoring paradigms (e.g. see Shadish et al., 2006) and multiple 
regression analyses (Steiner et al., 2010), which have been found either 
to reduce non-randomisation bias significantly (Shadish et al., 2008), or 
to remove it entirely (Aiken et al., 1998; Black et al., 2007). Other 
evidence supporting the equivalence of randomised experimental and 
quasi-experimental methodologies can be drawn from computer 
simulations (Drake, 1993) and doubly-randomised preference trials 
(Rücker, 1989), which Janevic and colleagues (2003) also found to reveal 
no significant difference between randomised- and non-randomised trial 
effects. 
 
However, whilst the studies mentioned above provide peripheral support, 
the most substantive evidence corroborating the validity of quasi-
experimental methodology comes from meta-analytic studies. For 
example, in a simple comparison of outcomes, Lipsey and Wilson (1993) 
found little difference in treatment effect between quasi-experimental 
and true experimental studies: a result later confirmed by Heinsman and 
Shadish (1996). Whilst this research has been criticised for its 
summative nature (i.e. it compiled outcomes only and made no attempt to 
regress confounding covariates – Shadish et al., 2008) other, more 
statistically rigorous projects, have taken these limitations into 
consideration. For example, in a meta-analysis of 47 quasi-experiments 
and 52 randomized experiments Heinsman (1993, cited in Shadish & 
Heinsman, 1997) found that randomised experiments yielded only ‘slightly 
higher’ effect sizes, whereas other studies have found no significant 
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differences at all (Wampold et al., 1997; Stiles et al., 1986; Meldrum, 
1998; although see Shadish & Ragsdale, 1996; Glazerman et al., 2003, who 
did find significant differences between methodologies). This effect is 
further confirmed by Wilson and Lipsey (2001), who conducted the 
largest meta-meta-analysis to date (of 319 meta-analyses) and found; 
 
“Virtually no difference, on average, between the results from nonrandomized 
comparison group designs and those from randomised designs” (Wilson & Lipsey, 
2001, pg424).  
 
That said, their study also revealed large discrepancies between the 
validity of some quasi-experimental studies, leading them to urge caution 
in assuming congruence between quasi-experimental and randomised 
experimental methodology;  
 
“These results underscore the difficulty of detecting treatment outcomes [and] 
the importance of cautiously interpreting findings from a single study” (Wilson & 
Lipsey, 2001, pg413 - abstract).  
 
This is particularly the case given the influence of unidentified or 
uncontrolled covariates (Steyer et al., 2000; Shadish & Ragsdale, 199654) 
and the limitations of statistical regression (Shadish et al., 2002). 
Therefore, whilst quasi-experiments do, under carefully planned 
circumstances, have equivalent validity to randomised experiments, my 
choice to follow this methodology comes with the strong proviso that I 
plan the study as carefully as possible and take every precaution possible 
                                                
54 Their study found that variation could be reduced by half if particular covariates 
were taken into account. 
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to limit the influence of confounding variables generated through the use 
of non-randomised groups. 
 
Choosing the quasi-experimental design 
 
Quasi-experiments establish causal descriptions (Aussems et al., 2011) 
using protocols;  
 
“That have treatments, outcome measures and experimental units [participants], 
but do not use random assignment to create the comparisons from which 
treatment-caused change is inferred” (Stouffer & Campbell, cited in Cook & 
Campbell, 1979, pg6).  
 
In this research the availability of modular A-level examinations in the 
January 2013 examination season determined the assignment of 
participants into control and experimental groups which, although a 
number of different quasi-experimental procedures exist (Shadish et al., 
2002), necessitated the choice of a non-equivalent group design for the 
methodology. Of these, the untreated control group design with one pre-
test was selected (see Figure 1 below) for the reasons given below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Diagram representing the untreated control group design with one pre-test quasi-
experimental methodology (adapted from a similar diagram in Shadish et al., 2002). 
NR:  O1 X O2 (Experimental Group) 
 
NR:  O1  O2 (Control Group) 
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This methodology has two distinct advantages over alternatives. Firstly, 
the inclusion of a pre-test procedure is widely recognised to improve 
quasi-experimental design (Shadish et al., 2002), as it enables the 
influence of ‘noise’ from pre-treatment variables to be removed from the 
measurement of the dependent variable, either by use of ANCOVA or 
statistical regression analyses. The second advantage is that this 
methodology makes use of a control group. Control groups literally provide 
control over the independent variable, which “helps separate the effects 
attributable to a treatment from the effects attributable to 
irrelevancies that are correlated with a treatment” (Cook & Campbell, 
1979, pg31). This would not be possible, for example, following a one-
group pre-test / post-test design. Similarly, control groups also remove 
the possibility of regression towards the mean, which is a common 
problem for quasi-experimental methodologies that use a single group 
design (Shadish et al., 2002). 
 
Therefore, in summary, quasi-experimental methodologies that use both 
control groups and pre-testing are recognised as being of ‘sounder design’ 
(Harris et al., 2006) than most other quasi-experimental designs and, as 
such, are the preferred methodology for use in this study. That said, 
Cook and Campbell (1979) identify other methodologies with the potential 
to develop more statistical power than the methodology employed here. 
However, such protocols frequently necessitate the inclusion of switching 
replications (Shadish et al., 2002) within the methodology. This involves 
utilising a second control group who, in this scenario, would have been 
required to sit the public examinations at a different time in the protocol 
to the other groups. Whilst the Joint Council for Qualifications (JCQ) do 
permit some flexibility in the scheduling of public examinations (see JCQ, 
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2012), this strictly applies to situations in which students have two or 
more public examinations scheduled at the same time on the same day, or 
when more than six hours of examinations are scheduled in the same day. 
Other changes to examination schedules are not permitted. Clearly, then, 
it is neither feasible, nor ethical to move the dates of public examinations 
to suit a research methodology, which explains why protocols with 
switching replications, despite their advantages, were not incorporated 
into this study.  
 
In similar vein, methodologies incorporating repeated-measures offer 
scope to develop the internal validity of a study because they allow for 
repeated testing of the same participants under identical conditions – a 
protocol very similar to test-retest procedures. Effectively, such 
methodologies control for variations between participants and would thus 
offer considerable potential to develop the generality of the conclusions 
of this study. However, as with methodologies employing switching 
replications, pragmatic considerations prohibited the use of such 
measures in this study. For example, many participants in the study sat 
just a single public examination in the January 2013 season, which 
precluded the option of repeated stressor exposure. Even for students 
who took multiple exams, the short intervals between papers (often only a 
few hours) made repeated testing phases both impractical and, arguably, 
unethical. One potential alternative would have been to arrange for some 
participants to take an additional raft of mock examinations, either a few 
weeks after, or a few weeks before, their public exams. I rejected this 
option for three reasons; a) on the grounds of the significant disruption 
to the teaching timetable such additional exams would inevitably cause, b) 
ethical reasons associated with the previous point, particularly as the 
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rationale for such an intervention bares little direct educational benefit 
to the pupils55 and, c) because of the implicit difference in stimulus 
valence between a ‘real’ public exam and a ‘fake’ mock exam – i.e. because 
an additional mock, however similar to a public exam, is fundamentally not 
a public exam, it cannot constitute an identical replication of stressor 
exposure and is, therefore, self-defeating in a repeated-measures 
methodology. Thus, for the purposes of this study, I limited testing to 
just a single phase of examinations. 
 
A final reservation with the choice of methodology is the use of a single 
pre-test. Campbell advocates the use of multiple pre-tests (Cook and 
Campbell, 1979, pg37) because they “assist in controlling time-varying 
confound effects,” such as threats associated with differential rates of 
participant maturation (Shadish et al., 2002), or the identification of 
regression artefacts generated by analysing only part of a natural cycle 
(Cook & Campbell, 1979). In both cases quantitative assessment of time-
dependent ‘background’ effect is possible, which can then be eliminated 
from the overall effect statistically (West et al., 2000). In a similar way, 
multiple pre-tests allow for assessment of instrument internal reliability 
(commonly by calculation of Cronbach’s alpha, or test-retest procedures) 
which, as pre-test error is known to combine synergistically with error 
generated through non-random grouping, can be statistically factored out 
of post-treatment assessment to avoid ‘flattening’ of regression lines. As 
the flattening effect is known to distort accurate assessment of the 
influence of the independent variable (particularly in methodologies using 
only a single pre-test - Trochim, 2006), the clear conclusion is that quasi-
                                                
55 This point is arguably amplified by conducting the study in an independent school, 
where the parents pay fees for the provision of their daughter’s education. 
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experimental methodologies employing multiple pre-tests are 
advantageous over those using a single phase of data collection. This 
obviously begs the question, ‘why were multiple pre-tests not used in this 
research?’  
 
The simple answer is that I had intended originally to follow an untreated 
control group design with two pre-tests: my ‘plan’ scheduled the project 
to run during the January 2014 examination season, providing ample time 
to recruit participants, secure necessary consents, and to run both pre-
test phases of data collection in the last months of 2013. However, on the 
9th November 2012 the Office of Qualifications and Examinations 
Regulation (Ofqual) suddenly and unexpectedly announced that, as part of 
on-going A-level reforms, “from next September, students will only be 
able to sit AS and A level exams in the summer” (Ofqual, 2012), which 
meant that the last available January modules would occur in the January 
2013 examination season. With plans thoroughly scuppered, this 
unwelcome announcement left me with four viable options; a) move the 
study to a summer examination season, b) switch the study to an internal 
examination season, c) recruit younger participants, or d) bring the 
project forwards a year.  
 
As virtually every student in every school in the country sits public 
examinations in June, following the first option would have meant 
abandoning the use of a control group. Whilst other quasi-experimental 
methodologies exist that adopt a single group format, the clear guidance 
is that, on the relative hierarchy of quasi-experimental design (Harris et 
al., 2006), methodologies using control groups develop more validity (Cook 
& Campbell, 1979) than those that do not. This effectively precluded 
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following the first option. A similar reservation applied to the second 
option, with the added limitation that mock examinations (or internal 
examinations) are intrinsically less stressful than the real thing. 
Therefore, I dismissed the option of designing the methodology around 
internal exams. I considered carefully the option of recruiting 
participants from Year 10, as some exam boards offer the option of 
sitting early modules in some GCSE courses (e.g. Edexcel Geography, OCR 
360 Science or AQA Drama). Whilst this arrangement would provide the 
option of a Control group (most Year 10 students do not sit public 
examinations in this year), I identified three significant limitations with 
this option, 1) the development of SE is age-dependent (see later section 
on participants) and is less defined in younger people, 2) additional ethical 
implications would need to be considered, were younger participants to be 
recruited to the study, and 3) the small number of students sitting public 
examinations in Year 10 would necessitate the recruitment of pupils from 
a number of schools to reach a sufficient sample size to generate the 
guideline 80% statistical power (Lipsey & Hurley, 2009 – see later). Taken 
together, these reservations led me to dismiss the third option as well. 
This effectively left moving the study forwards by a year as the only 
viable, practical solution. The caveat to this decision was that, given the 
time constraints of recruiting participants ethically, I was unable to 
schedule two phases of pre-testing and, therefore, the study followed an 
untreated control group design with just a single pre-test. 
 
Therefore, in summary, I posit that the choice of an untreated control 
group design with one pre-test constituted the most valid quasi-
experimental methodology to employ in the context of the research, both 
for pragmatic reasons and because it was the highest ranking available 
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option on the relative hierarchy of quasi-experimental designs (Harris et 
al., 2006). 
 
Application of the quasi-experimental design 
 
Participants were allocated non-randomly into two non-equivalent groups, 
which I refer to from this point forwards as the Experimental group and 
the Control group. Allocation was determined by the availability of 
modular AS and A2 A-level examinations in the January 2013 examination 
season. Students with examinations (N=70) constituted the Experimental 
group and students with no examinations (N=44) constituted the Control 
group. As examinations are widely recognised to be the most significant 
stressor adolescents experience at school (Burnett & Fanshawe, 1997; 
Kohn & Frazer, 1986), the premise behind the grouping procedure was 
that the Experimental group would experience acute academic stress as a 
consequence of exposure to academic stressor stimuli (represented by 
‘intervention X’ in Figure 1). By contrast, participants in the Control group 
were not exposed to academic stressors and, therefore, did not develop 
acute academic stress. 
 
As summarised in Figure 2 below, members of both groups participated in 
two discrete and identical phases of data collection, which I refer to as 
pre-stress (PrS) testing and post-stress (PoS) testing. PrS testing 
occurred 6-7 weeks before stressor exposure, whilst the PoS phase took 
place in the week of the examinations themselves. In keeping with 
guidance from Shadish and colleagues (Shadish et al., 2002) participants 
undertook PrS and PoS testing at approximately the same time of day, by 
completing instruments over two lunchtime sessions (either 12:40 – 13:00 
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or 13:00 – 13:20), which were available every day during the week of 
testing. Participants were instructed to come for testing on a specific 
day, but were free to choose which lunchtime session they came to. This 
procedure intended to limit clashes with other lunch commitments and, 
thereby, to increase participant retention.  
 
PrS and PoS testing took place in one of the school IT suites in groups of 
5-20 participants. Each computer workstation was screened from the 
others using free-standing A3 display boards, which stopped participants 
from talking to each other, or from distracting each other during testing. 
It also served to preserve participant privacy. 
 
Control Group: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Experimental Group: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Diagram representing the three phases of data collection. 
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Each phase of data collection consisted of three different instruments: 
the Examination Self-Efficacy Scale (ESES), the Perceived Stress Scale 
(PSS10) and the Stressor-Appraisal Implicit Association Test (SA-IAT). 
The instruments were completed over a period of 10 - 20 minutes in the 
order shown in Figure 2. The PSS10 and ESES were completed on paper 
(see Appendices E & D respectively), whereas the SA-IAT was hosted on 
the school’s VLE and, accordingly, was completed using a networked PC. 
Although I document the structure, function and validity of these 
instruments separately in this Chapter, the primary function of these 
instruments is as follows; 
 
SA-IAT:  measures the preconscious appraisal of stressor stimuli 
ESES:  measures academic SE 
PSS10:  measures perceived stress  
 
Relating the design to the research questions 
 
1. To what extent does academic SE limit the development of acute 
academic stress? The impact of academic stressor exposure on stress 
can be measured by performing an ANCOVA analysis between Control and 
Experimental groups with PoS stress levels as the dependent variable and 
PrS stress level as a covariate. Any contribution of academic SE towards 
the development of stress can be measured using a Pearson’s Product 
Moment Correlation Coefficient for each participant group, which assess 
the degree to which academic SE is correlated with PoS stress. Lastly, 
any differences revealed by the regressions can be assessed for 
significance through application of a Fisher’s r-to-z transformation 
calculation. 
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2. To what extent does acute academic stress exposure affect the 
preconscious appraisal of academic stressor stimuli? Similar to the 
previous question, the difference in post-stressor exposure measures of 
implicit stressor appraisal can be contrasted between Control and 
Experimental groups by conducting an ANCOVA analysis on PoS SA-IAT 
scores, with PrS SA-IAT data as a covariate. 
 
3. To what extent does academic SE affect the preconscious 
appraisal of acute academic stressor stimuli? The correlation between 
SE and implicit appraisal can be contrasted between Control and 
Experimental groups in both pre- and post-stressor exposure phases 
using Fisher’s r-to-z transformation calculations. For any significant 
differences, the contribution of academic SE towards implicit stressor 
appraisal can be assessed using a linear regression analysis. 
 
Considerations and Control Procedures 
 
Participants. In order to gauge the approximate number of participants 
required for this study I conducted an analysis of statistical power using 
G*Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2009). Using Cohen’s (1977) recommended values 
of Type I and Type II error (respectively, α = .05 and β = 0.2), the 
minimum number of participants required to achieve 80% power (the 
conventional ‘minimum target’ of power for statistical analyses – Lipsey & 
Hurley, 2009) in an ANCOVA analysis was calculated as between 52 and 
128 per group. This assumes a large to medium effect size (i.e. θ lies 
within the range .25 ≤ θ ≤ .4), as defined by Cohen (1992). These 
calculations are displayed graphically in Figure 3. 
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All schools develop a unique personality (Schein, 1985), or culture - “the 
way we do things around here” (Bower, 1966, pg12) - which is “manifested 
in people’s patterns of behaviour, mental maps, and social norms” 
(Paterson & Deal, 2009, pg18). This school ‘culture’ varies significantly 
from school to school (Paterson & Deal, 2009) - even when schools with 
students from broadly similar socioeconomic backgrounds are contrasted 
(Sirin, 2005) - and has been shown to exert a significant contributing 
effect on students’ SE (Artelt et al., 2003). This effect is independent 
of other factors known to affect average student SE, including 
socioeconomic status (McConney & Perry, 2010) and the academic 
standing of the school (Chiu & Xihua, 2008). Taken in conjunction with 
research from other  contexts demonstrating the influence of nationality 
(Kim & Park, 2006) and culture (Oettingen & Zosuls, 2006) on SE, I 
reasoned that the 52 – 128 participants should be recruited from the 
same school and should, therefore, share a similar sense of school 
  
Figure 3: Graphs representing G*Power power analysis for minimum sample size  
(left, θ = 0.4. right, θ = 0.25) 
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culture. This decision to recruit all participants from the same school was 
made in part for pragmatic reasons, in part for ethical reasons (mostly 
associated with access to other schools), but mostly as an attempt to 
limit the confounding effect of school culture on SE. Therefore, I chose 
to limit the study to the school in which I worked. This decision had a 
number of additional benefits;  
 
a) As the school selected is an independent and academically selective 
fee-paying day school, the influence of many of the other social factors 
known to affect SE (e.g. socioeconomic status, comprehension of English 
or General Intelligence [GI]) was limited as far as was possible. 
 
b) Gender is well-known to affect the development both of academic SE 
(Britner & Pajares, 2001; Pajares & Valiante, 2001; see also Hansen, 2009; 
Pajares, 2002) and of acute- (Matud, 2004) and chronic stress (Cleary, 
1987), as well as playing a significant role in the pathogenesis of stress-
related illness (Weissman & Klerman, 1987). As the school selected is a 
single-sex girls’ school, the confounding influence of gender was 
effectively controlled. However, this introduced the caveat of the effect 
of hormone cycles on self-reported stress and SE. However, as this 
effect was dispersed evenly across both participant groups (Control and 
Experimental group) and, as ANCOVA assesses variation between groups, 
the influence of hormone cycles was, therefore, eliminated statistically 
by the use of ANCOVA. 
 
c) Similar to the previous point, age has been shown to exhibit a marked 
effect on the development of academic self-efficacy (Anderman et al., 
1999; Urdan & Midgley, 2003) and stress (Rudolph & Hammen, 2003; 
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Rutter, 1981). Therefore, in order to reduce the effect of these 
variables, I chose to limit participant recruitment to within a single key 
stage. For ethical reasons, the availability of a large number of public 
examinations in January 2013 and because the size of the Sixth Form in 
the school selected (150 girls) exceeds the upper figure in the desired 
sample size (128), I elected to limit the study to Year 12 and 13 pupils at 
the chosen school. 
 
Ethics. Prior to collecting data, I sought approval for the design of the 
study from the Ethical Research Council at Brunel University. Approval 
was granted and a copy of this letter is included in Appendix C. 
 
Based on Creswell’s (2003) guidance, before beginning any data collection 
all participants were given a full briefing (see Appendix D), which 
explained their right to withdraw from the study at any point, their right 
to withdraw their data from the project, if they so desired, their right 
to ask questions and to obtain a copy of the results and an outline of the 
benefit of the study. The participants were then asked to sign a consent 
form (see Appendix E), which indicated that they understand the 
procedure and gave their informed consent to take part. As the majority 
of participants were under the age of 18, I requested that participants 
discussed the study with their parents and, therefore, instructed 
participants to take their briefing and consent forms home for counter-
signing by their parents. Counter-signing their daughter’s form was taken 
to indicate parental consent for participation. One participant failed to 
return a counter-signed consent form (despite a number of reminders) 
and she was asked politely to withdraw from the study. 
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In keeping with guidance from Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1992, 
cited in Cohen et al., 2008), I also took steps to maintain participant 
confidentiality. Each participant was instructed to follow a procedure 
that assigned them a unique, anonymous pseudonym – the first two letters 
of their mother’s maiden name and the last two digits of their phone 
number. This strategy preserved the identity of participants, but allowed 
completed instruments to be paired with their respective respondents 
during different phases of data collection, I chose to keep this data for 
2yrs (as recommended by Sieber, 1998, cited in Creswell, 2003). 
 
However, whilst the ethical issues mentioned so far are relatively 
germane across educational research, two additional ethical questions 
required special consideration. Namely; a) is it justifiable to expose 
participants knowingly to a significant academic stressor and, b) how to 
recruit participants in a school where, not only am I known to the 
students, but hold a position of authority within the school’s senior 
management team.  
 
In regard to the second point, in their Code of Conduct, the British 
Psychological Society emphasise that;  
 
“Investigators should realise that they are often in a position of authority or 
influence over participants… [and that] this relationship must not be allowed to 
pressurise the participants to take part in, or remain in an investigation” (BPS 
website).  
 
Therefore, although my role within the school gave me arguably greater 
authority as a researcher in this study than that of other researchers in 
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other projects, it is a problem common to all research scenarios, rather 
than an ethical point specific to this study. Therefore, I took steps 
similar to that of other researchers to recruit participants; namely the 
use of a neutral incentive (see recruitment section below).  
 
The other ethical concern – ‘is it justifiable to expose participants 
knowingly to a stressor?’ – was addressed in two ways. Firstly, by 
deliberately utilising a pre-existing academic stressor (modular public 
examinations in the January 2013 season), which would have taken place 
irrespective of the students’ participation in this study. As such, it is 
likely that the study generated little additional stress and, therefore, 
that the risk/benefit value of the study was extremely low (Sieber & 
Stanley, 1988). Secondly, in keeping with literature documenting the 
positive impact of debriefing in reducing stress56 (e.g. Robinson & 
Mitchell, 1993; 1995), all participants underwent a debriefing in groups of 
5 – 8 at the end of the study “to remove any harmful effects brought on 
by the study, and to leave participants with a sense of dignity and a 
perception that their time was not wasted” (Harris, 1988, pg191). In 
keeping with guidance from Aguinis and Henle (2004), the debriefing 
included a summary of the research findings, an opportunity express 
opinions and thoughts about the study and a chance to ask questions. 
 
Recruitment. In order to recruit participants I advertised the study in 
three ways; 1) through announcements in two school assemblies, 2) by 
giving brief introductory talks on the biochemistry of stress during Sixth 
                                                
56 There is some debate as to the efficacy of debriefing in reducing chronic, or post-
traumatic stress. However, recent reviews (e.g. Everly & Mitchell, 2000) uphold its role 
in stress reduction. 
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Form Biology and Chemistry lessons and, 3) by giving presentations 
outlining the research study in Sixth Form tutor group meetings. This 
approach was rationalised by research from Patel, Doku and Tennakoon 
(2003, pg234), who state that “few participants will take part in research 
unless they can identify with and understand its validity and relevance.” 
Additionally, as many of the participants were completing A-level courses 
in one or more science subjects, or who aspired to study a science-related 
degree at university, I also incentivised the study as an opportunity for 
students to participate in a ‘real research study’. This is in keeping with 
advice offered by Hoinville and Jowell (1978, cited in Cohen et al., 2008, 
pg110) that incentives should be “clearly seen as a token, rather than a 
payment for the respondent’s efforts and should be as neutral as 
possible.” 
 
This incentive proved particularly appealing (a fact emphasised by the 
dozen or so girls who mentioned ‘participating in a real research study’ in 
their UCAS personal statements) and, in total, 119 female Sixth Formers 
volunteered to participate in the study. However, as four students failed 
to complete all three phases of data collection and a further student 
withdrew for ethical reasons (her parents had not counter-signed her 
consent form), only 114 participants contributed data towards the 
completed study. This formed a Control group of 44 participants and an 
Experimental group of 70 students. 
 
Non-random grouping. Despite the non-randomised nature of the quasi-
experimental protocol, grouping participants in this manner came as close 
to arbitrary allocation as was possible under the circumstances. Briefly, 
seven curriculum departments (Mathematics, Geography, Biology, 
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Chemistry, Politics, Economics and Philosophy & Ethics) have it as policy 
that students studying for these courses sit examinations in the January 
examination season, both for the AS and A2 year groups. These subjects 
are relatively diverse and include a wide spectrum of students’ aptitudes, 
ambitions and interests; thus lending significantly towards heterogeneity 
of grouping. Furthermore, as students sitting the January examinations 
had not elected to do so, but instead had been entered as an indirect 
consequence of selecting their A-level subject options, the confounding 
influence of academic ability (or GI) upon group selection was reduced. 
This was further assisted by the precaution of excluding participants 
from the Experimental group if they were only re-taking AS examinations 
– i.e. only students sitting AS or A2 modules for the first time were 
selected for the Experimental group. 
 
Statistical Validity. Likert-type instruments are known to produce 
interval-type data because “[although] the response categories have a 
rank order, the intervals between values cannot be presumed to be equal’’ 
(Jamieson, 2004, pg1217 – see also Appendix 2). However, despite this, 
large scale meta-analyses observe that parametric statistical tests are 
widely employed in methodologies incorporating Likert-type instruments 
(Clason & Dormody, 199457), resulting in Kurzon to decry the use of 
parametric statistics on ordinal data, arguing that this oversight 
constitutes the first of “seven deadly sins of statistical analysis” (Kurzon 
et al., 1996, pg265). However, whilst Jameson’s point is well-made, others 
argue that the use of parametric testing on Likert-generated data is 
justified. This argument is supported in two distinct ways; 1) the 
                                                
57 Clason and Dormody (1994) analysed 95 studies and found that only 13% used 
nonparametric measures. 
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contention that, whilst single Likert items should be considered ordinal, 
Likert instruments consisting of sums across many items (such as those 
employed here) are effectively interval (Carifio & Perla, 2008), 2) the 
observation that, even if the ‘wrong’ statistical test is used, often the 
outcome of either test leads towards the same conclusion: “this is what 
statisticians call robustness - the extent to which the test will give the 
right answer even when assumptions are violated” (Norman, 2010, pg626). 
The robustness of parametric tests as applied to Likert-type instruments 
is well evidenced: for example, meta-analyses frequently demonstrate 
that parametric and nonparametric statistical tests yield similar power 
(Clason & Dormody, 1994; De Winter & Dodou, 2012), whilst other studies 
have found that, in circumstances where responses are relatively normally 
distributed, similar (low) incidences of Type I between test regimes (De 
Winter & Dodou, 2012 - and never more than 3% above the nominal rate 
of 5% [Lipsey & Hurley, 2009]). Thus, as Norman (2010) asserts; 
 
“Parametric statistics can be used with Likert data, with small sample sizes, with 
unequal variances, and with non-normal distributions, with no fear of ‘coming to the 
wrong conclusion’. These findings are consistent with empirical literature dating 
back nearly 80 years” (Norman, 2010, pg632). 
 
The design and validity of the instruments 
 
As stated earlier, this study utilises three specific instruments – the 
PSS10, the ESES and the SA-IAT. Of these (bar some very minor 
adjustments – discussed below) two of these instruments are, 
effectively, ‘off the peg’ (the PSS10 and the ESES) and, therefore, bring 
with them a wide body of prior validatory research. By contrast, though 
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heavily based on a cogent prototype, the absence of a pre-existing 
instrument necessitated the construction the SA-IAT myself. This 
process (and the obligatory trialling and validation steps associated with 
the design phase) are conferred in detail in my Institution Focused Study 
(see Appendix 2) and are, therefore, not discussed any further here. 
However, before detailing individually the evidence that supports the use 
of these specific instruments in this project, because they are commonly 
united by their use of self-report methodology, I wish briefly to outline 
my position on the validity of self-report measures per se. 
 
Traditionally, procedures for establishing the validity of the 
hypothetical, psychological constructs self-reports aim to measure 
tended to centre around establishing unequivocal, empirical observations 
that demonstrated Construct Validity – i.e. the degree to which “a test 
measures what it claims, or purports, to be measuring" (Brown, 1996, 
pg231). Methodologies for establishing construct validity tended to 
assess whether “one’s measure of a given construct related to measures 
of other constructs in a theoretically predictable way” (Smith, 2005, 
pg395), effectively justifying or disproving the validity of one construct 
based on empirical evidence gathered from the measurement of another. 
Though popular in the 1950s and ‘60s, such polarized ‘justificationism’ 
(Bartley, 1962) has more recently fallen out of favour, with authors such 
as Lakatos (1999) concluding that there is now a significantly greater 
appreciation for the ‘indeterminate and ongoing nature of theory building 
and scientific criticism.’  
 
In relation to self-reports: “the psychological processes underlying an act 
of self-reporting are understood to be exceedingly complex” (Paulhaus & 
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Vazire, 2006, pg224) and, because multiple factors may contribute to the 
content of individual items (Kessler, 1987), some authors assert (e.g. 
Paulhaus, 1991) that it is rarely clear precisely what construct self-
reports actually measure. 
 
“At the most basic level, there is concern about the construct validity of self-
report measures. Both theory and research indicate that self-report responses 
are a product of psychological, sociological, linguistic, experiential and contextual 
variables, which may have little to do with the construct of interest” (Razavi, 2012 
pg4). 
 
Thus, in contrast to the original assertions of Cronbach, as theories and 
techniques for knowledge assessment have evolved, so too has our 
understanding of construct validity (Smith, 2005) in that research no 
longer strives to demonstrate unequivocal validity, but rather to view the 
validation process as an on-going dialogue between evolving theories and 
methodologies. In the following section, I draw together elements of this 
dialogue, which support both my decision to employ self-report measures 
in this project, and also outline my reasoning for choosing specifically the 
PSS10, SA-IAT and ESES instruments. 
 
Examination Self-Efficacy Scale. Traditionally, SE has been measured 
quantitatively using a self-report instrument and, over the last three 
decades, a large number of such SE-assessment instruments have been 
developed (e.g. Scherer’s [1982] Self-Efficacy Scale and the New General 
Self-Efficacy Scale developed by Chen and his colleagues [Chen et al., 
2001]). Of these instruments, however, the General Self-Efficacy Scale 
(GSES) has emerged most popular, chiefly because it is free to use and 
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open-source, as well as being thoroughly validated in a wide range of 
research projects (e.g. Scholz et al., 2002). It is, therefore, the obvious 
instrument to use as a starting point in this research. 
 
Developed in Germany and translated into English by Schwarzer in 1995 
(Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995) the GSES was originally constructed as 
an assessment of General Self-Efficacy. However, this construct has 
been heavily criticised (e.g. Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998) as it runs in stark 
contrast to Bandura’s original concept of domain-specific SE (Bandura, 
1997). Thus, as “SE is typically defined as [a person’s] perceived 
capabilities within specific domains” (Schunk & Pajares, 2002, pg27 – my 
emphasis), the GSES, whilst a logical starting point for the measurement 
of SE, had to be adapted in order to measure specifically academic SE58. 
This precaution was intended to avoid measurement attenuation through 
generality with other SE domains. In fact, one of the secondary appeals 
of using the GSES is that, as Schwarzer asserts, the GSES “can be easily 
adapted to tap specific behaviour [by] add[ing] or change[ing] a few items 
to cover the particular content of the survey“ (Schwarzer, 2011). 
Therefore, to incorporate the changes that altered the GSES to become 
a specific measure of academic SE, I refer to the adapted version of the 
GSES as the Examination Self-Efficacy Scale (ESES – see Appendix D) 
from this point onwards. 
 
Duly adapted, the ESES now consists of 20 items, each of which scores 
between 1 and 6 points utilising a Likert-type scale. Questions 1, 3, 4, 7, 
                                                
58 Note that even across separate branches of academic SE the generality of SE 
appears limited (see Bong, 1999; Pajares, 1996 & Ferrari & Parker, 1992). 
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9, 12, 15, 16, 18 & 20 are ESES questions and are scored from 1 - 6, 
whereas the other ten questions are fillers and attract no score. Thus 
ESES scores range from a minimum of 10 to a maximum of 60. The 
inclusion of ten ‘filler’ questions was designed to obfuscate response 
direction - i.e. to limit the degree to which participants were able to 
manipulate their responses towards a specific outcome (a reported 
criticism of questionnaire methodology - see Williams, 2003) and also to 
avoid what Haladyna (1997, pg11) describes as Proximity Error, which can 
occur “when differing skills are rated similarly when sequentially ordered 
[in a questionnaire].” Additionally, to overcome Acquiescence Bias (the 
tendency to say ‘Yes’ indiscriminately in answer to questions [Toner, 
1987]) sequential items were adapted to elicit both positive and negative 
responses i.e. to balance the GSES; for example, I changed Question 2 to 
include the word ‘not’ (“I do not know what I want to do in the future) so 
that respondents are not tempted to bias their answers through 
indiscriminate positive responses. The use of a balanced Likert-type scale 
also controls Leniency and Severity Errors (the tendency to give high 
ratings to most items by agreeing / disagreeing with everything) as, with 
half of the questions adapted to elicit opposite answers to the other half, 
errors of these types are effectively averaged out across the items. 
 
Likert and Likert-type questionnaires are designed to comprise 
unidimensional items, which “are of equal value in that they each provide a 
replicated assessment of the dimension measured by the total score on 
the scale” (Siniscalco & Auriat, 2005, pg61). Assessments of internal 
variance of the GSES consistently report Cronbach’s alpha of between 
.70 and .90 (Schwarzer, Mueller & Greenglass, 1999; Dona et al., 2002), 
with “most [alpha] scores greater than .80” (Schawrzer, 2011). 
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Therefore, by basing the ESES on the format of the GSES, the 
instrument measures “a continuous underlying dimension assessed by total 
scores on the attitude scale” (Siniscalco & Auriat, 2005, pg60).  
 
As well as utilising unidimensional items, Likert-type scales have also 
traditionally employed a five- or six-item response scale as Johns (2010, 
pg6) asserts that “data from Likert items… becomes significantly less 
accurate when the number of scale points drops below five or above 
seven.” Whilst Johnson, Smith & Tucker (1982) confirm that skew 
increases for Likert-type scales with three scale-point responses or less, 
Dawes (2002) found little difference between response accuracy in 5- 
and 11-point scales, indicating that Likert-type items with higher numbers 
of response points might produce equally accurate data. This observation 
was similarly demonstrated for kurtosis by Dawes (2008), who found 
comparably (low) levels of this kind of central tendency bias between 5-, 
7- and 11-point responses to Likert-type items. That said, in the interest 
of ‘manageability’ Johns (2010, pg6) advocates utilising a smaller response 
scale where possible, arguing that “few people will have a clear idea of the 
difference between, say, the eighth and ninth point on an 11-point agree-
disagree scale.” Therefore, as Schwarzer has generally allocated 10min 
for completion of the GSES (Schwarzer & Hallum, 2008), adapting GSES 
to utilise a larger response scale would not only take respondents longer 
(and, potentially, generate disincentive and a lower completion rate), but 
would be unlikely to result in any net gain in accuracy, nor loss of skew nor 
reduction in kurtosis. Therefore, I adapted the ESES to utilise the 
smaller six-category response scale. 
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By tradition, Likert scales include an odd number of response items so 
that respondents are offered a neutral midpoint (the ‘neither agree nor 
disagree’ response), which helps identify indifferent and ambivalent 
responses from respondents whose opinions are genuinely directed, but 
not strong enough to access the stronger response categories at the ends 
of the scale (Nowlis et al., 2002). However, in keeping with Schwarzer’s 
(2011) original design, the ESES has only six semantic response 
categories, thus forcing participants to bias their response in one 
direction or another. Johns (2005) advocates such ‘Likert-type’ scales 
(i.e. not a true Likert scale as it lacks a central neutral response ‘fulcrum’ 
or ‘seesaw’ [McCall, 2001]) because “some people use a midpoint to avoid 
reporting what they see as less socially unacceptable answers” (Johns, 
2005, pg238). His research into odd- and even- Likert-type scales 
demonstrated that respondents answer more positively to questionnaires 
that use an odd number of scale points – “the midpoint attracts many of 
those who actually disagreed, but were reluctant to admit as much” 
(Johns, 2005, pg239). The same evidence is replicated by Garland (1991, 
pg68), who concluded that “resorting to a scale without a mid-point seems 
to alleviate social desirability bias without changing the direction of 
opinion.” Therefore, although Worcester and Burns (1975) point out that 
smaller response scales can alter the intensity of respondents’ opinions, 
the limiting effect of a six-category response on the Social Desirability 
Bias makes it the preferred option for this questionnaire. Additionally, 
Shaw and Wright (1967) posited that responses in the middle category 
were frequent when respondents either had no clear opinion, or had not 
yet formed a clear opinion: thus; 
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“The middle response category… is at least occasionally utilized as a 
‘dumping ground’ for not applicable, uncertain, indifferent or 
ambivalent response orientations” (Kulas & Stachowski, 2009, 
pg492).  
 
Therefore, the ESES has been designed to lack a neutral response 
position and, because of this, it constitutes a more accurate gauge of SE 
than odd-numbered response scales. 
 
Schwarzer (2011) does not provide a justification for his choice of ten 
scored items for the GSES. However, Gilem & Gilem (2003) advise against 
smaller questionnaires, favouring multi-item measures as the most 
appropriate tool for assessing psychological attributes. They assert that 
questionnaires with low numbers of items (or even a single item) have 
considerable measurement error (Gilem & Gilem, 2003), which must be 
averaged across a larger number of responses to increase reliability. 
They also advocate a multi-item scale “to discriminate among fine degrees 
of an attribute” (Gilem & Gilem, 2003, pg8). By contrast Herzog and 
Bachman contend that; 
 
“Survey instruments have a maximum length beyond which there is 
an increasing probability of premature termination, random 
responding, or other behaviour patterns which result in data of 
lower quality” (Herzog and Bachman, 1981, pg558)  
 
Their conclusion was that shorter questionnaires (which they loosely 
define as 45min or less) show less Position Bias than questionnaires with 
larger numbers of items. Johnson and his colleagues agree (Johnson et al., 
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1974), and further advocate shorter questionnaires on the grounds of 
limited response omission, as their study clearly demonstrated that 
questions placed within the first 18 items of a questionnaire had 
significantly higher response levels compared to questionnaires in where 
the same question appeared later on. Therefore, the choice of twenty 
items for the ESES is in keeping with this recommendation, whilst 
ensuring that the instrument is long enough both to overcome 
measurement error and to assess academic SE discriminatively, but not so 
long as to generate bias or response omissions. 
 
Apropos of omitted responses, Schwarzer recommends “our rule of 
thumb is to calculate a score as long as no more than three items on the 
ten-item scale are missing” (Schwarzer, 2011, pg3). Though something of 
a moot point (as no participant returned an incomplete instrument), had 
instruments been returned incomplete, I planned in this instance not to 
follow Schwarzer’s guidance and instead to remove the entire dataset 
from subsequent statistical analysis. This precaution would have lessened 
the erosive impact of omitted responses on internal validity, whilst also 
reducing compound measurement error.  
 
In addition to providing evidence of reliability, “establishing Stability is 
also vital to validating psychometric tools… Stability refers to the 
concept that constructs retain a degree of resistance to change over 
time” (Lane et al., 2004, pg 339). Across a number of test-retest studies 
SE self-reports have been recorded as having high stability coefficients, 
with a gap of weeks (Luszczynska et al., 2005; Leganger et al., 2000), 
months (Schwarzer et al, 1999) and even up to two years (Chen et al., 
2001). 
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One final source of error germane to questionnaires is Halo Effect Error, 
which Siniscalco and Auriat (2005, pg6) describe as “the tendency to rate 
a particular statement according to how respondents feel about it in 
general.” Cooper (1981) identifies four potential sources of halo; 
engulfing, insufficient concreteness, under-sampling & insufficient 
participant motivation. The latter sources are overcome respectively by 
including an appropriately large number of questionnaire items and 
allowing respondents enough time to complete the questionnaire. I have 
already addressed these issues previously. According to Cooper (1981, 
pg222) engulfing occurs when responses “are coloured by an overall 
impression” such that “judgements on seemingly unrelated dimensions are 
engulfed by a general impression” (Feeley, 2002, pg226). However, as the 
ESES constitutes a unidimensional assessment of a specific form of 
academic SE, engulfing is, in fact, the desired outcome of the 
questionnaire! In other words, I wish responses to individual items to 
generate (or ‘be engulfed by’) an overall impression of academic SE. By 
contrast, however, Cooper’s fourth source of halo - Insufficient 
Concreteness – is relevant to Likert-type questionnaires and occurs when 
items lack specificity or appear vague or ambiguous. Feeley’s (2002, 
pg234-235) advice here is to “use concrete, specific and clear categories 
to assess instruction” and to “define items clearly and precisely and 
include an example to clarify the item to [respondents].” Therefore, to 
reduce or overcome halo, I included exemplars in the participant 
briefings and also altered syntax in the ESES to be as deliberate and 
clear as possible. 
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However, despite the strengths of the ESES questionnaire and its 
practical utility, there are some limitations of Likert-type methodology. A 
major restriction is the use of discrete response categories which, by 
nature of their ‘coarse granularity’ (Chimi & Russell, 2009), can at best 
only be viewed as an ordinal qualitative scale i.e. it cannot be assumed 
that one person’s ‘moderately true’ is the same as another’s and “there is 
no assumption of equal intervals between categories” (Cohen et al., 2008, 
pg327). However, as the SA-IAT instrument has exactly the same 
limitation (see Appendix B), this is a moot point for the ESES. A second 
limitation is that there is no way of assessing whether participants have 
responded truthfully, even with the preventative bias-reducing measures 
outlined above, there is no absolute certainty that the data collected 
denotes a ‘true’ representation of the respondents’ academic SE. A third 
limitation is that “often the total score of a respondent has little clear 
meaning since a given total score can be secured by a variety of answer 
patterns” (Kothari, 2008, pg83). Therefore, despite the unidimensional 
nature of the ESES, I cannot assume that participants with similar ESES 
scores have identical SE beliefs. I return to this discussion in Chapter 6. 
 
Perceived Stress Scale. The 10-item Perceived Stress Scale (PSS10 – 
see Cohen & Williamson, 1988) is a shorter and more widely used version 
of the initial PSS self-report instrument conceived by Cohen, Kamarck 
and Mermelstein (1983). Both versions of the PSS are used “to evaluate 
the degree to which situations in one's life are appraised as stressful" 
(Cohen et al., 1983, pg385). Thus the PSS constitutes “a subjective 
estimate of global stress level” (Cohen & Williamson, 1988, pg34) and, as 
such, the PSS has become “among the most commonly used self-report 
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measure of perceived stress in the social sciences” (Lavoie & Douglas, 
2012, pg48). 
 
The PSS10 (see Appendix E) is a Likert instrument similar in design to the 
ESES. Participants respond using a 5-point scale ranging from 0 (never) to 
4 (very often). Of the 10 items, 4 items (4, 5, 7 & 8) are worded in a 
positive direction and were, therefore, reverse-scored. As with the 
ESES, the inclusion of such reversed items helped to balance the 
instrument, which in known to limit acquiescence bias (Toner, 1987) and to 
reduce leniency and severity errors. Similarly, the choice of employing 
the shorter PSS10 instrument in preference to longer alternatives is in 
keeping with the rationale for the design of the ESES in that it should 
help to limit the development of position bias across the instrument 
(Johnson et al., 1974). One stark difference between the design of the 
ESES and the PSS10 is that the PSS10 makes use of an uneven response 
scale, which is at odds with my earlier assertion that scales with a 
fulcrum, or midpoint, tend to encourage social desirability bias (Johns, 
2005) and, therefore, are prone to kurtosis. On balance, although I would 
have preferred to alter the instrument to include a sixth response 
category (as was the case with the ESES), the existence of a significant 
body of validitatory studies (see below) and the opportunity to utilise 
normative values (Cohen & Janicki-Deverts, 2012), support a decision to 
employ the PSS10 as designed (Cohen & Williamson, 1988). Thus the 
PSS10 was not altered and retained its original five-point response scale. 
 
As indicated, the validity of the PSS10 has been tested extensively. For 
example, assessments of internal validity consistently report high alpha 
scores (e.g. .89 – Roberti et al., 2006; .85 – Cohen et al., 1993; .78 Cohen 
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& Williamson, 1988; .82 - Cohen & Janicki-Deverts, 2012) and reliability 
analyses have been unable to identify any meaningful differential item-
bias by sex, race, education (Cole, 1999), age, employment status or 
income (Cohen & Janicki-Deverts, 2012). Similarly, factor analyses 
reliably demonstrate that the PSS10 constitutes a bidimensional measure 
of stress (Cohen & Williamson, 1988; Gitchel et al., 2011; Ramírez & 
Hernández, 2007; Roberti et al., 2006) in that it assesses ‘perceived 
distress’ and ‘perceived coping ability’ as distinct factors which, when 
summated, constitute an internally valid perceived global measure of 
stress (Cohen & Williamson, 1988; Hewitt et al., 1992; Lavoie & Douglas, 
2012). This conclusion is further supported by confirmatory evidence 
from test-retest studies (Cohen et al., 1983) and the consistency and 
volume of reports demonstrating the reliability of the PSS10 in a wide 
variety of different countries and across a diverse range of cultural 
contexts. For example, the PSS10 has been translated into at least 
twenty different languages (Cohen, 2012) including; Spanish (Remor & 
Carrobles, 2001), Swedish (Eskin & Parr, 1996), Chinese (Lee & Crocket, 
1994) and Japanese (Mimura & Griffiths, 2008), as well as the original 
English (Cohen & Williamson, 1988). Each study reports effects that 
support Cohen’s assertion that the PSS10 constitutes “a universal 
measure of perceived stress” (Cohen et al., 1983, pg386).  
 
Similar to reliability, the stability of the PSS10 has also been extensively 
tested, with authors publishing a high degree of concordance across tests 
separated by a year (Golden-Kreutz et al., 2004), or over repeated 
measures throughout that period (Byrne et al., 1989). 
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In addition to its consistent stability and demonstrable content validity, 
the PSS10 also exibits a high level of construct validity. For example, 
convergence has been demonstrated with the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (Roberti et al., 2006), the Stress Vulnerability Scale (Connor 
et al., 2007), the Stress in Academic Life Scale (Alzaeem et al., 2010), 
the Daily Stress Inventory (Machulda et al., 1998) and the 
Multidimensional Health Locus of Control (Roberti et al., 2006) as well as 
a number of other measures of stress (Cohen & Williamson, 1988) and 
depression (Mimura & Griffiths, 2008). Similarly, divergence has been 
observed with instruments that do not measure stress (Cohen & 
Williamson, 1988), including the Sensation Seeking Scale, the Santa Clara 
Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire and the Overt Agression Scale 
(Roberti et al., 2006). Further evidence of construct validity comes from 
studies in which participants with high self-reported stress levels (using 
the PSS10 instrument) demonstrated a correlating elevated level of 
salivary cortisol (Baker et al., 1984; Van Eck & Nicholson, 1994; Malarkey 
et al., 1995), thereby showing concordance with physiological measures of 
stress59, which further strengthens the construct validity of the PSS10.  
 
Despite Cohen’s (2012, pg2) warning that “the Perceived Stress Scale is 
not a diagnostic instrument” and his insistence that the predictive validity 
of the PSS “is expected to fall off rapidly after four to eight weeks” 
(Cohen et al., 1997, pg11) because “levels of appraised stress should be 
influenced by daily hassles, major events, and changes in coping 
resources” (Cohen, 2012, pg2), a growing number of studies have 
                                                
59 It should be noted that this association has not been observed in all studies (e.g. 
Ebrecht et al., 2004; Van Eck et al., 1996) possibly because of differences in testing 
methodologies (Stowell, 2003; Bosch et al., 2004), such as ambiguity in the measurement 
of acute vs chronic stress (Murphy et al., 2010). 
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established strong predictive validity of the PSS10 with a diverse range 
of pathologies, including infertility (Band et al., 1998), skin conditions 
(Chiu et al., 2003), supressed immune functioning (Kiecolt-Glaser et al., 
1995), depression (Otto et al., 1997; Treadgold, 1999) and ageing (Epel et 
al., 2004), to mention but a few (see also Cohen & Janicki-Deverts, 2012; 
Cohen, 2012). Additionally, a number of studies highlight the PSS10 as 
predictive of maladaptive stress-related behaviours, such as smoking 
(Cohen et al., 1993), missing sleep and consuming alcohol (Cohen & 
Williamson, 1988), which may begin to explain the strength of the 
connection between high PSS10 scores and stress-related illness. Either 
way, whether the link between PSS10 scores and stress-related 
morbidity (Nielsen et al., 2008) is directly causal, or whether it 
represents an indirect correlation through maladaptive behaviours 
(Kiecolt-Glaser & Glaser, 1988), the conclusion must be that the PSS10 
constitutes a valid measure of stress in that it is strongly predictive of 
stress-related illness. 
 
Therefore, as the PSS10 demonstrates robustness in all three 
subcategories of validity as identified by Messick (1989) – i.e. content 
validity, construct validity and predictive validity – I conclude that the 
PSS10 constitutes a valid measure of global stress (Cohen & Williamson, 
1988). That said, there are some limitations with the PSS10, of which the 
most significant is;  
 
“The potential influence of other variables such as the subject’s 
personality, mood during testing and psychopathology. Furthermore, 
if these types of variables are associated with a psychological 
disorder (diagnosed or undiagnosed), then the subject’s ability to 
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appraise their stress is suspect, thereby nullifying the instrument’s 
predictive validity” (Herbert & Cohen, 1996, pg300).  
 
As with the limitations of the ESES, I return to this discussion in 
Chapter 6. 
 
Stressor-Appraisal Implicit Association Test. Implicit Association 
Tests (IATs) provide a quantitative assessment of the relative strength 
of automatic appraisals using a reaction-time paradigm (Greenwald et al., 
1998). The IAT measures these automatic, or implicit evaluations by;  
 
“Assessing the strength of mental associations between a target 
concept (e.g. ‘exams’) and one pole of an evaluative dimension (e.g. 
‘stressful’), as compared to a contrast concept (e.g. ‘holidays’) and 
the opposite pole of the evaluative dimension (e.g. ‘relaxing’)” 
(Andrews et al., 2010, pg2388). 
 
Participants are asked to categorize stimulus words into a series of 
different target-concept groups as quickly as possible. The speed of 
their reaction time is measured and provides an indirect representation 
of the preconscious association between the individual target and the 
individual concept. Overall, therefore, IATs works on the assumption that 
“it ought to be easier to make the same behavioural response [a key 
press] to concepts that are strongly associated, than to concepts that 
are weakly associated” (Nosek et al., 2005, pg167). Thus we might expect 
the key-press timings of two strongly associated concepts (e.g. ‘exams’ 
and ‘stressful’) to be faster than the key-press timings of two weakly 
associated concepts (e.g. ‘holidays and stressful). By presenting the initial 
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target categories (e.g. ‘exams’ and ‘holidays’) and the associated concept 
attributes (e.g. ‘stressful’ and ‘relaxing’) in all possible combinations, the 
underlying relative implicit associations between these concepts can be 
evaluated. 
 
In this research, I employ an IAT specifically designed to measure the 
preconscious association between stress and exams - the Stressor 
Appraisal Implicit Association Test (SA-IAT). This instrument produces 
scores based on Greenwald’s D measure (Greenwald et al., 2003), which is 
an effect-size-like measure with a possible range of zero to two around a 
‘neutral’ position of one. Scores less than one denote a stronger 
association between ‘holidays’ and ‘stressful’, whereas scores higher than 
one represent associations between ‘stressful’ and ‘exams’. As the design 
and validation of this instrument formed the focus of my Institution 
Focused Study (which I enclose in full as the second appendix to this 
thesis), instead of reiterating that research here, I simply restate my 
conclusion from that research that the SA-IAT constitutes a valid 
measure of implicit stressor appraisal. I also urge the reader to read 
Appendix 2 for a full evaluation of the SA-IAT and a justification of my 
assertion that the SAI-IAT instrument is an appropriate tool for use in 
this research project. 
 
Précis of the methodology 
 
Thus far I have explained the rationale for adopting a quasi-experimental 
methodology and presented justifications for implementing an untreated 
control group design with one pre-test. I have proffered summaries of 
the individual instrument protocols and contextualised their use in this 
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study with statements of validity. I also have outlined the control 
procedures and processes employed to increase the validity of the 
methodology, and given an overview of the ethical considerations of this 
study, and the steps taken to ensure conformitiy with guidelines. With 
the methodological narration now complete, in the next Chapter I present 
the research findings from the study and details of the statistical tests 
utilised that I employed in order to reach those findings. 
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Chapter 5: Research Findings 
 
This Chapter summarises the statistical measures taken to address the 
three research questions, the outcomes of those processes and 
limitations to the significance of conclusions. I also take steps to confirm 
statistically the validity of the instruments. 
 
A summative table of data analysed in this Chapter is presented in Table 
1 and 2 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Addressing the research questions 
 
1. To what extent does academic SE limit the development of acute 
academic stress? A simple two-tailed student’s t-test for independent 
samples was conducted to compare Control (M=14.10, σ=2.50) and 
Experimental (M=17.11, σ=2.22) PoS PSS10 data.  An initial Levene’s Test 
 PrS Testing 
Statistic SA-IAT ESES PSS10 
Mean 1.092 42.159 15.705 
SD 0.143 5.460 2.483 
 
 PoS Testing 
Statistic SA-IAT ESES PSS10 
Mean 1.045 42.545 14.250 
SD 0.151 6.094 2.451 
 
 PrS Testing 
Statistic SA-IAT ESES PSS10 
Mean 1.104 41.643 14.757 
SD 0.163 4.866 1.929 
 
 PoS Testing 
Statistic SA-IAT ESES PSS10 
Mean 1.176 41.514 17.186 
SD 0.156 5.107 2.241 
 
Table 1: Means and SDs for PrS & PoS data for the Control group. 
Table 2: Means and SDs for PrS & PoS data for the Experimental group. 
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revealed equivalent variances (F[1,112]=.676, p=.413) and, therefore, a t 
statistic assuming homogeneity of variance was computed, which revealed 
a significant difference in reported stress between the two participant 
groups (t[112]=-6.375, p < .001). This can be seen clearly in Figure 4, 
where error bars (here representing 95% confidence limits) clearly 
exhibit no overlap. This suggests that there was a significant difference 
in self-reported acute academic stress levels between Control and 
Experimental participant groups subsequent to academic stressor 
exposure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, whilst the t-test confirms a difference in PoS data, it fails to 
consider both the non-randomised nature of the grouping procedure and 
the PrS level of stress (which, in fact, was also significantly different 
 Figure 4: Average PrS & PoS PSS10 scores for Experimental and Control groups. 
Blue = PrS data 
Green = PoS data 
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between groups – see footnote60). Therefore, in order to compensate for 
these considerations, a one-way ANCOVA analysis was conducted 
incorporating PrS PSS10 scores as a covariate and the type 3 Sums of 
Squares algorithm to compensate for uneven group sizes (George & 
Mallery, 2003). The ANCOVA (between-subjects factor: PoS PSS10; 
covariate: PrS PSS10) also revealed a significant difference in PoS 
reported academic stress levels between groups (F[1,110]=126.78, p < 
0.01, ηp2=.533), which confirms the conclusion suggested by earlier t-test 
data – i.e. that participants in the Experimental group experienced 
significantly more acute academic stress than those in Control group. 
Additionally, the ANCOVA also highlighted the effect of stress 
experienced prior to academic stressor exposure, as PrS PSS10 scores 
were also found to have a significant effect on PoS PSS10 responses 
(F[1,110]=111.09, p < 0.01, ηp2=.500). Finally, the interaction between pre-
stress and group variables was found to be insignificant (F[1,110]=.122, 
p=.728, ηp2 < .001), thus demonstrating that the regression slopes for PrS 
PSS10 between groups are homogenous (see Figure 5 below), which 
ensures that the ANCOVA procedure was appropriate for the data 
collected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
60 A student’s t-test for independent samples (t[112]=2.281, p=.34) compared PrS data 
across participant groups. It revealed a significant difference between PSS10 group 
scores (Control: M=15.70, σ=2.48; Experimental: M=14.76, σ=1.93) before stressor 
exposure. 
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Having established a significant difference in PoS PSS10 levels between 
groups, the relationship between academic SE and PoS acute academic 
stress was examined. To that end, an ANCOVA was conducted (between-
subjects factor: PoS ESES; covariate: PrS ESES) to determine whether 
the participant groups had significantly different academic SE. The 
results of the analysis confirmed no significant difference between group 
academic SE (F[1,110]=.021, p=.886, ηp2 < .001) and no significant 
interaction between group and PrS academic SE (F[1,110] < 0.001, p > 0.99, 
ηp2 < .001 – see Figure 6). Thus, pre-stress academic SE was the 
significant factor in determining post-stress academic SE 
(F[1,110]=518.49, p < 0.01, ηp2=.825). 
 
Assuming equivalence of academic SE, the correlation between PoS ESES 
and ΔPSS10 data (the difference between PrS and PoS PSS10 scores) 
Figure 5: Homogeneity of regression for PSS10 data for Control and Experimental groups. 
 
Green = Experimental 
Blue = Control 
 122
was calculated for each participant group using Pearson’s Product Moment 
Correlation Coefficient (Control: r[42]=-.127, p=.413; Experimental: 
r[68]=-.585, p < .001 - correlations are represented in Figure 7). 
Correlations were analysed using a Fisher’s r-to-z transformation 
calculation (Lowry, 2001), which revealed a significant difference 
(Z=2.74, p < 0.01) between correlations. However, as the ESES-ΔPSS10 
correlation used in the transformation calculation was not significant, the 
outcome of this test must be interpreted with caution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Homogeneity of regression for ESES data for Control and Experimental groups. 
Green = Experimental 
Blue = Control 
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To address the limitations of the previous test and to gage quantitatively 
the contribution of academic SE in the genesis of acute academic stress, 
two linear multiple regression analyses were conducted (one for each 
participant group). The regressions assessed the extent to which PoS 
PSS10 data (dependent variable) could be predicted from PrS PSS10 data 
and ESES scores (unrelated independent variables). For the Control 
group, the regression equation was significant (R2=.596, adjusted R2=.576, 
F[2,41]=30.254, p < 0.01) and revealed a significant contribution from pre-
existing stress (PrS PSS10: t[41]=5.875, p < 0.01) and a very nearly 
significant contribution from academic SE (ESES: t[41]=-1.999, p=0.52), 
Standardised coefficients revealed that 64.9% of stress was predicted 
by pre-existing stress and -22.1% was attributable to academic SE. This 
effect was considerably pronounced in the Experimental group, where -
47.7% of academic stress was predicted by academic SE, whilst the 
contribution of pre-stressor exposure stress was found to be consistent 
 
Green = Experimental 
Blue = Control 
Figure 7: Correlation between ESES and ΔPSS10 for Control and Experimental groups. 
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with the Control group at 62.6%. The regression equation was also 
significant for the Experimental group (R2=.684, adjusted R2=.674, 
F[2,67]=72.369, p < 0.01), although here the contribution from both 
variables was significant (PrS PSS10: t[67]=9.058, p < 0.01; ESES: t[67]=-
6.895, p < 0.01) 
 
Therefore, in summary, evidence from the statistical tests described 
here reveals that exposure to an academic stressor stimulus resulted in 
an increased level of self-reported academic stress in the Experimental 
group. This effect was limited substantially by the participants’ perceived 
SE. Furthermore, evidence from the Fisher’s r-to-z transformation 
suggests that the stress-reducing effect of SE was more pronounced for 
participants with greater pre-existing SE than those with average, or 
below-average levels of academic SE (although this effect was not 
established within established confidence limits). 
 
2. To what extent does acute academic stress exposure affect the 
preconscious appraisal of academic stressor stimuli? Two two-tailed 
student’s t-tests for independent samples were conducted to compare 
similarity of SA-IAT between Control and Experimental groups in both 
the PrS and PoS phases of testing. In both cases Levene’s Tests revealed 
equivalent variances (PrS: F[1,112]=.607, p=.438; PoS F[1,122]=.502, 
p=.472), so t statistics assuming homogeneity of variance were computed. 
For the first test PrS data was used (Control: M=1.092, σ=.143; 
Experimental: M=1.104, σ=.163) and no significant difference between 
Control and Experimental group SA-IAT scores was identified (t[112]=-
.400, p=.690). This can be clearly seen in Figure 8, where error bars for 
the Control group (displaying 95% confidence limits) demonstrate 
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considerable overlap. By contrast, error bars for the Experimental and 
Control PoS groups share virtually no overlap at all, implying a significant 
difference between scores. This was confirmed by the second t test, 
which found a marked and significant difference between these data sets 
(t[112]=-4.418, p < .001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, in order to compensate for the effect of PrS artefacts and 
non-randomised grouping on PoS SA-IAT scores, a one-way ANCOVA 
analysis was also conducted. The ANCOVA included PrS SA-IAT scores as 
a covariate and utilised the type 3 Sums of Squares algorithm to 
compensate for the uneven group sizes (George & Mallery, 2003). The 
ANCOVA (between-subjects factor: PoS SA-IAT; covariate: PrS SA-
IAT) also revealed a significant difference in Control and Experimental 
PoS SA-IAT scores (F[1,111]=30.795, p < 0.01, ηp2=.217), confirming that 
the Experimental group did indeed demonstrate a stronger association 
 
Grey = PrS data 
Red = PoS data 
Figure 8: Average PrS & PoS SA-IAT scores for Experimental and Control groups. 
 126
between the target category ‘exams’ and the concept attribute 
‘stressful’. As with the previous ANCOVA, homogeneity of regression was 
established by observing no significant interaction between Group and 
PrS SA-IAT scores (F[1,110]=.958, p=.330, ηp2=.009 – see also Figure 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The histograms shown in Figure 10 compare the distribution of pre- and 
post-stressor exposure SA-IAT scores. The elevation in PoS SA-IAT 
scores is clearly visible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Green = Experimental 
Blue = Control 
Figure 9: Homogeneity of regression for SA-IAT data for Control and Experimental groups. 
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3. To what extent does academic SE affect the preconscious 
appraisal of academic stressor stimuli? Four Pearson’s Product Moment 
Correlation Coefficient tests were calculated to assess the correlation 
between academic SE and SA-IAT score for the Control and 
experimental participant groups in both the PrS and PoS phases. The 
correlations were; PrS - Control: r[42]=-.082, p=.598; Experimental: 
r[68]=-.095, p=.434; PoS - Control: r[42]=.194, p=.208; Experimental: 
r[68]=-.201, p=.095. The correlations are shown in Figure 11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 10: Histograms of SAI-AT Scores showing the difference in distribution between 
Control (top) and Experimental (bottom) group in PrS (left) and PoS (right) phases. 
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Correlations were analysed using two Fisher’s r-to-z transformation 
calculations (Lowry, 2001), which revealed no significant difference 
(Z=.07, p=.472) between PrS correlations and a significant difference 
(Z=.2.02, p=.022) between PoS correlations. However, as all four initial 
correlations used in the transformation calculations were not significant, 
the outcome of this test must be interpreted with caution. 
To assess whether the Fisher’s r-to-z transformations had revealed a 
significant correlation between academic SE and SA-IAT scores, a two-
tailed student’s t-tests for independent samples was conducted to 
compare the similarity of ESES scores between two subpopulations of the 
Experimental group – those who had experienced a drop in SA-IAT scores 
between phases of testing (i.e. a decrease in the extent to which 
stressors were appraised as stressful; N=21, M=-0.057, σ=.038) and those 
who had experienced an increase (N=49, M=0.128, σ=.104). An initial 
  
Figure 11: Correlations between ESES & SAI-AT scores for PrS (left) and PoS (right) phases. 
Green = Experimental 
Blue = Control 
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Levene’s Test revealed equivalent variances (F[1,69]=.291, p=.591), so t 
statistics assuming homogeneity of variance were computed. The 
student’s t-test revealed a significant difference in ESES scores 
between sub-populations (t[68]=2.272, p=.026), demonstrating that 
participants in the Experimental group with higher academic SE had 
indeed appraised stressors less stressful than participants with lower 
academic SE. This relationships is also visible in Figure 12 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To gage quantitatively the contribution of academic SE in the implicit 
appraisal of stressor stimuli, linear multiple regression analyses were 
conducted for each participant group to assess the extent to which PoS 
SA-IAT data (dependent variable) could be predicted from PrS SA-IAT 
data and ESES scores (unrelated independent variables). For the Control 
group, the regression equation was significant (R2=.606, adjusted R2=.587, 
 Figure 12: Difference in SE scores between subpopulations of the Experimental group.  
Left bar represents population with negative ΔSA-IAT scores (PoS-PrS), right bar represents 
population with positive ΔSA-IAT scores. 
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F[2,41]=31.526, p < 0.01) and revealed a significant contribution from pre-
stress SA-IAT score (PrS SA-IAT: t[41]=7.645, p < 0.01) and an 
insignificant contribution from academic SE (ESES: t[41]=1.238, 
p=0.223), which had a standardised coefficient of 12.2%. By contrast, for 
the Experimental group, the contribution of academic SE in predicting 
SA-IAT scores was found to be significant (ESES: t[67]=-2.635, p=.01), 
with SE contributing to -21.9% of variation. The pre-stress SA-IAT 
score was found to predict 72.3% of SA-IAT score (PrS SA-IAT: 
t[67]=8.758, p < .01). The regression equation was also significant for the 
Experimental group (R2=.542, adjusted R2=.529, F[2,67]=39.707, p < 0.01). 
 
Therefore, in summary, whilst academic SE was not found to play a 
significant contribution to the implicit appraisal of academic stressor 
stimuli for the Control group. By contrast, for the Experimental group, 
participants with low academic SE exhibited significantly elevated SA-
IATs after exposure to the academic stressor, whilst participants with 
higher academic SE did not. 
 
Validity of the instruments 
 
The internal validity of IAT instruments is well documented (Banse et al., 
2001; Bosson et al., 2000; for a review see Nosek et al., 2007), both 
through studies demonstrating high alpha scores (e.g. Steffens & 
Buckner, 2003) and by research establishing robust temporal stability 
(Egloff et al., 2005). Whilst the omission of a second phase of pre-
testing precluded the assessment of the internal validity of the SA-IAT 
in this study, I was able to conduct a small post-study test-retest 
procedure following a method similar to that used by Dasgupta and 
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Greenwald (2001). Thirty-five participants from the Control group 
repeated the SA-IAT 24hrs after PoS testing. The correlation between 
first and second SA-IAT scores was examined using Spearman’s Rho and 
this measure of reliability was then corroborated by calculating 
Cronbach’s alpha. As Figure 13 shows, test-retest data were significantly 
correlated (r[35]=.705, p < .001), indicating a level of reliability similar to 
that reported by Bosson and colleagues (Bosson et al., 2000) and a level 
of reliability higher than that of many other studies (e.g. Greenwald & 
Farnham, 2000; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2000). Alpha calculations (α=.833) 
also support a conclusion that the SA-IAT is a reliable instrument. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The reliability of the other instruments (the ESES and the PSS10) was 
also assessed by calculating Cronbach’s alpha; although, in contrast to the 
SA-IAT, calculations for these instruments were based on data collected 
during PrS testing. In keeping with the conclusions of previous authors 
 
Figure 13: Test-retest reliability for the SA-IAT. 
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(e.g. Schwarzer et al., 1999; Dona et al., 2002; Siniscalco & Auriat, 2005), 
the ESES was found to be highly reliable (α=.896). By contrast, the 
PSS10 demonstrated a lower internal consistency (α=.661) than that 
reported by most authors (e.g. Roberti et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 1993; 
Cohen & Janicki-Deverts, 2012), although a number of studies have 
published comparable alpha values (Ramadoss & Bose, 2010 - .70; 
Wongpakaran & Wongpakaran, 2010 - .71; Cohen & Williamson, 1988 - .78). 
Therefore, despite the relatively low PSS10 alpha score, in this research 
the PSS10 displayed an ‘acceptable’ level of reliability, whilst the SA-IAT 
and ESES respectively demonstrated ‘good’ to near ‘outstanding’ 
reliability (George & Mallery, 2003). 
 
In addition to demonstrating their internal validity, all three instruments 
elicited response profiles very similar to published norms, thus 
demonstrating convergence with established standards and, therefore, a 
high degree of construct validity. For example, all three instruments 
achieved levels of significance greater than .05 in Shapiro-Wilk tests for 
both Control and Experimental groups (SA-IAT: Sig(Cont)=0.381, 
Sig(Exp)=0.172; PSS10: Sig(Cont)=0.67, Sig(Exp)=0.125; ESES: Sig(Cont)=0.293, 
Sig(Exp)=0.068). Similarly, Normal Q-Q plots (an example of which is given 
in Figure 14) demonstrated a high level of concordance with regression 
lines which, taken in conjunction with the results from normality tests, 
established that the data from all three instruments was normally 
distributed – the accepted profile for these tests. Furthermore, mean 
PrS PSS10 scores for both Control and Experimental groups (Control: 
M=15.7, N=44, σ=2.48; Experimental M=14.8, N=70, σ=1.93) were well 
within half a standard deviation of norms published for females under 25 
years old (Cohen & Janicki-Deverts, 2012). Similarly, ESES means were 
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found to be very similar to normative values (Schwarzer, 2011)61 and, in 
keeping with data from previous studies (e.g. Greenwald et al., 2009; 
Sriram & Greenwald, 2009), SA-IAT responses were identified as 
following a normal distribution with PrS means very close to the 1.00 
neutral position (Control: M=1.09; Experimental: M=1.04 – see also Figure 
9). This was the case for both participant groups. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distribution analyses confirmed that data from ESES responses and SA-
IATs displayed no significant kurtosis for either participant group (both 
PrS and PoS) and, across all response items, data for the ESES was found 
to be free from skew. Although slight negative skew was identified in the 
PrS SA-IAT data (SK=-0.783), the SK value was considerably less than 
the critical value of ±1.96 (Sheskin, 2011) and was, therefore, not 
significant. By contrast, the low alpha score in the PSS10 was 
                                                
61 Note that this incorporates an adjustment of Schrarzer’s (2011) normative values to 
accommodate adapting the instrument to include a 6-interval response scale. 
Figure 14: Normal Q-Q Plots for PrS SA-IAT data for Experimental group. 
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accompanied by mild, though significant, negative skew in half of the 
PSS10 response items (questions 1, 2, 6, 9 & 10 elicited SK values > 1.96). 
Additionally, significant leptokurtic distribution was also identified in 
three PSS10 response items (questions 2, 8 & 10 elicited kurtosis scores > 
1.96). I discuss these limitations in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
Review of the findings 
 
In this Chapter I have described the statistical procedures employed to 
analyse the data collected throughout the study. I have stated, where 
appropriate, the confidence limits of these measures and applied this to 
test outcomes to highlight where significance was achieved. In sum, the 
outcomes of these processes are encapsulated as follows; 
 
To what extent does acute academic SE limit the development of 
academic stress? 
 
1. Prior to academic stressor exposure, there was no significant 
difference in academic stress levels between participant groups. 
 
2. After exposure to the academic stressor, the Experimental group 
reported more acute academic stress than the Control group. 
 
3. There was no difference in academic SE between participants in 
the Control group and the Experimental group. 
 
4. The Experimental group showed a significant negative correlation 
between academic SE and the degree of acute academic stress 
experienced. 
 135
 
5. Academic SE predicted nearly 50% of this effect. 
 
To what extent does acute academic stress exposure affect the 
preconscious appraisal of academic stressor stimuli? 
 
1. Prior to academic stressor exposure, there was no significant 
difference in implicit academic stressor appraisal scores between 
participant groups. 
 
2. After exposure to the academic stressor, the Experimental group 
reported elevated implicit academic stressor appraisal scores. 
 
To what extent does academic SE affect the preconscious appraisal 
of academic stressor stimuli? 
 
1. Academic SE predicted approximately -20% of the increase in 
implicit stressor appraisal scores. 
 
In the next Chapter I discuss the ramifications of these findings, draw 
conclusions from the observations described in this Chapter, discuss the 
limitations of this research and speculate on future research directions. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
 
Individuality of stress 
 
In keeping with prior research (e.g. Lohaus, 1990; Lakshmi, 2009; 
Chamberlain et al., 2011), this study confirms the findings of others that 
exposure to academic stressor stimuli constitutes a potent elicitor of 
acute academic stress. In this study the Experimental group (M=17.11, 
σ=2.22) reported significantly greater levels of acute academic stress 
than the Control group (M=14.10, σ=2.50) in post-stressor exposure 
testing (see Figure 15), but not in pre-stressor exposure testing, implying 
a causal relation between academic stressor exposure and the genesis of 
acute academic stress.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Post-stress PSS10 scores for Control group (above) & Experimental group (below). 
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This association is further confirmed by the frequency of PSS10 scores 
of 20 or above, which a number of authors have used to differentiate 
between acute stress and acute distress (e.g. Stauder et al., 2009; Wilks, 
2009). In this study only one member of the Control group reported such 
distress (2.3%) and their score remained the same in both phases of 
testing (thus, I speculate, the distress was likely to have had a social 
underpinning). By contrast, however, 11 members of the Experimental 
group (15.7%) reported post-stressor exposure PSS10 scores of 20 or 
more, where only two had reported distress in the previous phase of 
testing. Furthermore, in both of these cases, the level of distress 
increased further after academic stressor exposure, supporting the same 
conclusion – i.e. that exposure to academic stressors contributes 
significantly to the acute academic stress experienced by adolescents. 
Given the evidence I presented in Chapter 2 demonstrating that chronic 
stress either predisposes (or potentially causes) adolescents to develop 
psychopathologies (e.g. Seiffge-Krenke, 2000), disease (e.g. Ohlin et al., 
2004; Rosengren et al., 2004) and increased morbidity (Nielsen et al., 
2008), the implications of my conclusion are concerning, particularly as I 
posit that some of the participants in this study are at some risk of 
developing chronic stress as a consequence of further academic stressor 
exposure after the end of the study (e.g. through additional public 
examinations). 
 
However, despite observing significant acute academic stress in many of 
the participants, it is both interesting and reassuring to note that 40% of 
students in the Experimental group reported academic stress levels lower 
than the normative mean for their age and gender (Cohen & Janicki-
Deverets, 2012 – see reference line on Figure 15), despite being exposed 
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to the same academic stressor stimuli that had made many of the other 
participants so distressed. This outcome is absolutely in keeping with the 
observations of others (e.g. Williams et al., 2011), who repeatedly report 
similar wide variations in stress levels when different people are exposed 
to the same stressor. Not only does this reliable finding offer some 
degree of hope in averting chronic stress becoming “our next public 
health crisis” (Anderson, 2010, pg17), but it also serves to reiterate the 
question that ultimately inspired me to begin this study – why do people 
react so differently to similar stressors? 
 
Effectively, this observation both highlights and reinforces the well-
established view that stress is highly individualistic (Cooper & Bright, 
2001) and greatly subjective (Lazarus & Erikson, 1952; Lazarus, 1999). 
Indeed, the large standard deviation of post-stressor exposure PSS10 
scores reported in this study (and that of others - Cohen & Williamson, 
1988; Cohen et al., 1993; Cohen & Janicki-Deverts, 2012) clearly supports 
Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984, pg19) assertion that stress is, 
fundamentally, “based on personal perception and individuality.” 
 
To what extent does academic SE limit the development of acute 
academic stress? 
 
In his Cognitive Mediational theory, Lazarus (1966; 1968) explains this 
individuality of stress in terms of the cognitive interpretation of 
stressors. Such evaluations - or appraisals (Lazarus, 2001; 1999; 1993) – 
are one of 9 sources of evidence I outlined in Chapter 2 to support 
viewing stress as an affective process. Among the ‘cognitive resources’ 
(Sherman et al., 2008) identified as contributing towards the conscious 
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appraisal of stressors, SE has been found to play a significant role. 
Specifically, SE has been shown to protect people from the effects of 
stress (Bandura, 1997) as numerous studies have demonstrated that SE is 
negatively correlated with stress (e.g. Betoret, 2006; Vaezi & Fallah, 
2011). In this study, the first research question sought to test the 
degree of generality of this finding, by investigating the correlation 
between academic SE and academic stress in a group of female 
adolescents. Although SE is known to develop with age (Anderman et al., 
1999; Urdan & Midgley, 2003), the link between SE and reduced stress is 
well-established by late adolescence (Hackett et al., 1992; Solberg et al., 
1993; Gigliotti & Huff, 1995; Solberg & Villarreal, 1997; Torres & 
Solberg, 2001), which enabled me to adapt instruments and methodologies 
used in prior research with adults (e.g. Schwarzer, 2011) for use in this 
study. 
 
In this project the Control group displayed no visible correlation between 
academic SE and self-reported academic stress – as expected; whereas 
the Experimental group was found to show a significant and strongly 
negative correlation between academic SE and acute academic stress 
after exposure to an academic stressor stimulus (see Figure 7). This 
effect was found to be independent both of the degree of pre-existing 
stress and also of the variation in academic SE between groups. Thus the 
answer to the first research question is that academic SE was found to 
limit the development of acute academic stress in the participants 
involved in this study. Furthermore, although I was unable to establish 
that the difference in SE-stress correlation was significant between 
participant groups, regression analyses suggested that academic SE may 
‘protect’ participants by removing as much as half of the effect of 
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academic stressor exposure in the Experimental group. This effect is in 
keeping with that found by other studies (e.g. Zajacova et al., 2005 - 
where SE was predictive of stress to a similar extent). 
 
However, by themselves, such correlations do not constitute evidence of 
causality between academic SE and the development of acute academic 
stress; nor do they suggest a mechanism by which this protection might 
occur – criticisms which both apply equally to my study. However, Bandura 
(1997) has collated evidence from numerous studies supporting a causal 
role for SE in protecting people from stress, the majority of which I 
have summarised earlier in Chapter 3. Of this evidence, the most evincing 
comes from school-based stress-reduction programmes, which have 
clearly established that enhancing young people’s academic SE results in 
decreased stress (e.g. Kraag et al., 2006), both in class-based schemes 
(Lohaus, 2011; Hampel et al., 2008; Frydenberg, 2004) and outdoor-based 
activities (Thurber et al., 2007; McKenzie, 2000; Masten & Coatsworth, 
1998). Not only do these prospective, experimental studies employ 
methodologies that most strongly support causality (Shadish et al., 2002), 
but they are also most ecologically valid (Messick, 1995) as they provide 
in situ, real-time evidence of academic SE limiting the acute stress 
experienced by young people on a day-to-day basis. Thus, not only do 
these studies strongly support a causal link between academic SE and 
acute stress reduction (which, I posit, generalises particularly to this 
study through cogent context), but I suggest they also offer the most 
promising route forwards for policy-makers and educational leaders in 
helping to equip young people with an element of protection against future 
exposure to academic stressors. 
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Whilst the weight of evidence supports the conclusion that academic SE 
does indeed protect adolescents from acute academic stress, identifying 
the mechanism by which this happens is much less straightforward. As I 
explained in Chapter 3, most research to date attempts to explain the 
link between SE and stress in terms of adaptive changes in coping style 
(e.g. Taylor, 1989; Rothbaum et al., 1982; Brandtstädter, 1992; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1999). Although evidence exists to support a 
coping-based explanation (e.g. Mikolajczak et al., 2007), maladaptive 
changes in coping style, by themselves, are not always predictive of the 
development of chronic stress (Chung et al., 2001), or the occurrence of 
stress-related diseases (Blalock & Joiner, 2000), suggesting that 
explanations of the protective nature of SE couched in terms of adaptive 
coping alone might not hold all of the answers. Thus I proposed in Chapter 
3 that SE may also exert an effect through the appraisal of stressors 
and that this effect may be more significant for the genesis of stress, 
rather than the regulation of pre-existing stress. Whilst evidence exists 
to support a role for SE in mediating the conscious appraisal of stressors 
(Chemers et al., 2001; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Pintrich & De Groot, 
1990), I have been unable to identify any research seeking to establish 
whether SE exerts a similar effect on preconscious appraisal processes. 
Therefore, the third research question sought to fill this ‘gap’ in our 
understanding of stress by investigating the effect of academic SE on 
the preconscious appraisal of academic stressor stimuli. However, in 
order to address this question, I first had to establish the role of 
preconscious appraisal processes during acute academic stress. This, 
therefore, formed the basis of the second research question. 
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To what extent does acute academic stress exposure affect the 
preconscious appraisal of academic stressor stimuli? 
 
During acute stress, such as that experienced by the participants in the 
Experimental group in this study, it is well established that preconscious 
appraisals bias conscious attention towards threatening stimuli (e.g. 
Rodrigues et al., 2009; LeDoux, 1998), generating the well-observed 
‘attentional tunnel’ phenomenon (see Staal, 2004). This adaptive response 
(De Kloet et al., 1999) occurs jointly through repression of neocortical 
functioning (specifically the PFC - Elzinga & Roelofs, 2005; Oei et al., 
2006) and elevations in the sensitivity of preconscious appraisal systems 
to stressors (specifically the amygdala - Van Marle et al., 2009). The 
combined effect of this activity acts to facilitate the encoding of 
stressor-specific memory (Zoladz et al., 201162) and, crucially, to divert 
conscious attentional resources towards the stressor stimulus (Bar-Haim 
et al., 2007). 
 
In this study I sought to test the degree of generality of this finding by 
observing whether preconscious stressor appraisals changed during the 
course of the acute academic stress process experienced by the 
participants in the Experimental group. As expected, whilst I found no 
significant differences in preconscious stressor appraisals before 
exposure to academic stressor stimuli (in either of the participant 
groups); by contrast, after exposure, the Experimental group 
demonstrated a significant increase in SA-IAT scores (see Figures 8 & 
                                                
62 Although note that this occurs only for stress-specific ‘flasbulb’ memories as acute 
stress has routinely been shown to have a general inhibitory effect on the formation of 
other memories (e.g. Diamond et al., 1996) 
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10), whereas the Control group’s scores remained relatively unchanged. 
Thus the answer to the second research question is that acute academic 
stress exposure appeared to affect the preconscious appraisal of 
academic stressor stimuli in the participants involved in this study. In 
other words, the experience of acute academic stress resulted in some 
participants evaluating academic stressors as being more stressful than 
they would otherwise have appeared. This observation was found to be 
independent both of the initial variation in SA-IAT scores and also of 
pre-existing academic stress. Furthermore, it can be readily explained 
using Chee’s theory of IAT effects (Chee et al., 2000): according to this 
model, the inhibitory effect of acute stress on cognitive processes during 
conditions of acute stress necessitates greater conscious effort to over-
ride automatic responses to stressors, which produces a greater delay in 
overall response – i.e. the IAT effect observed here. 
 
Therefore, the second finding of this study fits perfectly with the pre-
existing literature by demonstrating that exposure to acute academic 
stress resulted in a significant increase in the degree to which 
adolescents preconsciously appraised academic stressors as being 
stressful. However, whilst this conclusion holds true for the average SA-
IAT scores between participant groups, an analysis of the scores of 
specific participants reveals a very different pattern for many of the 
participants. For example, Figure 16 clearly shows that a marked 
proportion (30%) of the Experimental group exhibited either little 
change or a decrease in their SA-IAT scores after experiencing acute 
academic stress. Thus, although the Experimental group demonstrated, on 
average, a significant increase in the degree to which stressor stimuli 
were preconsciously appraised as stressful, this effect was not 
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homogeneous. This is not surprising given the observation that, despite 
exposure to significant daily stressors (e.g. road traffic accidents), some 
people neither experience symptoms of acute stress (Paton & Violanti, 
2006) nor go on to develop stress-related diseases (Prati et al, 2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clearly the line of inquiry to take forward from this observation is why 
did some one third of the participants in the Experimental group fail to 
show the same trend as the majority? In other words, what prevented 
them from developing the same degree of academic stress as their 
peers?  
 
Having demonstrated previously that SE exerts a significant ‘protective’ 
effect in limiting the development of stress, I posed the third research 
question to ascertain whether academic SE might explain this trend – i.e. 
 
Figure 16: Distribution of variation in SA-IAT scores between test phases (PoS-PrS) for Control 
group (above) & Experimental group (below). 
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whether the ‘protective’ role of SE might be mediated via changes in the 
preconscious appraisal of stressors. 
 
To what extent does academic SE affect the preconscious appraisal 
of academic stressor stimuli? 
 
Comparing the difference in average academic SE between sub-
populations of the Experimental group (those who showed increases in 
SA-IAT score between testing phases and those who showed decreases) 
revealed a significant difference between groups. This suggests that 
participants with lower academic SE tended to appraise academic 
stressors as being more stressful after acute academic stress exposure. 
This effect was further supported by the analysis of correlations in 
academic SE and SA-IAT scores between participant groups in both pre- 
and post-stressor exposure phases of testing. Furthermore, regression 
analyses found that academic SE was predictive of -22% of variance in 
SA-IAT scores, implying that high academic SE provides much of its 
protective effect by limiting, or buffering, the up-regulating effect of 
acute academic stress on the preconscious appraisal of academic stressor 
stimuli. 
 
Thus, the answer to the third research question is that academic SE 
appeared to limit the degree to which academic stressor stimuli were 
preconsciously appraised as being stressful. Although considerable 
additional work is required to establish whether this effect is causal (and 
not merely, for example, a correlation contingent on an indirect 
relationship between these variables); nevertheless, this study has 
provided the first evidence to suggest that academic SE exerts at least 
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part of its protective, stress-limiting role via an effect on preconscious 
appraisal processes. 
 
Although this conclusion is firmly in keeping with literature 
demonstrating the protective role of SE in ameliorating stress (e.g. 
Skaalvik & Skaalvik, 2007; Goddard et al., 2000; Hoy & Spero, 2005), it 
could appear to run at odds with Bandura’s (1997) conception of 
efficacious human agency with intentionality and forethought63 at its 
heart (Bandura, 1997; 2008). However, although Bandura views agentic 
function as ontologically emergent - i.e. an epiphenomenal product of 
human consciousness (Bandura, 1991b; 2006b), considerable evidence 
exists to suggest that this agentic “measure of control over… thoughts, 
feelings and actions” (Pajares, 2002, pg2) is as much a product of implicit 
processes as it is of conscious thought. For example, research using 
behavioural priming methodology has repeatedly shown that social 
behaviour can be instigated automatically by environmental stimuli 
(Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 1998), or that people will unintentionally 
adopt primed physical behaviours – the ‘chameleon effect’ - even in 
circumstances where there is no incentive to do so (Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999). However, the observation that goal-directed behaviours can also 
be activated automatically (e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 2002; see also Bargh 
et al., 2010) and result in the same judgmental outcomes as consciously 
derived behaviours (Bargh et al., 2001), constitutes clear evidence that 
purposive agentic behaviour may just as easily stem from preconscious 
processes as it does from explicit cognition. Indeed, recent findings from 
the field of automaticity now suggest that preconscious processes may be 
                                                
63 These are two of Bandura’s four ‘core beliefs of agency,’ the others being self-
reactiveness and self-reflectiveness (Bandura, 1997; 2008). 
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capable of judgement and decision making (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 
2006; see also Bargh et al., 2012) – processes long considered the “last 
bastions of conscious processing” (Bargh, 2011, pg632-633). Thus, “in 
both phylogeny and ontogeny, actions of an unconscious mind precede the 
arrival of a conscious mind” (Bargh & Morsella, 2008, pg73 - abstract) 
and, with ready access to explicit beliefs, values and goals, preconscious 
systems enable us to “influence the course of events by one’s action” 
(Bandura, 2011, pg52) and thus function as efficacious human agents. 
Therefore, in the words of John Bargh; 
 
“Conscious thought is causal and it often puts automatic processes into play; 
similarly, automatic processes regularly cause and influence conscious thought 
processes. These two fundamental forms of human information processing work 
together, hand in glove, and indeed one would not be able to function without the 
support and guidance of the other” (Bargh et al., 2012, pg602). 
 
Thus I assert that human agency interacts with both conscious and 
preconscious appraisal processes and that, in the light of this study, both 
systems of stressor appraisal appear to be influenced by our efficacy 
beliefs.  
 
Next Steps 
 
The findings of this study, whilst enthusing, leave a large number of 
unresolved issues outstanding that urgently require investigation. 
However, rather than listing lots of these here, I draw attention 
specifically to three further research questions, which I believe form the 
next priorities for research in this area. 
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1. By what mechanism/s does SE interact with preconscious appraisal 
processes? It is currently unclear whether SE exerts the effect 
identified in this study by interacting directly with preconscious systems, 
or via an indirect effect through modulation of neocortical appraisal 
processes and resultant alteration in ‘top-down’ influence on automatic 
processes. As I stated in Chapter 3, this study appears to be the first 
project to research potential interactivity between SE and preconscious 
appraisal processes and, therefore, further conjecture into the nature of 
the relationship would simply be pure speculation. Clearly, further work is 
required to unpick the nature of the observations recorded here, perhaps 
through the use of induced magnetic lesion methodology to remove top-
down inhibition from neocortical systems? Similarly, advances in temporal 
neuroimaging techniques may also help to identify the time-course of 
brain activity that underpins the link between SE and preconscious 
stressor appraisals? Either way, the findings of this study supports 
mounting evidence that; 
 
“Emotional information processing at an early level of processing, with limited 
conscious awareness, represents an important step in regulating the magnitude 
of… stress” (Ellenbogen et al., 2010, pg79).  
 
I look forward to further developments in this field which, I hope, will 
shed light on this important and potentially life-saving field of stress 
research. 
 
2. By what mechanism/s does chronic stress interact with 
preconscious appraisal processes? Deliberately, this study has focused 
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specifically on adolescents’ acute response to academic stressors and the 
interaction both academic SE and the stress process itself appear to 
exert on it. However, as the majority of the deleterious physiological and 
psychological repercussions of stress detailed in Chapter 2 occur as a 
consequence of chronic stressor exposure, rather than initial acute 
stress; it is, therefore, imperative that research is also conducted in the 
field of chronic stress in order to establish whether preconscious 
stressor appraisals are equivalently malleable in this process. 
 
In Chapter 2 I asserted that stress and affect share functional 
equivalence; given this position, it follows that research into the 
regulation of emotion may inform our understanding of the potential 
adaptability of preconscious appraisals that, I speculate, may occur 
during chronic stress. Within AER, evidence is beginning to accumulate to 
suggest that pathological failures of emotion regulation (such as avoidant 
personality styles) can be explained through disruption of top-down 
regulatory systems. For example, Phillips and colleagues (Phillips et al., 
2008) have suggested that neocortical dysregulation engenders either 
disinhibition of preconscious valence detection, or increased preconscious 
monitoring of affective state (Philips et al., 2008), or possibly both. 
Collectively, the resulting effect is to unbalance preconscious appraisals, 
which generates a maladaptive attentional bias towards emotive stimuli 
and, therefore, a predisposition toward psychoses. Could it be that a 
similar dysregulated ‘top down’ effect underpins the chronic pathology of 
stress64?  
                                                
64 It should be noted that, outside of stress research, theories highlighting the 
significance of maladaptive preconscious appraisal processes in the development of 
psychopathologies are plentiful. For example, dual processes models of addiction 
(Gladwin et al., 2011; Wiers et al., 2007; Bechara, 2005) identify that automatic systems 
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Within the field of chronic stress research, it is well known that 
preconscious appraisal processes may start to regulate cognitive 
attention adaptively by diverting attention away from the stressor stimuli 
(Ellenbogen et al., 2009; 2010). For example, Fabes and colleagues found 
that participants reporting high stress levels were more likely to 
disengage attention from other stressor stimuli (Fabes et al., 1993). 
Similarly, Mansell adapted a dot-probe task to incorporate social stressor 
words and observed that participants with high trait anxiety were 
significantly more likely to avoid threat cues than participants with low 
anxiety (Mansell et al., 1999) – a finding that was later replicated by 
Applehans and Luecken (2006). Comparable effects of stress-induced 
attentional bias have also been reported in modified spatial cueing tasks 
(Ellenbogen et al., 2002; 2009), Stroop-type tasks (Van Honk et al., 2000) 
and during the Trier Social Stress Test (Pilgrim et al., 2010).  
 
Based on this view, Luecken and Appelhans (2005) have advanced a model 
for maladaptive chronic stress that exhibits congruence with those 
proposed for AER. Their theory is based on the findings of a number of 
studies (e.g. Mogg et al., 2000; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003; Huguet et al., 
1999) that, under some circumstances, during conditions of prolonged 
stressor exposure, preconscious appraisals can become maladaptive. For 
example, Chajut and Algom (2003) used a Stroop-type paradigm to show 
                                                                                                                                       
underpin many of the drug-related behaviours of addicts (Ryan, 2002; Wiers & Stacy, 
2006).  Similarly, research into anxiety disorders (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998; Cisler & Koster, 2011; Öhman, 2000), depression (Gotlib et al., 2004), 
bipolar disorder (Philips et al., 2008), Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Harvey et al., 
1996), Panic Disorder (Schmidt & Woolaway-Bickel, 2006) and a variety of Eating 
Disorders (Faunce, 2002) also emphasises the key role biases in preconscious appraisal 
systems play in the development of many mental illnesses. 
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that manipulating task-related stress resulted in increased attention 
towards stressor stimuli during chronic stress. This effect was replicated 
by Roelofs and colleagues (Roelofs et al., 2007), who observed that 
preconscious regulation of conscious attention was bidirectional – i.e. the 
allocation of attention was contingent on magnitude of the cortisol 
response to prior stressors. Luecken and Appelhans (2005) suggest that 
this effect can be explained by stress-induced disruption of top-down 
neocortical systems during chronic stress. Normally, during chronic 
stress, these areas suppress the preconscious appraisal bias towards the 
stressor, resulting in the attentional avoidance reported in studies like 
Mansell’s (Mansell et al., 1999). However, in pathological conditions, this 
process becomes disrupted, resulting in amplification of the preconscious 
appraisal bias in a manner very similar to that reported during anxiety, 
depression and addiction. This theory is well supported, both by the 
reliable observation that exogenous cortisol injections dampen the 
threat-related preconscious attentional bias (Putman et al., 2007; 2010) 
and the wealth of evidence demonstrating the harmful effects of cortisol 
on neocortical regulatory functioning (McEwen, 2007). However, to date, 
this theory remains exactly that – a theory – as experimental data has 
proven conflicting. For example, Ellenbogen and colleagues (Ellenbogen et 
al., 2002; 2006; 2010) have employed stimulus masking paradigms to show 
that disengagement from stressors can occur independently of the 
behaviour of conscious appraisal processes. Similarly, the activity of 
these neocortical systems is not always predictive of HPA reactivity 
during chronic stress (Van Honk et al., 2000; Ellenbogen et al., 2006; 
2010), which suggests that chronic stress exerts its effect on 
preconscious appraisals via direct modulation of these processes. Thus it 
is currently unclear whether chronic stress exhibits its effect on 
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preconscious systems through a direct effect, via indirect top-down 
modulation or preconscious appraisals, or possibly by means of both 
mechanisms (Mogg et al., 2004; Pine et al., 2005). As I stated earlier, 
further work is required in this area to address this area of uncertainty, 
particularly given the “exorbitant toll” (Matheny et al., 1993, pg109) 
chronic stress exacts each year from young people across the UK. 
 
3. To what extent does academic SE buffer the preconscious 
appraisal of stressors during chronic stress? A very large number of 
studies exist which clearly demonstrate the stress-limiting effect of SE 
in adolescents. Collectively, these studies assess stress across a myriad 
of different contexts (e.g. Holden, 1991; Holden et al., 1990), including 
interpersonal stress (Rumi & Kunio, 2003); academic stress (Solberg et 
al., 1993; Solberg & Villarreal, 1997; Torres & Solberg, 2001) and social 
stress (Dalgard et al., 2012), to name but a few. However, despite the 
compelling unanimity of their conclusions, as with this study, the majority 
of such investigations have tended to focus on the role of SE in the acute 
stress response. By comparison, however, comparatively little research 
has investigated the effects of SE on chronic stress. Studies which have 
investigated chronic stress tend to focus either on the links between SE 
and stress-related disease (e.g. O’Leary & Brown, 1995; Caserta et al., 
2011) or stress-induced psychopathologies (e.g. McFarlane et al., 1995), 
most particularly anxiety disorders (Matsuo & Arai, 1998; Yue, 1996) and 
depression (Cutrona & Troutman, 1986). Although some research has 
investigated the effect SE appears to play in mediating the chronic 
stress response (e.g. Buddeberg-Fischer et al., 2000; Beehr & Newman, 
1978), such investigations almost exclusively involve adult participants 
and frequently centre around prolonged exposure to workplace stressors. 
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Therefore, not only is there a pressing need to investigate the effect of 
academic SE on chronic stress experienced by adolescents (i.e. within 
schools), but, given the conclusions of this study, it is also crucial to 
investigate whether, during conditions of chronic stress, SE exerts a 
similar protective to that documented in this study by buffering 
preconscious stressor appraisals. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In summary, the conclusions of this study are as follows; 
 
1. Stress is an inherently subjective process. 
 
2. Academic SE exerts a significant protective effect in limiting the 
development of acute academic stress. 
 
3. For adolescents with lower academic SE, exposure to acute 
academic stress increases the degree to which academic stressor 
stimuli are preconsciously appraised as stressful. 
 
4. For adolescents with higher academic SE, exposure to acute 
academic stress appears not affect the degree to which academic 
stressor stimuli are preconsciously appraised as stressful. 
 
Implications of the conclusions 
 
In the opening Chapter of this study I made the point that efficacy 
theories offer significant potential to develop pedagogy, policy and 
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practice that could successfully reduce the “exorbitant toll exacted from 
students by stressors” (Matheny et al., 1993, pg109). Having 
demonstrated in this study that academic SE effectively protects 
adolescents from the effects of an acute bout of academic stress (via a 
buffering effect on preconscious stressor appraisal processes), I again 
assert that efficacy beliefs offer a valuable and effective vehicle to 
combat the rising incidence and increasingly harmful effects of stress in 
young people (Twenge et al., 2010). 
 
Limitations of the conclusions 
 
Limitations of the methodology. Whilst I have justified my decision to 
employ a quasi-experimental design in this study (see Chapter 4), the use 
of this methodology comes with inherent limitations. Of these, “the lack 
of random assignment is the major weakness of the quasi-experimental 
study design” (Harris et al., 2006, pg17), chiefly because the lack of 
randomisation has an implicit tendency to introduce confounding variables 
within the participant groups. For example, although general intelligence 
(GI) is considered not to affect the development of stress (Singh & 
Sharma, 2012), it was not possible to control entirely for this potentially 
confounding factor across the participant groups. Although I took steps 
to limit the effect of GI on grouping demograph (by preventing students 
who were re-taking AS units only from participating); nevertheless, the 
influence of re-taking AS examinations will inevitably have skewed the 
level of GI across the two participant groups. Similarly, although I argued 
earlier that the seven subjects offering January units were “relatively 
diverse and include a wide spectrum of students’ aptitudes, ambitions and 
interests,” they are nonetheless biased towards the Sciences and Social 
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Sciences and, most notably, do not include representation from either the 
creative arts, or modern languages. As it has been shown that levels of 
stress can differ substantially across different academic disciplines 
(Clark, 1997) it seems plausible that the differences in academic pursuit 
that shaped the participant groups, may also have obfuscated accurate 
measurement of the dependent variable.  
 
In a similar vein, it is possible that the use of non-randomised participant 
groupings introduced non-academic confounding variables into the 
participant groupings. For example, fatigue is well-known to predispose 
adolescents to stress (e.g. Akerstedt et al., 2002) and, because it is also 
associated with diminished academic performance (Wolfson & Carskadon, 
2003), attenuated concentration, loss of motivation, increased anxiety 
and a host of other direct and indirect effects on emotion regulation and 
cognition (Dahl, 1999), discrepancies between the degree of rest 
experienced by members of the different participant groups over the 
2012 Christmas vacation may well have affected the distribution of 
stress described in this study. To explain, because members of the 
Control group did not have any forthcoming public examinations in the 
January 2013 examination season, it is likely that they undertook 
significantly less independent preparatory study over the vacation than 
did members of the Experimental group. As a consequence of this 
reduced workload, it is likely that the Control group enjoyed significantly 
more rest and recuperation over the Christmas vacation than did 
members of the Experimental group who, by nature of their revision 
workload, were likely to have experienced less sleep, or to have spent less 
time enjoying leisure activities. Thus, imbalances in convalescence 
between participant groups may well have resulted in differences in 
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fatigue levels amongst the participants, which could potentially have 
biased the outcomes of PrS testing and, ita sequitur, significantly 
reduced the external validity of my conclusions. 
 
In addition to differences in fatigue, when compared with members of 
the Experimental group, participants in the Control group are also more 
likely to have spent time away on holiday over the Christmas vacation. As 
this factor is well-associated with reductions in stress (Pols & Kroon, 
2007), the opportunity (or absence of opportunity) to go away on holiday 
constitutes another uncontrolled factor associated with the use of non-
randomised participant groups in this quasi-experimental methodology 
that may, potentially, have affected the findings of this study. 
 
Collectively, Shadish describes the effect of such uncontrolled factors 
as History Threats (Shadish et al., 2002), asserting that such threats 
”greatly limit the external validity of [quasi-experimental] procedures” 
(Cook & Campbell, 1979, pg45). Although the history threats I have 
described so far occurred as a consequence of the use of non-randomised 
participant groups, the existence of uncontrolled factors may well have 
biased experimental outcomes independently of the grouping protocol. For 
example, personality is predictive of health (Friedman, 1990) and 
psychopathology (Contrada et al., 1990) and a wide body of research 
demonstrates that specific personality variables, or traits, either seem 
to provide people with resilience against stress (e.g. De Neve & Cooper, 
1998; Carver et al., 1993), or may predispose them to it. For example, 
participants scoring highly on measures of trait anxiety are reliably 
shown to be susceptible to developing stress (Spielberger, 1985). 
Similarly, negative affect (Watson & Clark, 1984), neuroticism 
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(Schneider, 2004), Type A personality (Rosenman et al., 1964), Type D 
personality (Denollet, 2000) and a variety of other personality types are 
well-correlated with stress and the development of stress-related 
disease. In this study I took no steps to assess either the level, or the 
effect of these personality traits within the participants, so it is 
conceivable that the differences in PrS PSS10 scores I attributed to 
academic SE, in fact owed to variation within the distribution of 
personality traits across the participants. As well as personality type, 
specific dispositional characteristics of personality have also been 
implicated in the development of stress (e.g. aspiration [Kadapatti & 
Vijayalaxmi, 2012], self-expectation [Angola & Ongori, 2009] and 
expectation from family members [Ang & Huan, 2006] also promote 
stress), all of which are potential confounding variables, which could 
conceivably have led to the pattern of stress described in this study. 
 
As well as personality, lifestyle and environmental factors are also heavily 
implicated in the development of stress: smoking (Parrott, 1999), lack of 
exercise (Ensel & Lin, 2004), diet (e.g. Raloff, 2000) and increased coffee 
consumption (Pincomb et al., 1987) have all been shown to promote stress 
in some circumstances. By contrast, time spent socialising (House et al., 
1988), moderate alcohol consumption (Sayette, 1999; although see 
Pohorecky, 1991) and the presence of a family pet (Siegel, 2010) have 
been implicated in stress reduction. Similar to personality traits, these 
factors were neither controlled, nor statistically regressed in this study, 
and may well have biased the results reported earlier. Directly linked 
with lifestyle, socioeconomic status is strongly predictive of chronic 
stress (e.g. Baum et al., 1999) and the development of stress-related 
illness (Adler et al., 1994), chiefly because it predisposes adolescents 
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towards lifestyle choices that are associated with the development of 
stress (Cohen et al., 2006). Although I argued earlier that, being an 
“independent and academically selective fee-paying day school, the 
influence of many of the other social factors known to affect SE (e.g. 
socioeconomic status…) was limited,” this factor was, nevertheless, 
uncontrolled in this study, and may well reduce the external validity of 
the conclusions presented earlier. 
 
In keeping with the limitations presented earlier, the largest category of 
history threat in this study pertains to coping theory. Simply put, coping 
can be defined as;  
 
“Conscious volitional efforts to regulate emotion, cognition, behaviour, physiology, 
and the environment in response to stressful events or circumstances” (Compas et 
al., 2001, pg89). 
 
Despite the vast body of literature that exists in this field, and the 
diverse domains of coping that stem from it (see Skinner et al., 2003; 
Snyder, 1999; Lazarus, 1993b), most researchers agree that; 
 
“The set of adaptive processes that give… [people] the potential to fend off 
disaster, to reshape challenges and to transform stressful experiences into 
psychological growth” (Skinner, 2007, pg245).  
 
Thus coping makes a huge difference both on the impact stressors exert 
on adolescents and also on the likelihood of ensuing stress resulting in 
illnesses and chronic medical conditions, both concurrently and long-term 
(Skinner, 2007). Although this study focused on the implicit appraisal of 
stressors (part of the system of “automatic processes that are activated 
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in response to stress that are related to but distinct from coping” 
[Compas, 2006, pg230]), I have gone to pains here to present a case for 
the involvement of cognitive resources such as academic SE in the 
regulation of preconscious appraisal processes. Thus, despite the 
functional separation of automatic and volitional responses, a necessary 
inductive sequitur of my assertion that SE buffers preconscious stressor 
appraisals is that other cognitive processes (chief amongst which are 
coping resources) may also have a significant effect on preconscious 
systems.  
 
Although there is little direct evidence to support this view, it is well 
established that people with high SE tend to adopt more adaptive coping 
styles (Knoll et al., 2005; Terry, 1994), which has led to the suggestion 
that the protective effect of SE on stress could well be mediated by 
coping resources (Folkman, 1984; Dweck, 2000). As Ellen Skinner puts it;  
 
“Individuals who have high levels of self-efficacy tend to… cope constructively: 
regulation is action-oriented and focused on generating strategies, exerting 
effort, and using outcomes (even failures) as information to shape subsequent 
strategies” (Aldwin et al., 2011, pg566).  
 
In other words, SE and adaptive coping tend to be strongly correlated 
(Knoll et al., 2005). As I neither controlled for, nor assessed, coping style 
in this study, it is entirely plausible that the protective effect of SE 
identified in this study stemmed, in fact, from individual variations in 
coping resources via a putative effect on preconscious systems (Putman & 
Roelofs, 2011). This potential limitation impinges significantly on the 
construct validity of this study and, therefore, I call for further 
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investigation in this area to assess whether coping resources, SE, or a 
combination of both lies behind the distribution of SA-IAT scores 
reported in this study. 
 
Even if one does not accept the syllogism that, if SE affects preconscious 
systems so could coping, the premise behind the second and third 
research questions was that (either directly, or indirectly) stress affects 
the preconscious appraisal of stressors. The assumption being that stress 
was experienced homogeneously by the Experimental group as a 
consequence of exposure to an academic stressor – one or more public 
examinations. However, because the stress was experienced over a period 
of weeks, it is inescapable that this will have resulted in activation of 
“conscious volitional efforts to regulate emotion, cognition, behaviour, 
physiology” (Compas et al., 2001, pg89) which, in turn, will have instigated 
efforts to regulate stress and stress-related emotions (Primary Control 
Coping), efforts to adapt to the presence of the stressor (Secondary 
Control Coping) and/or efforts to withdraw from stress and stress-
related emotions (Disengagement Coping - Connor-Smith et al., 2000). 
Such coping strategies will inevitably have affected the development of 
the stress process during the study. Because stressors are known to have 
multiplicative effects when presented concomitantly (e.g. Lepore & Evans, 
1996);  
 
“People cope with multiple environmental stressors, which interact with each 
other, creating effects which differ from the simple addition of their individual 
effects” (Martimportugués-Goyenechea & Gomez-Jacinto, 2005, pg867). 
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Thus it is plausible that the variation in PSS10 data and/or SA-IAT 
scores between participants owed not to variations in academic SE, but 
rather to variance in the evaluation of the valence of the PoS stressor 
resulting from interaction between appraisal processes and pre-activated 
antecedent-based coping strategies (Mauss et al., 2007). Thus the 
individual effect of coping resources across the duration of the study 
could potentially contribute to a Maturation-type error as described by 
Cook and Campbell (1979). As with my previous point, further research is 
required to unpick this possibility and thereby establish whether the 
variance in stress reported here occurred as an effect of academic SE 
(as I assert), or via a coping-based mechanism. 
 
Aside from the inclusion of history threats, a second limitation germane 
to the use of quasi-experimental methodologies is the difficulty of 
demonstrating a causal relationship between experimental variables 
(Shadish et al., 2002). Although I fully addressed two of Mill’s 
prerequisite ‘fundamental conditions’ for investigating causal relationships 
(i.e. a] the cause should precede the effect and b] the cause should be 
statistically associated with the effect) and took steps to comply with 
the third ‘fundamental condition’ (c] there should be no plausible 
alternative explanations for the effect other than the cause – Rutter, 
2007); nevertheless, the statistical measures employed here 
demonstrated either simple correlations between variables, or confirmed 
differences between the variance of variables distributed across two 
discrete populations – neither of which serves to demonstrate a direct 
causal relationship between those variables. Whilst I have already 
suggested potential modifications to the methodology (see Chapter 4) 
which could improve the statistical rigor of this study, I posit that 
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further work utilising intervention-based procedures would best address 
this limitation. For example, adopting a false-feedback SE-manipulation 
protocol such as that employed by Holroyd (Holroyd et al., 1984), or 
Neufeld and Thomas (1977) would allow for direct assessment of 
covariance between SE and preconscious stressor appraisal. Similarly, 
covariance could be assessed utilising the type of SE-dependent stress-
reduction training discussed earlier in this Chapter (e.g. Kraag et al., 
2006; Masten & Coatsworth, 1998). As the robust exposition of 
covariance between cause and effect (or the absence of effect when 
cause is withdrawn) is considered a reliable criterion for the 
demonstration of causality (Cook et al., 1990), such interventionist 
methodologies would effectively address this limitation by either 
establishing “a lawful relationship between cause and effect” (Cook & 
Campbell, 1979, pg78), or by falsifying (Popper, 1959) my assertion that 
academic SE protects adolescents from stress via a buffering effect on 
preconscious appraisal processes. It is my hope that such studies will be 
conducted expeditiously. 
 
In keeping with the previous point, a third limitation contiguous to the 
methodology is the lack of comparative baseline data for the participant 
groups against which to contrast the effect of the PrS tests. In other 
words, the methodology does not allow for measurement of the effect of 
pre-testing on performance – an effect frequently described as Testing 
Error (Shadish et al., 2002). Although this limitation was partially 
ameliorated through the deliberate use of instruments with well-
established normative values, such indirect comparisons did not permit 
statistical regression of baseline effects within the participant groups. 
Furthermore, as IATs effects are known to be affected by repeated 
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testing (e.g. Waters et al., 2010), it is conceivable that the pre-testing 
process itself obfuscated accurate measurement in the second half of 
the study. Although pragmatic considerations (e.g. participant numbers) 
prohibited the use of a Solomon four group design in this study, I 
recommend that future studies incorporate such methodology to 
overcome any existing Testing Errors in subsequent research. 
 
Further limitations to generality. In addition to the points described 
above, there are two further limitations to the external validity of my 
conclusions, both of which relate to variables I controlled in this study. 
As described earlier, age is intricately linked with the development of 
academic self-efficacy (Anderman et al., 1999; Urdan & Midgley, 2003), 
stress (Rudolph & Hammen, 2003; Rutter, 1981) and the ability to cope 
with stressors (Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2007; Zimmer-Gembeck & 
Skinner, 2011). By limiting the study to participants in late adolescence, it 
is very likely that the conclusions I have drawn about the protective 
relationship that exists between academic SE, stress and preconscious 
stressor appraisal are not the same for younger adolescents, children or 
adults. It is, therefore, important that this study is repeated for 
participants across those age groups to ensure that the conclusions 
presented here develop wider external validity. 
 
Similar to the previous point, there are marked differences in the way 
academic SE develops in boys and girls (Britner & Pajares, 2001; Pajares 
& Valiante, 2001; see also Hansen, 2009; Pajares, 2002). Similarly, stress 
is widely known to be gender-specific, both in the response to acute 
stressors (Matud, 2004) and in the development of chronic stress 
(Cleary, 1987) and stress-related illness (Weissman & Klerman, 1987). 
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Furthermore, evidence exists to suggest that the effect of cortisol may 
differ markedly between men and women (Nielsen et al., 2008) and that 
women exhibit greater threat-specific attentional biases relative to men 
(Waters et al., 2007), which implies a direct gender-specific difference 
at the level of preconscious appraisals. As I concluded for the previous 
limitation, further research is required to ascertain whether the findings 
of this study generalise equally to men, perhaps by conducting a repeat of 
this study in a boys’ school? 
 
Limitations of the instruments. In Chapter 4 I collated a wide body of 
evidence to support the validity of the PSS10 and ESES instruments. 
However, despite this evincing material, these tests remain self-reports 
and are, therefore, subject to the inherent limitations of such tools. For 
example, as Greenwald and colleagues explain (Greenwald et al., 2002), 
self-reports are prone to error through the effect of various Response 
Factors, which include the ability to respond accurately, apprehension 
related to responding (Rosenberg, 1969) and the problem of response 
faking (Cronbach, 1990 – see Appendix B for further discussion). As a 
consequence of these errors, the accuracy, internal validity, and 
construct validity of these instruments may well have become 
compromised in this research, which undermines the external validity of 
my conclusions. To overcome this limitation, confirmatory studies need to 
be undertaken incorporating physiological measures of stress (e.g. HRV 
analysis – see Berntson & Cacioppo, 2004) and implicit stressor appraisal 
(e.g. pupillometry [Laeng et al., 2012] or GSR testing [McGinnies, 1949]), 
which would serve effectively as triangulation procedures (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004) to confirm the findings of this study and thereby 
reinforce the generality of my conclusions. However, the remaining caveat 
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with this suggestion is that, to date, direct quantitative measures of 
academic SE have yet to be developed and so, such triangulation 
procedures would inevitably be forced to incorporate academic SE self-
report instruments similar to the ESES utilised in this study. Looking to 
the future it is my hope that, with continuing advances in neuroimaging, it 
may soon become possible to map the neocortical system/s and processes 
that generate academic SE and thus excise the necessity of self-report 
measures in future studies when direct neurological measures of SE 
become available. 
 
In addition to the use of self-reports, there are two significant 
limitations specific to the SA-IAT instrument. Firstly, because the SA-
IAT measures the relative strength of a pair of associations, it cannot be 
interpreted as a measure of the absolute strength of single associations 
(Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). I discuss this limitation fully in Appendix B 
(and, therefore, do not repeat the argument here), but reiterate the 
conclusion stated there that, because the SA-IAT scores are neither 
normalised, nor measured according to an absolute interval scale, the data 
derived from the SA-IAT must be viewed as an ordinal hierarchy relative 
to itself. This greatly limits the degree to which conclusions based on SA-
IAT data generalise outside of this study. Secondly, and in keeping with 
the previous limitation, the SA-IAT instrument has not been tested 
outside of the environment in which it was conceived. Whilst I have taken 
(rigorous and, arguably, successful) steps to validate the SA-IAT (see 
Appendix B) these validation procedures utilised the same students who 
had originally participated in the initial design of the instrument. Because 
IAT tools are, at heart, relative measures, both the familiarity of 
stimulus items (Rothermund & Wentura, 2004) and the semantic valence 
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of those items (Belezza et al., 1986) have a marked effect on the internal 
validity of IATs (see Hofman et al., 2005; Greenwald et al. 2003; 2009). 
Although I took steps to control for these effects (see Appendix B), the 
point is that these steps did not incorporate participants outside of the 
single school community in which the study was conducted. As I argued 
earlier in Chapter 4, because individual schools develop a unique 
personality (Schein, 1985), which varies significantly from school to 
school (Paterson & Deal, 2009), it follows that the relative associations 
between stimulus items that underpin the SA-IAT would not hold 
constant for participants from different schools. Therefore, before 
assuming that the SA-IAT instrument (and conclusions based on data 
derived from it), hold validity outside of the initial school community in 
which the instrument was designed, further work must be conducted to 
establish the external validity of the SA-IAT instrument, preferably 
through repetition of the methodology utilised in Appendix B in a number 
of schools from as diverse a range of cultures and communities as 
possible. 
 
Limitations of the statistics. Aside from arguments pertaining to 
causality, there are two further statistical limitations that weaken the 
external validity of this study. Firstly, although I managed to recruit 
significantly more participants than the minimum target of 52 (see 
Chapter 4), I did not manage to achieve the recommended target of an 
Experimental group of 128 participants to cater for a medium effect size 
(i.e. θ ≥ .25 as defined by Cohen [1992]). Accordingly, the respective 
power of the descriptive statistical measures employed in Chapter 5 lie 
on a wide range (.91 ≤ δ ≤ .37) for the effect sizes achieved in this study. 
As with previously described limitations, repeating the study with a 
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larger participant cohort would be an appropriate intervention to increase 
the statistical power of future studies. 
 
The second statistical limitation is that, throughout the study, I have 
assumed that all recorded variables were homoscedastic – i.e. that the 
error variance across correlations was constant. However, it is certainly 
possibly that the relationship between SE and stressor appraisal does 
become non-linear at extremities, particularly for individuals with 
significantly higher SE. In this study I did not have enough data to assess 
this effect directly, but urge future researchers to look at this effect in 
more detail, perhaps by conducting a large scale regression analysis on 
participants with high SE (cofactors could include the variables discussed 
in the earlier part of this section), to analyse the relationship between 
high SE and stress. The simple addition of a Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey or 
Goldfeld-Quandt test would serve either to confirm my assumption of 
homoscedasticity, or highlight a non-linear relationship between SE and 
stress under some circumstances. 
 
Summary 
 
At the very beginning of this project I explained that “one of the guiding 
motivations behind this work is a desire to contribute, albeit in a very 
small way, towards the development of a national curriculum that 
incorporates a focus on stress resistance, or anti-stress training.” The 
conclusions of this study unerringly point towards SE as a crucial founding 
stanchion of such a programme, because of the protective role SE so 
clearly plays in shielding adolescents from stress. This assertion is doubly 
reinforced by the success of class-based schemes (Lohaus, 2011) and 
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outdoor-based activities (Masten & Coatsworth, 1998), which have 
successfully used SE-development training to reduce stress. It is my 
sincere hope that, if this study achieves any tangible outcome, it will be 
the expansion of such programmes of study in the UK over the next few 
years. 
 
In this study I have attempted to explain the protective effect of SE 
from a dual process perspective of stress (Compas, 2004), focusing 
specifically on the role of preconscious appraisals in the genesis of acute 
stress. This angle has not been explored previously in stress research, so 
it is exciting that this study has not only highlighted the important role 
implicit appraisals can play in determining the magnitude of the acute 
stress process; but also that SE may exert all or part of its protective 
effect by decreasing the degree to which stressors are implicitly 
appraised as stressful. Although I have been unable to identify whether 
this effect occurs at the preconscious level, or via a top-down influence; 
nevertheless, it opens the door for future research to establish the 
exact mechanism by which SE modulates or buffers preconscious 
stressor appraisals and thereby SE protects adolescents from acute 
stress. 
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Chapter 7: Implications for Practitioners 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, a significant body of research indicates that 
SE-enhancing curriculum programs such as that used by De Wolf & 
Saunders (1995) and Hampel (Hampel et al., 2008) may offer effective 
(Kraag et al., 2006) and long-lasting (Masten & Coatsworth, 1998) 
interventions for reducing the academic stress frequently experienced by 
adolescents at school (Lohaus, 1990; Currie et al., 2004). In this chapter 
I briefly summarise recent progress in this field and make suggestions 
which may help teachers and educationalists to reflect on their own 
pedagogy with a view to increasing the academic SE of the young people 
within their charge.  
 
Citing evidence linking academic underachievement, violent behaviour and 
physical illness (Altshuler & Ruble, 1989; Compas & Hammen, 1994) with 
maladaptive coping strategies (e.g. Olbrich, 1990), Segal’s (1983) 
pioneering stress-reducing intervention program established conclusively 
that teaching school children adaptive coping strategies reduced not only 
their level of self-reported stress, but also increased their long-term 
academic achievement as well. This effect has since been replicated by 
other studies (e.g. Forman, 1993; King et al., 1998) which have specifically 
highlighted interventions that boost either children’s emotional coping 
skills, or their problem-focused coping strategies (e.g. De Wolf & 
Saunders, 1995; Dubow et al., 1993) as being particularly effective in 
reducing academic stress. Although such programs most likely mediate 
the bulk of their effect through a coping-based pathway, authors such as 
Gerda Kraag have been quick to identify an underlying (and relatively 
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ubiquitous) secondary effect of these programs – namely, a significant 
accompanying increase in SE (Kraag et al., 1996). 
 
This observation led to the advancement of a different group of stress 
intervention curricula – those that aim to reduce the development of 
stress, rather than increasing children’s ability to cope with the stress 
once it has already been experienced. Such programs can be typified by 
that of Schinke, Schilling and Snow (1997), who used a combination of 
communication training, education in self-instruction and lessons in 
problem-solving skills to raise the self-reported SE of 278 6th grade 
children, resulting in significant decreases in stress and anxiety and long-
term heightening of self-esteem, interpersonal assertiveness and a mild 
(though statistically significant) elevation in academic achievement. 
Other, similar school-based training schemes involving social problem 
solving (Elias et al., 1986; Weissberg et al., 1981), social-emotional 
awareness (Klingman & Hochdorf, 1993) and relaxation (Zaichkowsky & 
Zaichkowsky, 1984) have also reported equivalent increases in SE and a 
resultant reduction in perceived stress, measured by a variety of direct 
and indirect measures. 
 
Although these SE-based curricula all utilise specific training 
interventions, I posit that the core themes of these curricula generalise 
specifically towards three of Bandura’s (1997) four sources of SE, namely 
Enactive Mastery, Vicarious Experience and Verbal Persuasion.65 Apropos, 
by explicitly and purposively equipping young people with strategies either 
for coping with, (Dubow et al., 1993) or devising solutions for common 
                                                
65 The fourth source is affective state. However, as SE plays a key role in determining 
affective state, it is likely that SE training indirectly benefits this area as well. 
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academic stressors (Weissberg et al., 1981), I argue that such 
intervention programs effectively bolster SE via repeated, reinforced 
and positive experience of Enactive Mastery. Additionally, by doing so in a 
carefully controlled peer group setting, students also gain considerably by 
Vicarious Experience gained through viewing their peers learning to 
tackle stressors. For example, in a large study across a number of Chicago 
schools, Yasutake and Bryan (1996) found that, in peer settings, students;  
 
“Had a profound influence on one another… [and that] the combination of peer 
tutoring with attribution training influenced self-perceived competence in a 
dramatic and positive way” (Yasutake & Bryan, 1996, pg23) 
 
Similarly, the combination of carefully selected and demand-specific 
group tasks, also serves to emphasise the role students serve in 
reinforcing the collective development of SE. Thus, as emphasised by 
Fencl and Scheel: “the type and nature of teaching strategies used in the 
classroom can and do make a difference to students' self-efficacy” 
(Fencl & Scheel, 2005, pg 21 – original emphasis) and, therefore, in their 
subsequent susceptibility to stress. Indeed, extensive research has 
repeatedly confirmed this (e.g. Bandura & Schunk, 1981; Dweck, 1975; 
Schunk, 1985; Wood & Locke, 1987), leading to the conclusion that, with 
minimal training and effort;  
 
“Teachers can modify their instructional strategies… and this can result in 
increases in their students’ self-efficacy and resistance to stress” (Siegle & 
McCoach, 2007, pg279). 
 
The next logical question, then, is how can teachers and educators modify 
their pedagogy to facilitate this?  
 172
 
A large body of research has identified teacher feedback as playing a 
particularly significant role in the development of adolescents’ SE 
(Schunk, 1984; 1985). Not only is the timing of feedback believed to be 
important (i.e. intervention is most successful when given within a few 
hours of the learning activity - Schunk, 1984), but also the style and 
content of feedback has been found to have a substantial effect on the 
development of SE (Schunk, 1989a; 1989b). For example, feedback that 
reinforces recent success (Bandura, 1997) has a markedly positive impact 
on SE and academic performance. Similarly, feedback that develops this 
to emphasise the balance between ability and effort has been reported as 
most effective in developing SE (Schunk, 1989b), particularly when poor 
performances are viewed in terms of lack-of-effort explanations and 
successes in terms of ability (Siegle & McCoach, 2007). This effect 
seems to be particularly helpful in overcoming gender-specific 
differences in the development of academic SE (Kenney-Benson et al., 
2006). Furthermore, feedback is reported to be enhanced when given 
systematically – i.e. to all learners en bloc, rather than in an unsolicited 
fashion (Zimmerman & Martinez-Pons, 1990), possibly because students 
tend to associate spontaneous help with teachers targeting 
underachieving pupils (Graham & Barker, 1990), which is erosive to SE. 
 
Similar to effective teacher feedback, structured goal-setting can have a 
substantial effect on improving SE (Bandura, 1986; Schunk, 1989b – see 
also Appendix A); as “when children can easily gauge their progress 
against a goal, their perception of improvement enhances their self-
efficacy” (Schunk, 1989a, pg17). Goals that are unambiguous (Dweck & 
Leggett, 1988) and relate to specific performance standards tend to be 
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the most effective (Gutman, 2006). Equally, goals that let students 
decide for themselves how to break up larger goals into smaller, 
attainable ones tend to facilitate better the development of SE. Finally, 
goals are most effectual when students perceive them to be difficult, but 
achievable (Siegle & McCoach, 2007) 
 
Reiterating the advice already given, Margolis and MaCabe (2006) assert 
that practitioners should; 1) plan moderately challenging tasks, 2) teach 
specific learning strategies, 3) capitalise on student choice and interest, 
and 4) reinforce effort and correct strategy use. However, they also 
emphasise the role of peer modelling in cultivating academic SE as this 
serves both to reinforce vicarious experience and also verbal persuasion, 
particularly if the peer model has more competence in the areas of focus 
than the targeted pupil – a pairing strategy Schunk (1989a) found to be 
more effective even than teacher-based modelling. Developing this area 
further, Siegle and McCoach (2007) advocate teachers employing “a 
variety of ways to use models” (pg286), including videotaping, peer 
tutoring, work groups and class demonstrations, all of which “can help to 
exploit the power of models” Siegle and McCoach (2007, pg286). 
Furthermore, early research has established that self-modelling 
techniques (e.g. where a videotape of a student performing a desired 
behaviour is made, with any undesired or unsuccessful behaviours edited 
out) also constitute promising tools for fostering the development of SE 
in young adults (Bray & Kehle, 2001). 
 
Complementing the guidance already presented, Demos and Foshay (2010) 
advocate strategies for extending and expounding classroom motivation. 
Not only does this pedagogy seem to foster academic engagement 
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particularly effectively (which, in turn is linked to higher grades, higher 
test scores, lower drop out rates [Siegle & McCoach, 2005], and 
correlates well with achievement and persistence [Klem & Connell, 2007]), 
but it has also been reported to lead directly to the promotion of 
academic SE (Bandura, 1995b). Although numerous strategies for 
increasing engagement and motivation have been suggested (e.g. see Coiro 
& Dobler, 2007), Guthrie and Davis (2003) identify three categories of 
intervention that have proven particularly effective; namely 1) ‘pegging’ or 
linking tasks and activities with children’s underlying interests, 2) the 
development of strategic goals that expand the previous point in tandem 
with the learning objectives, and 3) schemes that enhance literacy and/or 
lead to reading strategy development. Of these, the latter is particularly 
pertinent as disengagement is frequently connected with reading 
difficulty;  
 
“Given the importance of reading to school achievement, limited success with 
reading is likely connected to poor grades, difficulty with curricular demands, and 
pervasive disenfranchisement with school requirements” (Demos & Foshay, 2010, 
pg58). 
 
Although a full review of techniques to foster the development of 
engagement through literacy is beyond the scope of this chapter, I point 
the reader towards literature from the Centre for Applied Special 
Technology (CAST, 2008), whose research into universal learning 
guidelines has made significant progress within this field. 
 
One final area for consideration is the adoption of heutagogical curricula, 
which have been found to correlate reliably with increases in SE 
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(Bandura, 1997). For example, Alfassi (2003) found students enrolled in 
learner-centred study programs consistently out-perform control groups 
engaged in existing, more pedagogical curricula. His research has been 
replicated by others, who conclude that;  
 
“Schools have an opportunity to build self-efficacy through instructional design 
methods that focus on a learner-centred approach” (Daumer, 2006, pg 32). 
 
This conclusion mirrors the material I presented earlier documenting the 
success of outdoor training curricula programs (Thurber et al., 2007; 
McKenzie, 2000; Masten & Coatsworth, 1998) which, by necessity, have 
centred on the development of specific heutagogical skills. Equally, 
parallels can be drawn with coping-based schemes that have successfully 
enhanced adolescents’ SE through specific aptitude training (Hampel et 
al., 2008). Though wide-scale, I suggest that by emulating the ethos of 
these large-scale stress intervention programs there is much that can be 
done on a small scale to make learning, learning environments and 
pedagogy more pupil-centred. This, in conjunction with the 
recommendations made by researchers such as Margolis and MaCabe 
(2006), may well enable teachers and educators to foster more easily the 
development of academic self-efficacy in young people, and thereby help 
protect our children from many of the maladaptive effects of academic 
stressor exposure. 
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The effect of SE on academic performance 
 
High SE has been shown to predict performance in a variety of different 
assessment protocols (De Vries et al., 1988) including musical recitals 
(McPherson & McCormick, 2006), reading tasks (Schunk & Rice, 1993), 
athletics (Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1996) and examinations (Lane & Lane, 
2001) across a wide range of academic subjects (see Bandura, 1997 for a 
review). Meta-analyses conducted by Stajkovic and Luthans (1998) and 
Multon and her colleagues (Multon et al., 1991) found that self-efficacy 
accounted for, respectively, 28% of the improvement in work-related 
performance and 14% of variance in academic accomplishment, indicating 
that “efficacy beliefs contribute significantly… to performance 
accomplishments” (Bandura, 2001a - pg4). Furthermore, growing evidence 
exists demonstrating that SE self-reports are strongly predictive of 
performance (Bandura, 1997), more so even than academic ability (Jinks & 
Morgan, 1997; Bandura, 1993). For example, during research for his 
thesis, Collins (1982, cited in Zimmerman & Cleary, 2006) divided high-
school mathematics students into high-scoring and low-scoring groups 
according to their perceived maths efficacy. He found that, irrespective 
of their underlying ability at maths, students in the high efficacy group 
“discarded faulty solution strategies more quickly, reworked more failed 
problems, and achieved higher maths performance” (Zimmerman & Cleary, 
2006, pg56). The same effect was also witnessed by Schunk and Gunn 
(1986, pg243), who found that “SE makes an independent contribution to 
academic performance” in a division-based maths task, which could not be 
attributed to performance attributes, task strategy or to effort. Their 
work was repeated and the findings further corroborated by Bouffard-
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Bouchard and her colleagues (Bouffard-Bouchard, Parent & Larivee, 1991), 
who also concluded that SE exerts a significant influence on performance. 
 
Similar supportive evidence demonstrating a link between SE and 
performance can be drawn from experiments examining the opposite 
procedure to Schunk and Gunn (1986), where poorly calibrating SE with 
the difficulty of a problem-solving task causes diminished performance, 
which is, again, not determined by students’ academic capability (Bandura 
& Wood, 1989). However, the most compelling evidence strengthening the 
association between SE and academic performance comes from 
prospective studies where existing SE is built up through training 
interventions and its effect on performance is then observed. The 
outcome of the training reliably produces a corresponding positive effect 
on accomplishment and, as with studies cited previously, the effect 
supersedes underlying academic ability. For example, in a word-selection 
task, Bouffard-Bouchard (1990) demonstrated that students whose 
efficacy had been raised through false positive feedback not only 
achieved a higher solution-rate than the control group, but also employed 
better strategic flexibility and had higher levels of aspiration. The same 
result was observed by Cervone and Peake (1986) for an anagram and 
graphical problem-solving task. A large body of work documenting the 
affect of intervention-based training programs on students’ SE and 
performance has been carried out by Dale Schunk (e.g. Schunk 1981; 
1987). “In these investigations Schunk and his colleagues not only 
demonstrated the sensitivity of efficacy beliefs to instructional 
interventions, but also the mediational role of these beliefs in explaining 
changes in learners’ self-regulation and achievement outcomes” 
(Zimmerman, 2000b, pg89). Similarly, research investigating Zimmerman’s 
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model of self-regulation (Perels, Gurtler & Schmitz, 2005) also 
underscores the strong link between SE and performance, establishing SE 
“as a potent mediator of students’ learning… [which] confirms the historic 
wisdom of educators that students’ self-beliefs about academic 
capabilities do play an essential role in their motivation to achieve” 
(Zimmerman, 2000b, pg89). 
 
However, the exact nature of this ‘essential role’ has been extensively 
debated. Bandura (1982, pg126) argues for a “causal contribution of self-
efficacy to action”: in other words, SE itself has a causative affect on 
behaviour. However, this position has come under some criticism. Lee 
(1989) dismisses SE as being non-scientific - SE is “a vague descriptive 
model, not an explanatory theory” (Lee, 1989, pg121, my emphasis). 
Hawkins (1992, pg252; see also 1995) explains Lee’s point clearly: he 
argues that, as SE is “a hypothetical construct which is invoked to help 
understand a pattern of observed behaviour” it cannot be a de facto 
independent variable - “it [SE] does not exist” (Hawkins, 1992, pg255) 
Consequentially, it is inappropriate to analyse behavioural observations 
with an a priori concept of SE as this not only makes SE effectively into 
an unfalsifiable concept (Lee, 1989) but also constitutes circular logic. To 
illustrate the point, Hawkins draws the example of a study (Bandura et 
al., 1980) frequently cited by Bandura (e.g. Bandura, 1982) as evidence of 
causality between SE and behaviour. In this quasi-experiment Bandura 
and his colleagues used a behaviour-training program to increase phobic 
participants’ SE from a low starting level to a much higher degree. 
Measuring performance by tolerance to phobia exposure Bandura noted 
that, not only did performance improve significantly after training, but 
that the increase varied in proportion to the participants’ perceived SE. 
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He concluded that SE had directly led to the increase in tolerance. 
However, applying the principle of Occam’s Razor, Hawkins argues that 
the most parsimonious explanation is that the behavioural training 
program itself affected the participants’ behaviour and, therefore, that 
the behavioural training, rather than the improvement in SE, must be 
viewed as the independent variable in this study;  
 
“A hypothesis involving a theoretical term not defined independently of the 
behaviour giving rise to it is always less satisfactory than a functional account 
which involves no special concept at all” (Hawkins, 1992, pg256).  
 
Hawkins (1995) argues that, in this example, SE simply acts as a record 
of experience and is, therefore, not itself causally linked to performance.  
 
Bandura’s polemic response (Bandura, 1995a) effectively dispatched 
Hawkins’ ‘Skinnerian functionalism’ on the grounds that;  
 
“Evidence from countless studies demonstrate[s] that perceived self-efficacy 
contributes independently to subsequent performance when variations in prior 
performance are controlled” (Bandura, 1995a, pg180).  
 
This evidence is extensive and compelling (e.g. see Bandura, 1984; 1997) 
and is further corroborated by studies examining the synergistic 
relationship that exists between SE and performance in some work 
settings (Gist & Mitchell, 1992). In such environments the ‘malleability’ of 
SE is strongly determined by performance outcomes, such that self-
reinforcing ‘efficacy-performance spirals’ are generated, both in 
individuals and within groups and organisations (Lindsley, Brass & Thomas, 
1995). These ‘spirals’ constitute transparent evidence of a causal link 
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between SE and performance and, whilst other (more valid) criticisms of 
SE will be addressed later on, for the remainder of this piece I take the 
position that “students’ self-efficacy beliefs… play a causal role in 
students’ development and use of academic competencies” (Zimmerman, 
2000b, pg89).” 
 
How SE affects performance outcomes 
 
1. Increased Persistence. Measured under various guises (e.g. ‘number of 
attempts’ [Schunk, 1982] or ‘effort’ [Salomon, 1984; Schunk, 1983b]) 
children with higher levels of SE reliably demonstrate greater task 
persistence. For example, when given an insolvable wire- or word-puzzle, 
Zimmerman and Ringle (1981) found that children with higher self-
reported SE spend longer attempting to solve the puzzles before giving 
up. The same effect was observed by Zimmerman and his colleagues for 
college students sitting exams (Zimmerman, Bandura & Martinez-Pons, 
1992) and is clearly evident in meta-analyses where, for example, Multon 
and her colleagues (Multon et al., 1991) found that SE was independently 
responsible for 12% of persistence. SE is also heavily implicated in 
engagement theory (see Linnenbrick & Pintrich, 2003 for a review) where 
students with high SE have been shown not only to display longer periods 
of behavioural engagement, but also reliably demonstrate deeper 
processing strategy and better cognitive engagement as well (Pintrich & 
Schrauben, 1992), sometimes by up to 10% more than students with lower 
SE (Pintrich, 1999). Further evidence linking SE with persistence can be 
drawn from the work of Paul Pintrich on the positive impact of motivation 
on learning (see Pintrich, 2000b for a review). Although a separate domain 
to persistence, motivation is strongly predictive of effort (both 
 333
behaviourally and cognitively – see Linnenbrick & Pintrich, 2003) and has 
been shown repeatedly to correlate positively with SE (Pintrich & Schunk, 
1996). Pintrich (2003) conceptualises motivation as a multi-factorial 
construct that over-laps considerably with interest (see next section), 
emotion, affect and SE. Although he acknowledges that it is very difficult 
to ascertain the relative causal ordering of SE and motivation – i.e. does 
SE cause motivation, or vice versa? - in this case, regardless of whether 
the tail wags the dog or the dog wags its tail, his conclusions very much 
establish a central role for SE in regulating student performance via 
effects on persistence and motivation. 
 
2.  Increased Interest. In his excellent book Schunk (1989) presents 
evidence suggesting that students with high levels of specific academic 
SE develop a greater depth of interest in that domain. This has 
subsequently been confirmed by others (e.g. Bandura, 1997), who found 
that, independent of ability, personality or outcome expectancy (Donnay & 
Borgen, 1999) SE may contribute up to 27% of variance in interest (Lent, 
Brown & Hackett, 1994; see also Rottinghaus et al. [2003], who concluded 
from their [much larger] meta-analysis that SE makes a lower, but 
nevertheless significant, contribution to interest). However, research by 
Silva (2003) suggests that SE may exert a more complex, ‘quadratic 
influence’ on interest - i.e. initial increases in SE have a marked positive 
effect on interest, which gradually diminishes until the task reaches a 
point where “success seems completely certain and the task is thus 
uninteresting” (Silva, 2003, pg237 - abstract). This effect was first 
posited by Bandura (1986b), who also postulated the existence of a low-
SE ‘threshold’ before an increase in interest can be observed. Whilst 
evidence exists to support the second proposition (Lenox & Subich, 1994), 
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the exact nature of the link between SE and interest requires further 
investigation as, although the quadratic relationship documented by Silva 
has been observed in some studies (Tracey, 2002), it has not been 
replicated in others (Lenox & Subich, 1994). 
 
3.  Goal-Setting. A wealth of literature demonstrates not only the 
direct and positive effect of goal-setting on task performance (see Locke 
et al., 1981; Locke & Latham, 1990 for reviews), but also the significant 
influence on accomplishment SE contributes via its mediating effect on 
the goal-setting process (Locke, Frederick & Bobko, 1984). For example, 
in a study of male varsity basketball players Cleary and Zimmerman 
(2001) found that, although ‘expert’ sportsmen tend to set approximately 
the same number of goals compared to ‘non-experts’, there was a 
pronounced disparity in the type of goal they selected, and that the 
degree of variation in goal type was very closely correlated with the 
athletes’ SE. Cleary and Zimmerman (2001) concluded that high SE leads 
people to set more specific goals: an observation that has been confirmed 
by many others (see Locke & Latham, 1990). Furthermore, in addition to 
more explicit goal-setting, SE also causes people to adopt goals that are 
both more realistic (McClelland, 1985) and more challenging (Schunk, 
1990), which has the combined effect of increasing the commitment 
students are prepared to make to achieve the goals (Zimmerman, 1995; 
see also Point 1 above). 
 
As well as goal-perseverance and goal-type, people with high SE make two 
further enhancements to their goal-setting process; a) they adopt a 
hierarchical goal structure that includes ‘paced’ or ‘proximal’ shorter-
term goals (Bandura’s 1986b), which has the same positive effect on 
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performance outcome as changing goal-type (Bandura, 1997); and b) they 
implement different strategies to achieve their goals, which include 
changes to the performance monitoring and management process, a more 
specific performance-goal evaluation mechanism and a greater degree of 
self-evaluation with respect to performance (Zimmerman. 1989). 
Therefore, through its constructive and synergistic mediation of multiple 
steps in the goal-setting process, SE has a particularly potent and 
positive effect on achievement. However, although Bandura (1997) 
asserts that the effect of SE on goal-setting is linear – i.e. goal-setting 
has no reciprocal effect on SE (“people do not choose the goal of 
swimming a treacherous body of water and then wonder whether they 
have the swimming capabilities to reach the opposite shore” [Bandura & 
Cervone 1986, pg104]), this view has been increasingly undermined by 
studies observing a bidirectional relationship between SE and goal-setting 
(Garland, 1985). Schunk (2003) postulates that “specific goals… promote 
efficacy because it is relatively easy to evaluate progress toward an 
explicit goal” (Schunk, 2003, pg163-164); therefore, it now seems likely 
that, in addition to augmenting performance, SE itself is also increased 
indirectly through the processes outlined above. 
 
4. Self-Regulation Strategy. Early investigation into metacognitive 
learning processes – processes that develop “awareness of and knowledge 
about one’s own thinking” (Zimmerman, 2002, pg65) - clearly 
demonstrated that students’ use of self-reflective learning strategy is 
well correlated with academic success (Zimmerman & Martinez-Pons, 
1988) and is highly predictive of academic achievement (Zimmerman & 
Martinez-Pons, 1986) independently of prior attainment (McClelland, 
Morrison & Holmes, 2000) and of ethnicity, gender and other personal 
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differences (Yen, Konold & McDermott, 2004). This is particularly the 
case for students of lower ability (Zimmerman & Martinez-Pons, 1986). 
These initial findings gave rise to a very large body of research on the 
“self-directive process by which learners transform their mental abilities 
into academic skills” (Zimmerman, 2000a, pg18), which quickly became 
known as Self-Regulated Learning (SRL).  
 
Many different models of SRL have been proposed (see Zimmerman & 
Cleary, 2001; Boekaerts et al., 2000 for reviews) and, although some (e.g. 
McCombs & Marzano, 1990) propose a general agentic ‘self-system’ that 
mediates between personal and contextual characteristics and 
performance (Pintrich, 2004), the majority of models identify separate 
organisational components within SRL, amongst which SE has been 
implicated as particularly significant (Zimmerman, 1990). Consequentially, 
SE features in the majority of models of SRL (Zimmerman & Cleary, 
2001). For example, in Zimmerman’s model of Self-Regulation (see Figure 
A1 below), SRL is conceptualised as a cyclical, relational process 
consisting of three discrete phases. The ‘Forethought Phase’ is perceived 
as a reinforcing transaction between task-analytic processes (planning 
and goal setting) and self-motivation beliefs (in which SE plays a pivotal 
role), which collectively mediate the ‘Performance Phase’ of SLR.  
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Zimmerman presents compelling evidence to support the influential role 
of SE in his model of SRL. For example, in a dart-throwing task 
Zimmerman and Kitsantas (1997) found that girls who used SE to inform 
their goal-setting strategy not only achieved the best performance, but 
also developed substantially higher SE than girls who used different task 
analytical processes. The same effect was observed in a word-sorting 
task (Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1999). In the opposite scenario Pintrich 
(2000a) conducted a longitudinal study into the effect of different types 
of forethought strategies on performance in maths. He found that 
students who were coached to use outcome-specific targets only (i.e. ones 
that made no use of SE) exhibited significant decreases in SE, increased 
negative affect and were more likely to withdraw effort and engagement 
in lessons. From this study (and others) Pintrich (2003) drew two 
important conclusions; 1) SE heavily influences motivation (see earlier) 
which is in keeping with Schunk and Swartz’s (1993) observation that 
persistence with learning strategy is positively correlated with SE 
(Schunk & Swartz, 1993); and, more importantly, 2) that SE leads 
 
Figure A1: “Phases and Sub-processes of self-regulation” adapted from a similar 
diagram in Zimmerman (2002) 
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students to adopt different learning strategies, chief amongst which are 
those that focus on planning, systems of self-monitoring and time-
management (Pintrich, 1995). This was Zimmerman’s thinking as well 
(Zimmerman & Martinez-Pons, 1992) and, although different SRL theories 
each invoke SE in subtly different ways, it is highly likely that much of 
the link between SE and performance occurs indirectly through SE-
induced mediation of SRL strategy.  
 
5.  Anxiety. “When people see themselves as ill-equipped to cope with 
potentially threatening events, they will become anxious” (Muris, 2002, 
pg338). In other words, students suffer from achievement anxiety 
because they have a low perceived SE to manage academic demands 
(Meece et al., 1990; Pintrich & De Groot, 1990). Anxiety has a pronounced 
negative effect on performance as demonstrated in correlation path-
analyses (Bandalos et al., 1995; Williams, 1991) and in experimental 
induced-stress studies, where test-anxious students make appreciably 
more performance errors than control groups (Kurosawa & Harackiewicz, 
1995). This is in keeping with students’ own post-examination reports, 
which reliably ascribe performance deficits to high levels of test anxiety 
(Cassady & Johnson, 2002). Explanations for this effect have suggested 
that the anxiety-state may obfuscate memory retrieval cues, either via 
cognitive interference from other thoughts (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 
1992), physiological stress (Sarason, 1984) or by anxiety-related 
disruption of pre-test conceptualisation, processing or encoding 
processes (Naveh-Benjamin, 1991). However, given Khul’s (1982) finding 
that goal-setting is also undermined by anxiety and other studies 
demonstrating anxiety-generated interference on other performance-
related factors (e.g. anxiety contributing to decreased perseverance – 
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see Cassady & Johnson [2002] for work on anxiety-related 
procrastination) it is likely that the full impact of anxiety on performance 
is multi-factorial, complex and of considerable significance, particularly 
when the perception of threat is significant enough for anxiety to 
become stress. 
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Institution Focused Study 
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Developing, Testing and Validating the Stressor Appraisal Implicit 
Association Test (SA-IAT): an Institution-Focused Study 
 
Introduction: why the IAT? 
 
Procedures measuring implicit cognitive processes have proliferated 
extensively since Greenwald and Banaji (1995) first coined the term 
‘implicit social cognition’. For example, in 2005 Nosek and colleagues 
(Nosek et al., 2005) recorded that, between 1998 and 2004 more than 
120 papers had been published using the most popular implicit 
methodology – the Implicit Association Test (IAT; see Greenwald et al., 
1998). In 2011 that figure was close to 3000, which accounted for only 
43% of studies utilising implicit methodologies. The grand total stood at 
6,282 and included a range over twenty different implicit measurement 
procedures in what Nosek (Nosek et al., 2011, pg152) termed “a veritable 
cottage industry… for measuring implicit social cognition.” Such implicit 
procedures are now also being applied to a wide range of fields across 
psychology and related disciplines, ranging from emotion regulation 
(Mauss et al., 2006; Chen & Bargh, 1997) to addiction (Wiers & Stacey, 
2006), or from religious views and political affiliation (Nosek et al., 2007) 
to sexual attraction (Gray & Snowden, 1998). 
 
Traditionally, self-report instruments are employed to measure cognitive 
processes. However, in the assessment of implicit cognition self-report 
methodologies are notoriously inaccurate, suffering from the twin 
limitations of Introspective Limits and Response Factors (Greenwald et 
al., 2002). Briefly, Introspective Limits describe the ability of 
participants to report on the intended content domain. As implicit 
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cognition occurs outside of subjective awareness (Epstein, 1994; Nisbett 
& Wilson, 1977) patients are unable to self-score accurately because they 
lack explicit awareness of the content domain assessed by the instrument 
(Greenwald et al., 2002). This leads to the second limitation, whereby the 
participant’s willingness to report about him- or herself becomes 
compromised by various Response Factors, which include the ability to 
respond accurately66, apprehension related to responding (Rosenberg, 
1969) and the problem of response faking (Cronbach, 1990). Taken 
together, these reservations severely limit the use of self-report 
methodologies in implicit cognitive research and are the main reason for 
the proliferation of implicit techniques such as the IAT. 
 
As stated earlier, of the numerous implicit methodologies available, by 
far the most popular is the IAT, which accounts for just under half of all 
studies in implicit cognitive research (Nosek et al., 2011). No doubt part 
of the success of the IAT is owed to its ‘ease of implementation’ 
(Greenwald & Nosek, 2001) and the large effect sizes it produces 
(Greenwald & Nosek, 2001). Similarly, because the IAT is open source and 
free to use it is, understandably, appealing to thrifty researchers and 
insolvent teachers conducting research degrees. However, the real allure 
of the IAT is its ‘versatility and adaptability’ (Meade, 2012), which has 
led not only to its wide and varied application, but also generated 
sufficient data to assess rigorously the validity of the instrument (for a 
review see Greenwald et al., 2009; see also later section on validity of the 
IAT). Although alternative methodologies investigating implicit 
association do exist (e.g. the ‘Go / No-Go’ Association Task [e.g. Nosek & 
                                                
66 This is often subsumed into the wider category of the demand characteristics of 
responding (Orne, 1962) 
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Banaji, 2001], the Lexical Decision Task [Wittenbrink et al., 1997] or 
Stroop-type procedures [e.g. Cox et al., 2006]), these methodologies are 
considerably less versatile than the IAT and, therefore, tend to be 
employed in research less frequently than the IAT. Consequentially, the 
validity of these methodologies is less well documented. This is because; 
a) there has been less call (or funding) for studies establishing the 
validity of these methodologies and, b) currently, insufficient data exists 
to establish test validity based on meta-analytic research. Therefore, of 
the lexical methodologies, the IAT is the obvious preferred choice.  
 
However, a variety of non-lexical implicit techniques are also available, 
including a number of affective priming processes (e.g. Fazio et al., 1986; 
De Houwer & Eelen, 1998; Winkielman et al., 1997) or implicit activity-
based procedures, such as the Approach-Avoid Task (Rinck & Becker, 
2007) or the Stimulus Response Compatibility Task (Mogg et al., 2003). 
Similarly, a number of physiological techniques have been developed that 
indirectly correlate with implicit cognition (e.g. pupillometry [Laeng et al., 
2012] and GSR tests [McGinnies, 1949]). However, all of these IAT-
alternatives have in common three significant limitations; 1) they require 
the use of expensive laboratory equipment, 2) they are designed for (and 
are generally employed in) experiment-type methodologies, which 
compromises their use for in situ research in a school environment, 3) by 
nature of their non-lexical design, they are less applicable to the kind of 
academic stressors found in such environments. Therefore, for the 
research methodology put forward in Chapter 4, the IAT constitutes the 
preferred instrument for measuring implicit cognition. 
 
How Does the IAT work? 
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In essence, the IAT is “a general-purpose procedure for measuring 
strengths of automatic associations between concepts” (Greenwald et al., 
1998, pg1465). The key underlying concept is the assumption that it ought 
to be easier to make the same behavioural response (a key press) to 
concepts that are strongly associated, than to concepts that are weakly 
associated (Nosek, Greenwald & Banaji, 2005). The IAT is, therefore, a 
timed classification test in which participants use two response keys to 
sort items into opposing groups. Each group comprises two oppositional 
sub-components: the initial target categories (e.g. ‘exams’ and ‘holidays’) 
and the associated concept attributes (e.g. ‘stressed’ and ‘relaxed’). 
These target and attribute categories are combined in two different 
ways - i.e. the combination of ‘exams’ + ‘stressed’ press left and ‘relaxed’ + 
‘holidays’ press right, is compared with the combination ‘exams’ + ‘relaxed’ 
press left and ‘holidays’ + ‘stressed’ press right. The IAT effect is the 
difference in reaction times between these two sorting conditions, based 
on the idea that, when two concepts are associated, sorting is easier (and, 
therefore, will occur faster and with fewer errors)67. 
 
The exact nature of the implicit cognitive and preconscious mechanism/s 
that underpin the IAT effect is the subject of some considerable debate 
(see Fazio & Olson, 2003 for a review). However, a key study by De 
Houwer (De Houwer et al., 2001; see also De Houwer & Hermas, 2001) 
strongly suggests that the effect owes to a preconscious stimulus 
categorisation process, rather than an automatic, valence-determined 
reflex. In a series of important experiments De Houwer asked 
participants to categorise famous people into ‘British’/’foreign’ target 
                                                
67 For worked examples of the IAT, see www.implicit.harvard.edu. 
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categories, which were paired with ‘positive’/’negative’ attributes. The list 
of famous people was deliberately structured to include both positively- 
and negatively-valenced British and non-British people (e.g. Princess 
Diana, Albert Einstein, Adolf Hitler etc) which, De Houwer hypothesized, 
ought to influence the categorisation process if stimulus valence is 
important in generating the IAT effect – i.e. IAT scores would produce 
markedly different results depending whether ‘British’ accompanied 
‘positive’ or ‘negative’ attribution characteristics. This is not what he 
found, suggesting that the specific valence associated with the famous 
individual names did little to affect the IAT test. This conclusion is also 
supported by Mitchell and his colleagues (Mitchell et al., 1999), who found 
that participants produced different IAT scores when asked to 
categorise the same list of famous white or black politicians and athletes 
into either ‘white’/’black’ or ‘politician’/’athlete’ categories – i.e. the 
stimulus itself was largely irrelevant: the IAT effect was produced by 
the specific evaluation of the stimulus in terms of its association with the 
target categories. In other words, the IAT effect is generated by the 
processes that appraise the stimulus, rather than any specific property 
of the stimulus itself (Banaji, 2001)68.  
 
It might be tempting to assume that an Implicit Association Test 
measures only implicit, or preconscious, appraisals as some have suggested 
(Cunningham et al., 2001). However, this view is limited for two reasons; 1) 
as I have demonstrated in Chapter 2, both conscious and preconscious 
systems are capable both of self-regulation and also of regulating each 
                                                
68 For a review of appraisal processes, please see Chapter 2. 
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other: in effect, they are inseparable and interdependent (Sherman et 
al., 200869), 2) as Conrey and her colleagues highlight;  
 
“No task is ‘process pure.’ It is technically impossible that any task that requires 
observable responses depends entirely on automatic processes and not at all on 
controlled processes. Moreover, it is quite unlikely that any task depends entirely 
on controlled processes and not at all on automatic processes. Rather, most, if not 
all, of the behaviours researchers wish to understand will be influenced by 
simultaneously occurring automatic and controlled processes that influence one 
another” (Conrey et al., 2005, pg470).  
 
Thus, because the IAT depends on behavioural responses, it must be 
considered as a measure of the combined influence of preconscious 
appraisal processes and their regulation by cognitive systems.  
 
This view is well supported by neuroimaging studies, which have 
repeatedly shown that participants undertaking IATs show increased 
activity in subcortical stimulus appraisal systems (Cunningham et al., 
2003), particularly the amygdala (Phelps et al., 2000), but only if stimuli 
are presented for 25ms or less (Cunningham et al., 2004). Beyond this 
window, activity also registers in neocortical areas (Chee et al., 2000), 
particularly the PFC and ACC (Aron et al., 2004), which are heavily 
involved in cognitive appraisal processes (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, 
other studies (Richeson et al., 2003; Cunningham et al., 2004) have found 
a clear correlation between IAT scores and PFC activity, leading to the 
conclusion that, whilst preconscious appraisal processes mediate the 
                                                
69 This has led to the movement away from dual processes models of appraisal towards 
diffusion-based models such as the Quad Process model (see Beer et al., 2008 for a 
review). 
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initial IAT response70, the activity is carefully regulated by overlying 
cortical processes (Stanley et al., 2008). Thus, according to Chee and 
colleagues (Chee et al., 2000), the IAT effect is generated by cortical 
processes over-riding preconscious responses. According to this view, 
when response categories are congruent, cortical inhibition is not 
required, resulting in fast IAT response times. However, when the items 
are incongruent, the preconscious response behaviour must be over-
ridden by neocortical systems, resulting in a delayed response which 
generates the IAT effect. This conclusion is supported by two key 
sources of evidence; 1) people with prefrontal damage show an inability to 
suppress preconscious responses (Diamond, 1998) and, 2) fMRI studies 
(e.g. Aron et al., 2004) have found that activation of the PFC and ACC 
occurs most strongly during unmatched stimulus IAT responses71. Thus, it 
can be concluded that the IAT measures stimulus evaluation, or stimulus 
appraisal, and the IAT effect occurs as a consequence of the interaction 
between preconscious and cognitive appraisal mechanisms. 
 
The IAT and stress 
 
                                                
70 This is posited to occur via a process of stimulus evaluation (valence, relevance for 
attention etc) and with respect to the target category (Cunningham et al., 2004). 
71 It should be noted that this observation has not been reliably replicated (e.g. Mitchell 
et al., 2008) and that other explanations exist, other than the cortical inhibition theory 
put forward here, to explain the IAT effect. For example, the IAT effect has been 
posited to occur as a consequence of preconscious systems needing to access semantic 
memory in order to categorise the stimuli accurately (Mason & Macrae, 2004). Although 
this is a fundamentally different proposal to Chee’s, it still explains the IAT effect in 
terms of the interaction between preconscious appraisal systems and cortical regulatory 
processes, which is the position I adopt here. Thus, to some extent, regardless of the 
underlying mechanism, a general conclusion may be that the IAT assesses stimulus 
appraisal processes. 
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To date, comparatively few studies have investigated the relationship 
between preconscious stressor appraisal and resultant stress. Those that 
exist tend to make use of attentional orientation tasks, such as Posner’s 
test (Pilgrim et al., 2010) or visual probe techniques (Fox et al., 2010), 
which have proven pivotal in establishing the role of preconscious 
appraisal processes in directing conscious attention towards stressors. 
For example, Ellenbogen and colleagues (Ellenbogen et al., 2010) showed 
that participants who had been pre-exposed to a Trier Social Stress Test 
(TSST) exhibited a stronger attentional bias towards later stressor 
stimuli than controls. Furthermore, they found that the extent of the 
attentional bias was strongly predictive of the magnitude of the 
participants’ cortisol response - evidence that robustly supports the 
notion that stress is attributable to the moderating effect of 
preconscious appraisal processes on cognitive appraisal via changes in 
attention. This conclusion is further supported by Jansson and Najström 
(2009) who observed, not only is the stressor attentional bias 
phenomenon replicable in other stressor-exposure procedures (in this 
case a Stroop-type task), but that the bias is also predictive of the 
participants’ autonomic reactivity to the stressor. In other words, stress 
(and particularly stress viewed in response-based terms, see McEwen, 
2000; 200772) is strongly affected by changes in our systems of stressor 
appraisal73.  
 
                                                
72 For a review see Chapter 2. 
73 Jansson and Najström (2009) used their research to develop a model of clinical 
anxiety based on maladaptive positive feedback within systems of attentional bias. This 
model proposes, in effect, that cognitive appraisal processes become sensitized to 
stressors by chronic alternations in preconscious appraisal processes. See also Philips 
(Phillips et al., 2010), who expound a similar theory for the generation of depression via 
changes in implicit appraisal processes. 
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However, whilst this research constitutes a significant step forward in 
our understanding of the role of stressor appraisal in eliciting stress, the 
major limitation of these studies (Fox et al., 2010; Pilgrim et al., 2010; 
Ellenbogen et al., 2010; Jansson & Najström, 2009) is that the underlying 
nature of the preconscious appraisal itself was not considered in their 
methodologies – their work only examined the effect of stressor 
exposure on the implicit regulation of conscious attention. In principle 
this limitation could be at least partly overcome using different implicit 
appraisal methodologies, such as the IAT. However, despite this 
advantage, very little work to date has employed the IAT in stress 
research and I have been unable to identify any studies that have used 
the IAT to measure stressor appraisal directly. This is surprising because 
research by Sato and Kawahara (2012)74 and Egloff and Schmukle 
(2002)75 clearly demonstrate that the IAT is sensitive enough to measure 
differences in implicit stressor appraisals under varying conditions. 
Therefore, in order to readdress this gap in the research, I intend to use 
the IAT to measure implicit stressor appraisal. However, in order to do 
so, I need first to develop and then validate an IAT instrument specific 
for the assessment of the appraisal of academic stressors, which will be 
accessible and appropriate for the adolescent participants taking part in 
this research. This goal constitutes the rationale for this Chapter. 
 
Developing the Stressor Appraisal IAT (SA-IAT) 
 
                                                
74 Sato and Kawahara (2012) used the IAT to test for the effect of stress on the 
categorisation of ‘self’/’other’ stimulus items and, thereby, confirm the existence of 
acute stress in the participants (although see Schmukle & Egloff, 2004). 
75 Egloff and Schmukle (2002) used the IAT to establish the existence of stress in 
order to validate a self-report questionnaire they were developing. 
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During IATs participants undergo a simple behavioural response-based 
learning program in which they are asked to classify stimulus words into 
single and then paired combinations of super-ordinate categories. 
Although a variety of IAT designs now exist (such as the Brief Implicit 
Association Test – see Sriram & Greenwald, 2009) the majority of IAT 
procedures adopt the traditional five-step procedure designed by 
Anthony Greenwald (Greenwald et al., 1998), which can be summarised as 
follows. 
 
Step 1: This is an initial target-discrimination step in which the 
participants allocate stimulus words to one of two super-ordinate target 
categories: in this case ‘exams’ (a blanket term for academic stressors) 
and an appropriate antonymous category (here ‘holidays’ was chosen). This 
step is designed to familiarise participants with stimulus items, the key-
pressing procedure and the super-ordinate concept categories. 
 
Step 2: This step introduces the stimulus attributes and reinforces the 
participants’ familiarity with the IAT procedure. In a similar two-
category discrimination task, participants allocate stimulus words into one 
of two antonymous super-ordinate attribute categories (in this case 
‘stressed’ and ‘relaxed’). 
 
Step 3: In this step both target and attribute categories are 
superimposed (i.e. ‘exams’+’stressful’ and ‘holidays’+’relaxing’). Stimulus 
words for target and attribute discriminations appear on alternating 
trials. The speed at which participants allocate individual stimulus words 
into the appropriate paired category is recorded. 
 
 351
Step 4: This step is a repeat of Step 1 but with the key press response 
assignments reversed. This step prepares participants for Step 5 and 
also controls for unintentional directional bias or preference for response 
assignments. 
 
Step 5: This step is a repeat of Step 3 but with the target and attribute 
categories paired the other way around (i.e. ‘exams’+’relaxing’ and 
‘holidays’+’stressful’). As with Step 3, response speeds are timed and will 
later be compared with those of Step 3. An IAT effect is generated if 
the stimulus categorisation timings differ between Steps 3 and 5. If the 
target categories are similarly associated with the attribute dimension, 
participant tend to categorise the same list of stimuli (it is identical in 
Steps 3 and 5) with equal speeds in both Step 3 and Step 5. However, if a 
participant responds significantly faster on one of the two steps – i.e. the 
participant finds this step considerably easier than the other – the 
implication is that an implicit association exists between the target and 
attribute categories (Greenwald et al., 1998).  
 
As the majority of published studies adopt the five-step procedure 
outlined above, I chose to base the Stressor Appraisal IAT (SA-IAT) on 
Greenwald’s (Greenwald et al., 1998) original design, but using his 
improved D scoring algorithm (Greenwald et al., 2003). A number of 
software programmes are available which allow for the construction and 
scoring of IATs using these parameters (e.g. the Free IAT design 
software developed by Meade [see Meade, 2012], or the IAT Design 
package [see Jander & Jander, 2010]). However, the most widely used is 
the Inquisit IAT software developed by Millisecond (see Millisecond 
Website), which has been utilised by over a thousand research groups, 
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including Greenwald’s (e.g. Dasgupta et al., 2000). The Inquisit software 
allows not only for the SA-IAT instrument to be completed on-line (via a 
web hosting or, in this case, using a school VLE platform), but also for 
multiple participants to complete the SA-IAT concurrently, saving 
considerable time. A further benefit is that the Inquisit software 
includes a high precision key-press timing system, so that response times 
to Steps 3 and 5 are automatically recorded (and any difference 
calculated), thus removing with the need to record IAT sessions 
digitally76 and calculate key-press timings retrospectively by playing back 
recorded sessions at half-speed. However, in developing the SA-IAT 
using the stipulations of the Inquisit software, two key decisions had to 
be made in order to produce the SA-IAT instrument, namely; 1) the 
choice of appropriate antonymous terminology for the target and 
attribute categories and, 2) choice of the stimulus words. 
 
1. In developing the High School Stressors Scale, Burnett and Fanshawe 
(1997) identified ‘examinations’ as the most significant stressor 
adolescents experience at school77. This finding replicated Kohn and 
Frazer’s (1986) earlier conclusion that examinations were the most 
significant contributor to school-based stress. Thus, I chose ‘exams’ as 
the blanket term for the academic stressor target category. Although 
this choice was obvious, it presented an unforeseen problem in the choice 
of antonymous term for the partner target category: i.e. ‘exams’ has no 
immediately obvious antonym. To overcome this problem I conducted a 
brief survey of Sixth Form students to establish an appropriate word 
                                                
76 And the ethical considerations associated with such practices (see Mertens, 1998). 
77 Their study demonstrated that exams correlate with 69% of self-reported stress – 
making it by far the most significant stressor. 
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that participants would readily associate as semantically opposite to 
‘exams’. In the survey, 33 female participants (all between 16 and 18 
years of age) were each given 20 seconds to list antonyms for the word 
‘exams’. Their responses were collated and ranked according to their 
frequency to determine popularity. The data collected demonstrated 
overwhelmingly that participants associate the word ‘holidays’ as 
antonymous to ‘exams’ and, therefore, ‘holidays’ was selected as the 
second target category to partner ‘exams’. 
 
Choice of the attribute terms proved more straightforward. I chose 
‘stressful’ as the most appropriate term to describe the ability of a 
stressor to elicit stress and, as the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 
lists ‘relaxing’ as the primary antonym for ‘stressful’, the attribute terms 
‘stressful’ and ‘relaxing’ were selected for the SA-IAT. 
 
2. Specific words have strong affective and emotional connotations 
(Ainsfeld & Lambert, 1966; Teasdale & Russell, 1983) and, in order to 
avoid obfuscating the implicit target-concept association, it is critical to 
select stimulus items for the SA-IAT that possess equivalent semantic 
‘value’. Additionally, stimulus items must be readily comprehended by the 
participants (i.e. be words within their common vocabulary) in order for 
implicit associations to be revealed by the SA-IAT. Therefore, in order 
to generate a list of appropriate stimulus items, a second pilot study was 
conducted using the same group of 33 female adolescent participants, 
which followed a broadly similar method to that employed by Belezza, 
Greenwald and Banaji (1986) in that it required participants to complete a 
Semantic Categorisation Questionnaire instrument. By completing this 
instrument, participants confirmed not only whether potential stimulus 
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items were in their common usage, but also helped to generate 
approximate semantic normative values for the stimulus items, which then 
enabled me to select items for the SA-IAT that were both semantically 
equivalent and in the participants’ common parlance.  
 
The Semantic Categorisation Questionnaire (SCQ) instrument employed 
in the pilot was constructed from words selected from lists included by 
Russell (1980) in his emotion circumplex model. Twenty items synonymous 
for ‘stressful’ were taken from the extreme perimeter of the 
‘obstructive-negative’ quadrant of his affective semantic wheel and a 
further twenty items synonymous for ‘relaxing’ were selected from the 
‘conducive-positive’ quadrant. Russell’s (1980) emotion circumplex model 
attempts to map affective vocabulary in two-dimensional space according 
to valence and activity/arousal (Russell, 1983). Thus, in selecting words 
from the similar areas of the wheel, the affective valence and arousal of 
items is effectively controlled, ensuring similar semantic value. Having 
selected words for the SCQ, participants completed the instrument to 
indicate (using a 5-point Likert-type scale) the degree to which they 
found the stimulus items ‘relaxing’ or ‘stressful’. This served to confirm 
the semantic valuation and also to ascertain the familiarity of the word 
within the participants’ vocabulary (participants were instructed not to 
score unfamiliar words). From the SCQ scores, the top and bottom ten 
items were chosen for inclusion in the SA-IAT. 
 
Therefore, having found solutions to the questions outlined above, the 
design of the SA-IAT was completed using the Inquisit software and is 
represented in Figure A2 below. 
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Establishing the validity of the SA-IAT 
 
After the publication of the original IAT in 1998, a large body of 
research accumulated to support the validity of the instrument, which led 
to the IAT receiving rapid and extensive support (Devine, 2001). This 
espousal owed, at least in part, to studies demonstrating a high degree of 
reliability in the IAT instrument, both internally (with alpha equal to 
approximately 0.8 – see Greenwald & Nosek, 2001) and externally via 
test-retest procedures (Greenwald et al., 2002). Similarly, positive 
measures of temporal concordance have been recorded (e.g. Cunningham 
et al., 2001 who recorded a stability of .46 over two weeks) supporting 
earlier research upholding the stability of IAT instruments (Dasgupta & 
Greenwald, 2000; Bosson et al., 2000; Egloff et al., 2005; although see 
Gschwender et al. [2008] who found that IATs could be affected by 
context). 
 
 
Figure A2: Schematic illustration of the Stressor Appraisal Implicit Association Test 
(adapted from a similar diagram in Greenwald et al., 1998) 
Step 1 2 3 4 5 
Task 
Description 
Initial Target-
Concept 
Discrimination 
Associated 
Attribute 
Discrimination 
Initial Combined 
Task 
Reversed 
Target-
Concept 
Discrimination 
Reversed 
Combined Task 
Task 
Instruction 
 
• EXAMS 
HOLIDAYS • 
 
• Stressful 
Relaxing • 
• EXAMS 
• Stressful 
HOLIDAYS • 
Relaxing •  
 
EXAMS • 
• HOLIDAYS 
EXAMS • 
• Stressful 
• HOLIDAYS 
Relaxing • 
Sample 
Stimuli 
VACATION • 
• TEST 
• ASSESSMENT 
BREAK • 
• MOCK 
REST • 
GOING ABROAD • 
• QUIZ 
• Fraught 
• Jittery 
Serene • 
Tranquil • 
• Nervous 
Calm • 
• Strained 
Peaceful • 
• Paper 
• Tense 
WEEKEND AWAY • 
Chilled • 
TIME-OFF • 
 • Worried 
 • FINALS 
Soothed • 
• TRIP 
• SOJOURN 
CHECK • 
• LEAVE 
INVESTIGATION • 
QUALIFICATION • 
• FREE-TIME 
MODULES • 
• Overwrought 
RELAXATION PERIOD • 
Placid • 
• APPRAISAL 
• Hassled 
STAYING HOME • 
Cool • 
• TASK 
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Support was further bolstered when IAT effects were shown to be 
independent of handedness bias (Greenwald & Nosek, 2001), assignment 
of categories to specific sides (Greenwald et al., 1998) intertrial-interval 
duration (Greenwald et al., 1998), order of combined tasks (Nosek et al., 
2005) variation in the number of stimulus items, familiarity of items78, 
variability in the duration of the response-stimulus interval, or the order 
of mixed categorisation tasks (reviewed in Brunel et al., 2004). 
 
However, despite this early positive reception, demonstrations of 
reliability verify only content validity, which accounts for only a slim 
portion of construct validity (Messick, 1995) – a point that did not go 
unnoticed as reviews of the IAT (e.g. Cunningham et al., 2001; Kihlstrom, 
2004) published an urgent call for further research to address key 
questions over the use of the IAT as a valid measure of implicit cognition. 
This call for inquiry prompted a flurry of research, which Greenwald and 
his colleagues (Nosek et al., 2007; Lane et al., 2007) then reviewed 
extensively. Their meta-analyses concluded that the validity of the IAT 
had largely been established insomuch that it could be demonstrated in 
all three of the subcategories of validity identified by Messick (1989) – 
i.e. Content validity (Reliability, or Internal validity), Criterion-related 
validity (also known as Concurrent or Predictive validity – Brown, 1996) 
and Construct validity – as well as a fourth category of ecological, or 
Consequential Validity, which is the aspect of construct validity that 
“appraises the value implications of score interpretation as a basis for 
action” (Messick, 1995). I briefly outline this evidence below. 
  
                                                
78 Except in circumstances where familiarity of stimulus items is very low (Brendl et al., 
2001). 
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1. Construct Validity. Cooper and Schindler (2001) advocate the use of 
convergent and discriminant measures in establishing the validity of a 
construct, such as implicit appraisal theory. Applied to this field, 
construct validity is most commonly demonstrated through the 
convergence of conclusions based on data taken from separate implicit 
measures run concurrently across the same group of participants. For 
example, in a study on self-esteem Bosson, Swann and Pennebaker (2001) 
compared seven different implicit measures (including the IAT) and found 
that these instruments produced broadly supportive results. Other 
studies have compared IAT instruments with priming procedures 
(Sherman et al., 2003; Marsh et al., 2001), where convergence was also 
established. Criticism of these studies highlights the finding that these 
validating supportive relations are often weak, which might seem to 
undermine the principle of convergence. However, in a review of such 
studies Greenwald explains that;  
 
“Implicit measures often demonstrate relatively weak reliability compared to 
other forms of psychological measurement. Reliability of measures set upper limits 
on their possible correlations with other measures. For example, the maximum, 
meaningful correlation that can be observed between a measure with reliability of 
.10 and a measure with perfect reliability (1.0) is .32, which is estimated by 
calculating the product of the square roots of the two reliability coefficients” 
(Nosek et al., 2007, pg277). 
 
Therefore, given that the IAT and other implicit measures can have 
relatively low reliability (compared to other quantitative measures), weak 
correlations between implicit measures actually corresponds to a strongly 
convergent measure of validity. This becomes more obvious when the low 
initial reliability of some implicit measures is compensated for 
 358
statistically, which Cunningham and colleagues (Cunningham et al., 2001) 
and Nosek and Banaji (2001) have made the focus of independent 
research projects. Their work demonstrated significantly higher 
correlations between implicit measures (up to 0.77) which, taken 
together, constitutes strong evidence of construct validity via 
convergence, thus adding significantly to the validity of the IAT as a 
measure of implicit appraisal. 
 
Similar to convergence studies, triangulation methodologies employ 
separate qualitative and quantitative data collection processes “to obtain 
different but complementary data on the same topic” (Morse, 1991, cited 
in Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, pg87; see also Creswell, 1999). This 
approach has been adopted in IAT research, where studies have 
attempted to establish validity by analysing the correlation between IAT 
scores and parallel explicit self-report measures. This approach initially 
met with mixed success: whilst some studies reveal high correlations 
(Nosek et al., 2002a), others show no significant correlation at all (Nosek 
& Banaji, 2002). Such contradictory findings prompted wide-scale meta-
analyses (Nosek, 2005; Poehlman et al., 2004; Hofmann et al., 2005) 
which determined that, whilst explicit and implicit measures do show a 
high degree of inter-relation, they should be considered as distinct 
constructs (Nosek, 2005; Nosek & Smyth, 2007). This conclusion is not 
surprising because neuroimaging studies (Cunningham et al., 2003; 2004; 
Phelps et al., 2000), psychometric evidence (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; 
Nosek & Smyth, 2005) and dual process theories of emotion79 all 
delineate explicit and implicit appraisal processes as being neurologically 
and functionally separate. Apropos, some researchers have concluded 
                                                
79 See Chapter 3 (see also Wilson et al., 2000 and the opening section of this Chapter). 
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that studies demonstrating an absence of (or low) correlation between 
implicit and explicit techniques (Nosek & Smyth, 2007; Nosek & Hanson, 
2008) constitute evidence of construct validity via discriminant technique 
(Cooper & Schindler, 2001) – i.e. when similar instruments fail to 
converge, rightly, because they measure separate constructs. However, 
although this argument initially seems compelling, on inspection it proves 
paradoxical as one cannot take the presence of correlations between 
implicit and explicit methods as evidence for construct validity (Poehlman 
et al., 2004; Hofmann et al., 2005) whilst also arguing that the absence of 
such convergence also constitutes evidence of construct validity by 
discriminant technique (Nosek, 2005; Nosek & Smyth, 2007). This 
impasse has, in part, been created through the employment of a diverse 
array of implicit and explicit instruments across the literature, each of 
which allows for a different blend of interaction between explicit and 
implicit appraisal processes. This is further confounded by the inter-
dependence of the appraisal processes themselves80. Therefore, whilst 
data from parallel explicit and implicit measures does, for the most part, 
support the construct validity of the IAT (Nosek, 2005; Poehlman et al., 
2004; Hofmann et al., 2005), further work is certainly required to 
establish this beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
2. Predictive Validity. Studies of convergence analysis have brought to 
light another possible avenue for validation of the IAT, namely the 
potential for implicit measures to predict behaviour (Maison et al., 2004). 
A number of early studies had shown positive correlations between IAT 
measures and the prediction of maladaptive behaviours, including anxiety 
(Asendorpf et al., 2002) and chronic alcohol dependence (Wiers et al., 
                                                
80 See Chapter 3. 
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2002). However, Nosek’s (Nosek et al., 2002b) observation that implicit 
negativity towards mathematics was heavily correlated with performance 
in maths SAT examinations suggested that the IAT might also prove 
predictive of mainstream behaviours. In a meta-analysis of 122 studies in 
this field, Greenwald (Greenwald et al., 2009) concluded exactly this, 
particularly for socially sensitive topics, where the IAT significantly out-
performed alternative explicit instruments. Although he advocates a 
combination of explicit and IAT measures as the best predictor of 
behaviour, Greenwald’s (Greenwald et al., 2009) finding that IAT scores 
are correlated with behavioural probabilities does achieve the effect of 
methodological triangulation and, therefore, adds credence to the 
application of the IAT as a valid measure of implicit stressor appraisal. 
 
3. Internal Validity. Response-latency studies are not renowned for 
having high internal reliability (Lane et al., 2007) as error variance is too 
easily introduced across items (e.g. by participant distraction). Equally, 
the internal consistency of the IAT is frequently measured as being lower 
that that of self-report instruments (Buchner & Wippich, 2000). Taken 
together, this evidence could lead to the inference of low reliability 
within the IAT. However, that conclusion is not supported by the wider 
literature as meta-analytic studies (e.g. Hofman et al., 2005) place 
average alpha scores at .79 for the IAT, indicating a relatively high level 
of consistency across the instrument. This is in keeping with the 
observation that, of the available measures of implicit appraisal, the IAT 
is consistently recorded as having the best internal reliability 
(Cunningham et al., 2001). Test-retest procedures also support this view 
as, in a study of implicit appraisal of self-esteem, Bosson and colleagues 
(Bosson et al., 2004) found that the reliability of implicit instruments was 
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significantly higher for the IAT across successive tests than that of 
other implicit measures. Other test-retest literature also lends support 
to the internal validity of the IAT as a number of studies have 
demonstrated strong reliability correlations between test and retest 
(Dasgupta et al., 2000; Egloff et al., 2005; Steffens & Buchner, 2003)81, 
lending support to the conclusion that the IAT shows a high degree of 
reliability.  
 
Despite this evidence, some researchers have identified specific threats 
to internal validity within IAT measures. Of these, familiarity of items 
has attracted the most research. Citing Zajonc’s (1968; 2001) 
observation that familiar stimuli tend to be favoured in preference to 
unfamiliar stimuli, Rothermund and Wentura (2001) demonstrated that 
IAT-like effects could be produced in a ‘go/no-go’ task simply by 
manipulating the salience of the target-descriptor category. This led 
them to propose that the IAT effect occurs through asymmetry of 
stimulus valence (Rothermund & Wentura, 2004), rather that through 
implicit stimulus evaluation as Greenwald advocates (Greenwald et al.; 
1998; 2003; 2009) – a clear challenge to the internal validity of the IAT.  
 
Rothermund and Wentura’s argument hinges on the assertion that 
participants tend to focus predominantly on one of the two IAT 
categories, effectively remodelling the IAT task as a stimulus-detection 
activity in which salience asymmetry wholly governs response time (either 
directly through familiarity via pre-exposure, or indirectly through 
natural sources of asymmetry [e.g. linguistic markedness (Lyons, 1977), or 
                                                
81 However, see also Dasgupta and Asgari (2004), who found very low test-retest 
reliability correlations. 
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the popout effect (Strayer & Johnson, 2000)]). This position is supported 
by some experimental evidence. For example, Brendl and colleagues 
(Brendl et al., 2001) demonstrated that positive and negative IAT effects 
could be reversed when ‘nonwords’ were included as stimulus items, 
implying that the lack of familiarity (with ‘nonwords’) drove the IAT 
effect they had observed. Their conclusion that item familiarity 
confounds the IAT effect is also supported by Rothermund and Wentura 
(2001), whose ‘association-free’ IAT designs were found to elicit effects 
similar to those measured by ‘normal’ IAT procedures. Similarly, inverting 
salience asymmetry of stimulus items has been shown clearly to reverse 
the IAT effect (Rothermund & Wentura, 2004), whereas manipulation of 
association did not alter the IAT effect in the same experiments if 
salience asymmetrics were held constant – outcomes that not only support 
Rothermund and Wentura’s (2004) theory of salience asymmetry, but also 
appear to undermine considerably the internal validity of the IAT 
instrument. 
 
However, counterbalancing this data is large body of evidence suggesting 
that stimulus familiarity has little or no effect on the IAT. For example, 
in a key study, Dasgupta and colleagues (Dasgupta et al., 2000) controlled 
stimulus familiarity by use of a statistical regression and still observed a 
marked IAT effect across participants - a result that directly 
contradicts Rothermund and Wentura’s salience asymmetry account. 
Similarly, in unconscious stereotyping experiments, the use of unfamiliar 
stimulus items led to the robust preservation of IAT responses (Ottaway 
et al., 2001, see also Rudman et al., 1999), which is also at odds with the 
notion of familiarity-based stimulus processing. Finally, it has been shown 
that participants’ familiarity with words and symbols related to 
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mathematics does not contribute to an ‘automatic liking’ for that 
discipline as measured by the IAT (Nosek et al., 2002b). Therefore, the 
overall conclusion must be that salience symmetry, by itself, does not 
generate the IAT effect. However, given the number and variety of 
studies that do support a role for stimulus valence in IAT processing, I 
accept Kinoshita and Peek-O’leary’s (2005, pg442) reservation that IAT 
effects can also be “interpreted in terms of salience asymmetry, based 
on dimensions like familiarity and linguistic markedness.” Therefore, 
whilst the IAT does display significant internal validity (Hofman et al., 
2005), I acknowledge that a potential limitation in its use is the 
confounding effect of stimulus asymmetry. As yet, a solution to this issue 
has not been proffered, so I await future research clarifying this area 
with enthusiasm and interest. 
 
Aside from stimulus familiarity, four other factors have been shown to 
have a limiting effect on the internal validity of the IAT; namely, a) 
participants’ familiarity with the IAT itself, b) the fakeability of the IAT 
effect, c) the age of participants and, d) cognitive fluency of 
participants. 
 
a) Pre-exposure to implicit instruments has been shown to have a 
small, but significant, effect on the IAT (Greenwald et al., 2003). 
Although an interpretation of this result has yet to be offered, it 
nevertheless constitutes an additional threat to internal validity. 
However, given the age and demographic of the participants in this 
study, the chance of any of them having previously completed an 
IAT is miniscule and, therefore, presents little threat to the 
internal validity of the SA-IAT as employed here. 
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b) Despite Kim’s (2003) evidence that the IAT effect is not 
deliberately fakeable, the consensus of studies tend to draw the 
opposite conclusion (e.g. Fiedler & Bluemke, 2005; Gregg et al., 
2006; De Houwer et al., 2007), leading to the suggestion that IAT 
tests are easily biased by demand compliance (De Houwer, 2006) 
and could, therefore, be unreliable. However, whilst I cannot rule 
out this possibility, most evidence of fakeability derives from 
studies in which novel words (Mitchell et al., 2003) or ‘nonwords’ 
(Gregg et al., 2006) are used and, as De Houwer and colleagues 
report (De Houwer et al., 2007), this result is difficult to replicate 
in IATs with well-known attitude objects such as those utilised in 
the SA-IAT. Additionally, as the ability to fake an effect 
increases with experience of IAT (Steffens, 2004; Cvencek et al., 
2010), demand compliance is doubly unlikely to have a significant 
biasing effect on response timing, in either this research, or that 
of the main study. Therefore, I posit that the influence of 
fakeability on the internal reliability of the SA-IAT is also minimal. 
 
c) Response latency measures are well known to suffer from age-
related biases (Faust et al., 1999; Ratcliff et al., 2000) and the 
IAT is no exception (Greenwald & Nosek, 2001; Hummert et al., 
2002). However, not only has Greenwald significantly adapted the 
IAT scoring algorithm to compensate for this effect (Greenwald et 
al., 2003), but the participants contributing to this research and 
the main study have all been selected from the same school year 
(the Sixth Form), ensuring that their age was controlled and, 
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therefore, that any age-related threats to internal validity were 
eliminated. 
 
d) In keeping with the previous point, response-based measures have 
been shown to be biased both by intelligence (Jensen, 1993; 
Salthouse, 1996) and the cognitive fluency of participants to cope 
with switching between intellectual processing tasks (Salthouse et 
al., 1998). These influences have been shown to affect IAT 
measures as McFarland and Crouch (2002) were able to 
demonstrate that independent IAT scores (measuring very 
different association processes) could be made to correlate closely 
with each other: a result that led McFarland and Crouch (2002) to 
conclude that underlying cognitive ability is responsible for 
producing the IAT effect. However, whilst Greenwald 
acknowledges this influence (Cai et al., 2004), he also clearly 
demonstrates that cognitive fluency only confounds millisecond-
measures of latency, such as those utilised in McFarland and 
Crouch’s study. Greenwald has since presented a new scoring 
algorithm for the IAT (Greenwald et al., 2003) which rescales 
individual IAT effects according to within-participant latency 
variablility, which carefully controls for individual variations in 
cognitive fluency as well as intelligence. Greenwald (Cai et al., 
2004) reports that, when this algorithm is employed in IATs, the 
biasing influence detected by McFarland and Crouch (2002) is 
reduced to insignificant levels82. This observation has been 
replicated by others (Mierke & Klauer, 2003), supporting the view 
                                                
82 Although, note, that the influence of intelligence and cognitive fluency is not 
eliminated entirely by Greenwald’s (Greenwald et al., 2003) new algorithm. 
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that neither cognitive fluency, nor intelligence significantly 
confounds IAT effects and thus that the IAT demonstrates 
robust internal validity83. Therefore, with the caveat of stimulus 
asymmetry (discussed above), the evidence presented here 
strongly supports the conclusion that the SA-IAT, as employed in 
this research, constitutes a reliable implicit measure. 
 
4. Consequential Validity. Blanton and Jaccard (2006) have criticised the 
IAT on the grounds of low metric meaningfulness, arguing that it fails to 
reveal the underlying psychological dimension it was designed to measure 
(implicit associations between stimuli). Because of this, Blanton and 
Jaccard (2006) assert that the IAT constitutes an arbitrary analytical 
instrument and thus, in keeping with Shepard’s (1997) and Popham’s 
(1997) interpretation of consequential validity,84 they argue that the IAT 
must be considered as ecologically invalid because it leads researchers 
towards unintended and inappropriate inferences. Blanton and Jaccard 
(2006) cite the absence of normalisation (i.e. measurement relative to 
normative values) and the lack of a fixed zero-point as specific examples 
of the lack of meaningfulness in the IAT. However, in regard to their 
first point, Nosek and Sriram (2007) observe that, in order to conform to 
a normalised scale, relative preferences between target concepts and 
relative attributes must interact additively in order to form a framework 
for comparison between concept-attribute pairs. This is not the case “as 
relative preferences are not decomposable into component attitudes at 
all” (Nosek & Sriram, 2007, pg394); rather they are interdependent 
                                                
83 See also Stüttgen et al., 2011, who argue for a different IAT scoring process to 
address a flaw in Greenwald’s (Greenwald et al., 2003) scoring correction. 
84 See also Messick (1995). 
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(Hsee et al., 1999) and demonstrate multiple levels of additivity 
(Anderson, 1977). Although measures of single association are now 
available (e.g. De Houwer’s ‘EAST’ (the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task - 
see De Houwer, 2003), they have yet to be validated and, as the IAT is 
not an appropriate measure for single association (Nosek et al., 2005), 
there is limited scope to accommodate for Blanton and Jaccard’s (2006) 
call for the IAT to be normalised. This remains a limitation in the use of 
the IAT in research and, potentially, a threat to consequential validity if 
utilised by researchers with a lack of awareness of the limitations of the 
IAT. 
 
By contrast, Blanton and Jaccard’s (2006) second criticism - that the 
IAT contains an implicit assumption that the IAT zero-point maps onto 
neutral stimulus association, and that this has yet to be validated – has 
been robustly dismissed. In a swift response to Blanton and Jaccard’s 
2006 paper, Greenwald (Greenwald et al., 2006) provided succinct 
evidence of zero-point congruence by comparing explicit and implicit 
preferences for presidential candidates. Their work clearly demonstrated 
IAT scores centring about a zero-point, which correlated very closely 
with the neutral position of the self-reports. Therefore, whilst I accept 
Blanton and Jaccard’s (2006) criticism that the IAT has not been 
normalised (and thus that measures of relative implicit association 
recorded in this research must be considered as exactly that – relative 
measures rather than absolute measures), I reject their assertion that 
the IAT lacks meaningfulness. As the IAT has been shown to 
demonstrate predictive validity in 86 separate and independent studies 
(Poehlman et al., 2004), I posit that the meaningfulness of the IAT has 
indeed been established (albeit from a relativistic perspective) and that, 
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in conjunction with the evidence presented above, that the SA-IAT 
constitutes a thoroughly and demonstrably valid measure of implicit 
stimulus association (Nosek et al., 2007; Lane et al., 2007). 
 
Using the Stress Appraisal Measure to validate the SA-IAT 
 
As I have demonstrated above, IAT instruments comprise valid measures 
of implicit association. However, despite their inventor’s repeated 
affirmation that IATs measure differences in preconscious appraisal 
processes (e.g. Greenwald et al., 1998; 2009; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001), 
other contending theories have also been advanced. For example, IAT 
effects have been ascribed to environmental associations (Karpinski & 
Hilton, 2001), response criterion shifts (Brendl et al., 2001), task-set 
switching (Mierke & Klauer, 2001; 2003), response conflicts (De Houwer, 
2001) and stimulus valence asymmetry (Rothermund & Wentura, 2001; 
2004), to mention but a few. This diversity of discourse undermines the 
validity of the SA-IAT as a measure of implicit stressor appraisal. Added 
to this - as mentioned previously - I have been unable to identify any 
studies within the literature where IATs have been utilised specifically 
as measures of implicit stressor appraisal, which further limits the 
construct validity of the SA-IAT. Therefore, in order to justify the use 
of the SA-IAT in the manner I propose, I chose to conduct a small 
research project to validate the SA-IAT as a measure of implicit 
stressor appraisal.  
 
The study was designed to follow a method similar to that employed by 
Nosek and his colleagues (Nosek et al., 2002a) in that it utilised 
concurrent implicit and explicit instruments in an attempt to establish 
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concordance between (and thus the validity of) similar measures. The 
implicit measure chosen for this study was, of course, the SA-IAT, whilst 
the second instrument selected was the Stress Appraisal Measure (SAM 
- Peacock & Wong, 1990, see Appendices C & D) - a well-used explicit 
measure of stressor appraisal. Briefly, the SAM is a 28-item, 5-point 
Likert-type instrument85, initially developed by Peacock and Wong (1990) 
to assess the appraisal of an anticipated academic stressor. The SAM 
uses a multi-dimensional, seven sub-scale scoring system to model 
stressor appraisals in terms of Lazarus’s cognitive-relational theory 
(Lazarus, 1991; 1999; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), either as 
‘threat’/’challenge’ primary appraisals, or a variety of secondary appraisal 
processes. Although the SAM is an explicit measure (and thus accesses 
different, though interlinked, neurological appraisal processes to the SA-
IAT [Cunningham et al., 2003; 2004]86), it is an appropriate instrument to 
use in this study because the SAM is “one of the few instruments… 
specifically designed to assess dimensions of primary and secondary 
appraisal separately [my emphasis] and which explicitly attempts to 
distinguish coping processes from appraisal processes” (Cohen et al., 
1997, pg32). As Lazarus’s (1991) ‘primary appraisals’ have been defined 
either as being similar to implicit appraisal processes (Lazarus, 1999; 
Ochsner & Barrett, 2001), or identical to them (Marsella & Gratch, 
2009), by distinguishing between primary and secondary appraisal 
processes, the SAM enables us, to a point, to affect a measure of control 
on the influence of explicit processes during the completion of the SAM 
instrument. This, therefore, allows for legitimate, quantitative 
comparison between the implicit SA-IAT data and the quasi-implicit 
                                                
85 For a critique of Likert-type measures please see Chapter 4. 
86 See also the section of this Chapter on Construct Validity. 
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primary appraisal scores generated from the ‘threat’ and ‘challenge’ sub-
scales in the SAM87. 
 
Furthermore, as well as the ability to limit the effect of explicit 
appraisals, a further justification for the use of the SAM to validate the 
SA-IAT is that the SAM instrument robustly demonstrates high internal 
validity (α ranges from 0.74 to 0.90 – see Roesch & Rowley, 2005) and, 
because of its multidimensional structure, it has been employed in a wide 
variety of contexts (Anshel et al.. 1997; Peacock & Wong, 1990; Roesch & 
Rowley, 2005; Senol-Durak & Durak, 2012), which has the further 
advantage in that a number of robust assessments of validity have been 
completed. These include test-retest research (Peacock & Wong, 1990; 
Durak, 2007) and convergent and discriminant procedures (Rowley et al., 
2005; Roesch & Rowley, 2005). Taken together, these studies confirm 
Peacock and Wong’s (1990) initial assertion that the SAM is a valid and 
reliable measure of academic stressor appraisal and, therefore, an 
appropriate instrument to use to validate the SA-IAT as a measure of 
implicit stressor appraisal. 
 
The IFS Study 
 
Thirty-seven participants volunteered to take part in the study. They 
were split into two groups (a group of 18 and a group of 19); one group 
completed the SA-IAT followed by the SAM and the other half 
completed the instruments in the reverse order. However, as three 
                                                
87 Although Peacock and Wong’s (1990) original SAM instrument splits primary appraisals 
into 'threat', 'challenge and 'centrality' sub-scales, the ‘centrality’ scale has been found 
to work poorly with adolescents (Rowley et al., 2005) and will be not be scored in this 
study. Thus only data from the ‘threat’ and ‘challenge’ sub-scales will be used here. 
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participants left sections of the SAM blank, and two students failed to 
return their consent forms with parental counter-signatures, only 32 sets 
of data went forward for analysis. 
 
Based on Creswell’s (2003) guidance, before taking part in the study, all 
participants were given a full briefing, which explained their right to 
withdraw from the study at any point, their right to withdraw their data 
from the research if they so desired, and their right to ask questions and 
to obtain a copy of the results and an outline of the benefit of the study. 
The participants were also asked to sign a consent form indicating that 
they understood the procedure and that they had given their informed 
consent to take part. As the majority of students were under the age of 
18, all of the participants were asked to give their briefing and consent 
forms to their parents for counter-signing to indicate parental consent 
for participation. As stated previously, two students failed to return 
counter-signed forms and were, therefore, not allowed to participate. 
Additionally, in order to maintain participant confidentiality (but allowing 
completed SAM & SA-IAT instruments to be paired to their respective 
respondents), each participant was instructed to follow a procedure that 
assigned them a unique, anonymous pseudonym – the first two letters of 
their mother’s maiden name and the last two digits of their phone 
number. This is in keeping with strategies recommended by Frankfort-
Nachmias and Nachmias (1992, cited in Cohen et al., 2008). Data from the 
study will be kept for 5 years (as recommended by Sieber, 1998, cited in 
Creswell, 2003. 
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Data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant 
SAM Scores 
SA-IAT 
D Score 
Threat Qs Challenge Qs 
5 11 20 28 Mean 7 8 10 19 Mean 
1 4 3 4 3 3.50 2 2 3 4 2.75 1.37 
2 4 3 3 3 3.25 2 2 2 3 2.25 1.15 
3 4 4 3 3 3.50 3 2 2 3 2.50 1.21 
4 3 2 4 4 3.25 3 1 3 2 2.25 0.88 
5 4 2 3 3 3.00 2 2 2 2 2.00 1.11 
6 3 5 4 3 3.75 2 2 2 3 2.25 0.92 
7 2 3 3 2 2.50 3 2 2 2 2.25 0.67 
8 4 3 4 3 3.50 2 2 4 3 2.75 1.33 
9 4 4 5 3 4.00 1 2 2 3 2.00 1.01 
10 3 3 3 3 3.00 3 3 2 2 2.50 0.92 
11 3 4 3 3 3.25 2 1 2 4 2.25 1.11 
12 4 4 3 3 3.50 3 2 2 2 2.25 1.08 
13 4 3 3 3 3.25 2 2 2 1 1.75 1.22 
14 4 5 2 3 3.50 2 3 3 2 2.50 0.55 
15 2 2 3 3 2.50 2 3 2 2 2.25 0.76 
16 4 2 3 4 3.25 3 3 2 2 2.50 1.18 
17 3 3 3 4 3.25 2 2 2 2 2.00 1.20 
18 4 3 5 4 4.00 2 2 2 3 2.25 1.11 
19 4 4 4 4 4.00 2 2 1 2 1.75 1.19 
20 3 2 3 3 2.75 2 2 1 1 1.50 1.33 
21 3 4 3 3 3.25 2 3 2 2 2.25 0.65 
22 4 4 4 3 3.75 1 2 2 1 1.50 0.98 
23 4 3 4 4 3.75 2 2 2 2 2.00 1.33 
24 3 2 3 4 3.00 2 3 1 1 1.75 1.28 
25 2 2 4 4 3.00 2 2 2 2 2.00 0.77 
26 3 4 3 4 3.50 2 2 2 3 2.25 1.33 
27 4 4 4 5 4.25 2 2 2 4 2.50 1.27 
28 2 3 4 3 3.00 2 3 1 1 1.75 1.11 
29 2 2 2 3 2.25 2 2 3 3 2.50 1.06 
30 3 2 4 3 3.00 3 2 2 2 2.25 0.65 
31 3 4 3 3 3.25 2 2 1 3 2.00 0.89 
32 4 4 3 5 4.00 2 2 1 2 1.75 1.26 
 Table A1: Data showing SAM question scores for ‘threat’ and ‘challenge’ sub-scales and 
SA-IAT D Score. 
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Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based 
on 
Standardized 
Items 
N of 
Items 
.452 .464 4 
 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
  Q5 Q11 Q20 Q28 
Q5   .369 .215 .254 
Q11 .369   .027 -.013 
Q20 .215 .027   .215 
Q28 .254 -.013 .215   
 
Item-Total Statistics 
  
Scale 
Mean if 
Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance 
if Item 
Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Squared 
Multiple 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
Q5 9.969 2.031 .466 .227 .164 
Q11 10.125 2.177 .194 .150 .468 
Q20 9.906 2.604 .203 .075 .430 
Q28 9.938 2.706 .201 .103 .430 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Cronbach's 
Alpha Based 
on 
Standardized 
Items 
N of 
Items 
.005 -.087 4 
 
Table A2: Calculation of Cronbach’s Alpha for items assessing the ‘challenge’ sub-scale of the SAM. 
 
Table A3: Calculation of Cronbach’s Alpha for items assessing the ‘threat’ sub-scale of the SAM. 
 
Table A4: Calculation of inter-item correlation for items assessing the ‘threat’ sub-scale of the SAM. 
 
Table A5: Calculation of Cronbach’s Alpha for removal of items assessing the ‘threat’ sub-scale of the 
SAM. 
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Figure A3: Graph showing the 
correlation between average score on 
the ‘threat’ sub-scale of the SAM 
against participants’ SA-IAT scores. 
 
Figure A4: Graph showing the 
correlation between average score on 
the ‘challenge’ sub-scale of the SAM 
against participants’ SA-IAT scores. 
 
Graphs. 
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Discussion 
 
‘Challenge’ Appraisals. Figure A4 demonstrates a very slight negative 
correlation between participants’ average scores on the ‘challenge’ sub-
scale of the SAM and their SA-IAT D scores. However, the correlation is 
insignificant (r = 0.113), even at the 10% significance level (rcrit = 0.296). 
Two possible conclusions can be drawn from this observation; 
 
a) In contrast to previous studies (Peacock & Wong, 1990; Rowley et al., 
2005; Roesch & Rowley, 2005), the ‘challenge’ sub-scale of the SAM is 
unreliable as a measure of ‘challenge’-type primary appraisals. This 
conclusion is supported by Table A2, which shows the Cronbach’s α value 
calculated for these items (0.005), indicating a complete absence of 
reliability within this sub-scale of the SAM instrument!  
 
b) That the implicit appraisal processes measured by the SA-IAT are 
separate constructs from ‘challenge’ appraisals and thus no concordance 
of measures was observed. On the face of it this conclusion appears 
relatively straightforward as Lazarus (1984; 1991) and other early 
appraisal theorists (e.g. Leventhal & Scherer, 1987) appeared to define 
appraisals primarily as ‘cognitive’ events, implying that implicit processes 
play no (or a very limited) part in ‘challenge’ appraisals. However (and 
without wishing to re-open the famous Zajonc-Lazarus debate), this 
assumption “led to a series of misrepresentations of appraisal theory. In 
fact, however, Lazarus himself and essentially every other appraisal 
theorist after him has pointed out that appraisals can be and often are 
automatic and outside of awareness (Kappas, 2006). Thus it is entirely 
 376
conceivable that ‘challenge’ appraisal have an implicit underpinning (Frijda, 
1986; Smith & Kirby, 2001).  
 
However, a fundamental difference between ‘challenge’ and ‘threat’ 
appraisals is the notion of expected outcome. Whilst ‘threats’ are 
associated simply with a negative outcome, ‘challenges’ encompass the 
notion of controllability of outcome (Kausar and Powell, 1999), which is 
intricately linked with the individual’s self-evaluation of his/her coping 
strategies and coping resources (Lazarus, 1999). Thus ‘challenge’ 
appraisals occur as a consequence of the individual’s perception of their 
ability to manage the demands of the stressor (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985), 
whereas ‘threats’ centre on the potential harms and losses concerned 
with exposure to the stressor (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). The key 
difference between the two processes, therefore, is the emphasis on 
coping in ‘challenge’ appraisals. 
 
Coping encompasses the “conscious volitional efforts to regulate emotion, 
cognition, behaviour, physiology, and the environment in response to 
stressful events or circumstances” (Compas et al., 2001, pg89). Although 
this is a vast and diverse literature (see Skinner et al., 2003 for a review 
of over 300 different types of coping), a significant body of evidence 
supports the notion of a dual process system of stress responses (e.g. 
Compas, 2004; Compas et al., 2001; see also Eisenberg et al., 1997; 
Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2007. Such systems identify that; 
 
“Two fundamental processes are involved in self-regulation in response to stress. 
First, there is a set of automatic processes that are activated in response to 
stress that are related to but distinct from coping… Second, individuals initiate a 
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set of controlled, volitional responses to stress. It is these voluntary responses to 
stress that are included in the concept of coping” (Compas, 2006, pg230).  
 
Thus coping, as defined by such dual processes theories, is a purely 
cognitive process, with close similarity to (Barrett & Campos 1991), 
and/or identical features of (Bridges & Grolnick 1995) the systems that 
regulate of cognitive emotion. Indeed, there is strong evidence from 
neuroimaging studies to support a purely explicit role for coping, as 
separate coping styles are associated with specific patterns of cortical 
activity (Stiller et al., 1997; Sander et al., 2002) and a very large body of 
research identifies the PFC and Cingulate Cortex as central to coping (see 
Gianaros & O’Connor, 2011 for a review). Therefore, as ‘challenge’ 
appraisals are intricately linked with coping, and coping is a cognitive 
process, we should not expect any concordance between the ‘challenge’ 
sub-scale of the SAM and the SA-IAT, which is what I found. In effect, 
this validates the SA-IAT as an implicit measure of stressor appraisal by 
the process of discriminant technique (Nosek & Smyth, 2007; Nosek & 
Hanson, 2008). 
 
‘Threat’ Appraisals. Figure A3 demonstrates an apparent correlation 
between participants’ average scores on the ‘threat’ sub-scale of the 
SAM and their SA-IAT D score. In keeping with guidance given in Clegg 
(1990) for analysis of paired data, I conducted a statistical analysis of 
correlation using the Spearman’s Rho Correlation Coefficient for ordinal 
data. The test produces an r value of +0.331, which is indicated by the 
line of fit shown in Figure A2. This constitutes a relatively weak 
correlation between ‘threat’ score and SA-IAT D score. Indeed, as the 
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critical value for this test (p=0.05) is 0.364 the correlation must be 
viewed as insignificant. 
 
However, looking at Table A5, it becomes apparent that one of the items 
in the ‘threat’ sub-scale of the SAM (Question 11) has limited the 
reliability of the sub-scale to some degree (the low ‘corrected item-total 
correlation’ value and the increased α score if deleted support this 
conclusion). If I exclude this question from the data and re-calculate the 
statistics, the Spearman’s Rho Correlation Coefficient becomes 0.467, 
making the correlation significant at both the 5% (rcrit = 0.364) and 2% 
significance level (rcrit = 0.432). This correlation is presented in Figure 5 
below.  
 
 
 
From this adjusted data I draw the conclusion that ‘threat’ appraisals and 
SA-IAT measures demonstrate concordance in that they both measure 
the “‘fast, reactive, emotionally driven, impulsive ‘hot’ system that 
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Figure A5: Graph showing the correlation between average score on the adjusted ‘threat’ sub-
scale of the SAM against participants’ SA-IAT scores. 
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appraises and reacts to external stressor stimuli or situations relatively 
automatically and with little [immediate] conscious control” (Skinner & 
Zimmer-Gembeck, 2007). This ‘hot’ system is automatic, in that it occurs 
“outside of an individual’s awareness” (Compas, 2006, pg227) and, as such, 
utilises subcortical emotion systems, particularly the amygdala (Davis & 
Whalen, 2001). In contrast to the volitional, coping-based system, the 
implicit preconscious system is responsible for short-term adaptive 
responses, which “bring the organism into a state of readiness to act in 
accordance with the emotional urge, whether that be to flee, protest, or 
approach” (Compas et al., 1997, pg110). As ‘threat’ appraisals exist for 
this specific purpose (i.e. responding rapidly to the potential negative 
impact of a stressor) it has been suggested that they make more 
significant use of the preconscious system that forms the underlying 
foundation of dual process theories of stress response (Compas, 2004; 
Compas et al., 2001). Therefore, it follows that ‘threat’ appraisals and 
SA-IAT responses both measure the automatic, sub-cortical (and thus 
exclusively implicit) ‘hot’ appraisal system that underpins the stress 
response system (Compas, 2006) and thus, by demonstrating significant 
concordance, the adjusted ‘threat’ sub-scale of the SAM validates the 
use of the SA-IAT as a measure of implicit stressor appraisal. 
 
Conclusion of IFS Study 
 
I conclude that the SA-IAT constitutes a valid measure of the implicit 
appraisal of stressor stimuli. 
 
Limitations of IFS Study 
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Despite drawing the conclusion above, there are a number of limitations 
to this study, which detract from the validity of the conclusion as 
presented. I list these limitations as follows; 
 
1. The SA-IAT measures the relative strength of a pair of 
associations, rather than the absolute strength of single 
associations (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). The consequences of 
this limitation are significant and, as yet, not fully explored in the 
literature. For example, I cannot assume that relative associations 
between one pair of semantic categories generalise to other 
categories, even if they appear similar. For example, the SA-IAT 
pairings between ‘stressful’ and ‘relaxing’ categories would not 
necessarily yield similar results for the categories ‘worrying’ and 
‘calm’, despite the similarity of the concepts. This is because the 
very nature of the pre-attentive or ‘automatic evaluation’ process 
(Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) is based on experiential (and, 
therefore, highly subjective and contextual) associations between 
explicit stimuli per se. Without the accompanying cognitive 
appraisal process (which would identify ‘relaxing’ and ‘calm’ as being 
synonymous) I cannot assume that one person’s ‘relaxing’ is in any 
way similar to another person’s ‘calm’. The same criticism can also 
levelled at individual SA-IAT scores, where I cannot conclude that 
participants with identical SA-IAT scores evaluate individual 
concepts in the same manner. Instead, I can only deduce that the 
weighted evaluation between shared concept pairs has elicited a 
similar degree of relative association. 
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Thus the data produced by the SA-IAT must be taken as having 
ordinal value, which limits its statistical power considerably and is 
the reason for using the Spearman’s Rho statistical test in place of 
the Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient. 
 
2. Following on from the previous point, I have already set out Blanton 
and Jaccard’s (2006) argument that IATs should be considered to 
be arbitrary instruments on the grounds that they utilise relative 
scales, rather than normalised values. However, although I have 
endorsed Nosek and Sriram’s (2007) reasoning for such a 
normalisation process being inapplicable to IAT instruments, 
nevertheless I accept Blanton and Jaccard’s reservations as 
applied to this study and, therefore, given the relative nature of 
the SA-IAT scores recorded in this study, I caution readers that 
the extent to which my conclusion generalises to other research 
may be limited. 
 
3. As discussed in the validity section of this project, individual 
differences between participants have been shown to affect 
associations in some IAT studies. Although, to a degree, I have 
controlled for the effect of age (Mellott & Greenwald, 2000) and 
gender (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000), I have not taken measures to 
consider the effect of racial, ethnic or cultural differences 
(Greenwald et al., 1998) on IAT effects. Although many of these 
individual differences will be limited by choosing participants from 
the same school community, it is inevitable that individual 
differences between participants will affect the stimulus appraisal 
process to some degree. 
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4. Whilst I have justified the use of the SAM to assess implicit 
appraisal processes, nevertheless some researchers assert that 
explicit measures have a limited role in this kind of research (e.g. 
Shields & Steinke, 2003). For example, in a discussion of the 
limitations of self-reports in appraisal studies, Kappas states that;  
 
“self-report measures are bound to produce at best a mix of recalled 
reflective appraisals and reconstructed appraisals that have little to do with 
what happened in the participants’ brains during the recalled event“ (Kappas, 
2006, pg968)   
 
Accepting this conclusion would undermine the use of the SAM in 
this type of validation study. 
 
5. As discussed above, familiarity of stimulus items may well have 
confounded, or even been responsible for, the IAT effects 
observed in this study (Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). Whilst I 
have presented evidence that undermines this conclusion (e.g. 
Dasgupta et al., 2000, Ottaway et al., 2001), I have not attempted 
to control for stimulus asymmetry in this research and, therefore, 
I accept that discrepancies between the familiarity of stimulus 
items across participants may well limit the validity of my 
conclusion. 
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Permission to use GSES 
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Appendix D 
 
The Examination Self-Efficacy Scale (ESES) 
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Participant ESES Questionnaire 
 
DO NOT PUT YOUR NAME ON THIS FORM  
 
Please enter the first three letters of your mother’s maiden name and 
the last two digits of your phone number (For example John Doe 
078948465 would enter SMI65 as his mother was Jane Smith!)  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
For each of the following statements, please tick the choice that is 
closest to how true you think it is for you. The questions ask about your 
opinion. There are no right or wrong answers. 
  
1. I can always manage to solve difficult exam questions if I try hard 
enough.  
 
 
 
 
2. I do not know what I want to do at university.  
 
 
 
 
3. It is easy for me to complete examination questions accurately.  
 
 
Not at all true Hardly true Occasionally true Moderately true Mostly true Exactly true 
      
 
Not at all true Hardly true Occasionally true Moderately true Mostly true Exactly true 
      
 
Not at all true Hardly true Occasionally true Moderately true Mostly true Exactly true 
      
 
 387
4. I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected exam 
questions  
 
 
 
 
5. In an academic exam, it is important to say what you think 
 
 
 
 
6. I am not good at communicating my point in exams 
 
 
 
 
7. Having people feel sorry for me makes no difference in performing 
well in an exam.  
 
 
 
 
8. Its important that other people know I’m right.  
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all true Hardly true Occasionally true Moderately true Mostly true Exactly true 
      
 
Not at all true Hardly true Occasionally true Moderately true Mostly true Exactly true 
      
 
Not at all true Hardly true Occasionally true Moderately true Mostly true Exactly true 
      
 
Not at all true Hardly true Occasionally true Moderately true Mostly true Exactly true 
      
 
Not at all true Hardly true Occasionally true Moderately true Mostly true Exactly true 
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9. When I am confronted with a problem in an exam, I can usually 
find the solution.  
 
 
 
 
10. It doesn’t matter if you get something wrong in an exam, if you 
learn from it.  
 
 
 
 
11. I think the results can sometimes justify the means.  
 
 
 
 
12. I spend time identifying my academic goals. 
 
 
 
 
13. I think about my academic future a lot. 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all true Hardly true Occasionally true Moderately true Mostly true Exactly true 
      
 
Not at all true Hardly true Occasionally true Moderately true Mostly true Exactly true 
      
 
Not at all true Hardly true Occasionally true Moderately true Mostly true Exactly true 
      
 
Not at all true Hardly true Occasionally true Moderately true Mostly true Exactly true 
      
 
Not at all true Hardly true Occasionally true Moderately true Mostly true Exactly true 
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 14. When I need to think I spend time by myself.  
 
 
 
 
15. I feel responsible for my academic future.  
 
 
 
 
16. I feel driven by my personal values to succeed in exams.  
 
 
 
 
17. My parents are a source of academic inspiration.  
 
 
 
 
18. Little of my success in exams happens because I am lucky.  
 
 
 
 
19. My friends help me do well in exams. 
 
 
Not at all true Hardly true Occasionally true Moderately true Mostly true Exactly true 
      
 
Not at all true Hardly true Occasionally true Moderately true Mostly true Exactly true 
      
 
Not at all true Hardly true Occasionally true Moderately true Mostly true Exactly true 
      
 
Not at all true Hardly true Occasionally true Moderately true Mostly true Exactly true 
      
 
Not at all true Hardly true Occasionally true Moderately true Mostly true Exactly true 
      
 
Not at all true Hardly true Occasionally true Moderately true Mostly true Exactly true 
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20. There are few academic challenges that I cannot control if I 
focus my efforts on them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all true Hardly true Occasionally true Moderately true Mostly true Exactly true 
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Appendix E 
 
The 10-item Perceived Stress Scale (PSS10) 
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Instead, please enter the first three letters of your mother’s maiden name and the last two digits of your phone number 
(For example John Doe 078948465 would enter SMI65 as his mother was Jane Smith!)  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
The questions in this scale ask you about your feelings and thoughts during the last month. In each case, you will be asked 
to indicate by ticking how often you felt or thought a certain way. There are no right or wrong answers. Please tick one 
box only per question. 
 
1. In the last month, how often have you been upset because of something that happened unexpectedly? 
 
 
 
 
 
Perceived Stress Scale 
Never Almost Never Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
     
 
DO NOT PUT YOUR NAME ON THIS FORM  
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2. In the last month, how often have you felt that you were unable to control the important things in your life?  
 
 
 
 
3. In the last month, how often have you felt nervous and “stressed”? 
 
 
 
 
4. In the last month, how often have you felt confident about your ability to handle your personal problems?  
 
 
 
 
 
Never Almost Never Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
     
 
Never Almost Never Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
     
 
Never Almost Never Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
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5. In the last month, how often have you felt that things were going your way? 
 
 
 
 
6. In the last month, how often have you found that you could not cope with all the things that you had to do?  
 
 
 
 
7. In the last month, how often have you been able to control irritations in your life? 
 
 
 
 
 
Never Almost Never Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
     
 
Never Almost Never Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
     
 
Never Almost Never Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
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8. In the last month, how often have you felt that you were on top of things? 
 
 
 
 
9. In the last month, how often have you been angered because of things that were outside of your control? 
 
 
 
 
10. In the last month, how often have you felt difficulties were piling up so high that you could not overcome them? 
 
 
 
End of Questionnaire!  
Many thanks for participating in this study. TWF.
Never Almost Never Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
     
 
Never Almost Never Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
     
 
Never Almost Never Sometimes Fairly Often Very Often 
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Appendix F 
 
Confirmation letter from the Ethical Research Ethics Committee 
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Appendix G 
 
Participant Briefing 
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Participant Briefing 
 
 
Before any data collection began the following statement was read to the 
participant. After which the participant was asked if she had understood 
the briefing. If she agreed that she had, she was given an opportunity 
either to ask questions, to withdraw from the study, or to read and sign 
the consent form.  
 
……………………………………… 
 
Thank you very much for volunteering to participate in this study! Your 
time is greatly appreciated and will really help with research on how 
different people appraise different stimuli. 
 
The study consists of two short phases; 
 
1. An initial session in which you will be asked to complete two short 
10min questionnaires. Each question in the questionnaire has either 
five or six answer categories. Please tick just one of the 
categories, the category that you feel best reflects you. 
 
2. After you have completed the questionnaires we would like you to 
take a brief 5min word-association task on the computer. 
Instructions for completing the task are given on the computer at 
the start of the task. 
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Any data collected in this study will be kept entirely anonymous. If you 
want to you leave the room at any point and withdraw from the study feel 
free - you can do that without any repercussions at all. Also, should you 
wish it, you can withdraw your results from the study after you’ve 
finished. 
 
If you’re still happy to proceed, please read and sign the consent form 
and I’ll answer any questions you may have.  
 
Thank you very much! 
 
TWF 
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Appendix H 
 
Participant Consent Form 
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Participant Consent Form 
 
 
I hereby give my consent for my participation in this project 
 
I understand that the objective of this study is to study certain aspects 
of how examinations affect Sixth Formers. 
 
I understand that for this study I will be asked to fill out two short 
questionnaires and complete a brief computer test. I am happy to do this. 
I understand that the person responsible for this study is Mr Filtness. I 
understand that Mr. Filtness' supervisor, Professor Watts, has agreed to 
answer any inquiries that I may have concerning the procedure of this 
study. I have been informed that I may contact Professor Watts at the 
School of Sport and Education at Brunel University if I have further 
questions. Professor Watts’ email address is Mike.Watts@Brunel.ac.uk 
 
I understand that this study is not dangerous to my health. I also 
understand that all information concerning this experiment will be coded 
and that my name or other identifying information will not be used in a 
way that will link me as a subject in the experiment. I understand that I 
will be given more details about the study after I have finished 
participating in it. I understand that I may discontinue my participation in 
this study at any time I choose. 
 
Signature of participant:    Counter-signature of parent: 
Date:       Date: 
 
